In response to Rob's questions, George correctly identifies one key point in this discussion:
My own view, having tried to think through the question as carefully
and soberly as possible, is that the injustices supported by the
Democratic Party (though, of course, not by all Democrats) are so
grave, and their magnitude is so great, that it is not reasonable to
act for the sake of bringing the party into power--even assuming for
the sake of argument that the Democrats have the superior (including
more just; less unjust) positions on issues such as immigration,
welfare, taxes, social security, and foreign policy. Obviously, the
validity of my judgment here depends on the soundness of my assessments
of the gravity and scope of the injustices on both sides of the
equation.
George's emphasis on the gravity of the injustice of abortion is
incomplete because it seems to assume a 1:1 relationship between
abortion's legality and its practice, as Amy observes. But setting that issue aside, the debate over how to weigh abortion's gravity is the same discussion we had about abortion a few weeks back (i.e., whether abortion is the same as murder, some lesser form of adult homicide, or whether it constitutes a form of homicide that is so morally different from the killing of an adult that it is not even useful to use the same nomenclature for the two acts). On that score, George has, in his recent writings (and in his responses to MOJ posts) given us some indication of his view of the magnitude of injustice in permitting legal abortion: in his NRO essay from the last election, he compares it to slavery; in his responses to MOJ posts, he suggests that perhaps it is like the intentional killing of hundreds of thousands or millions of civilians with nuclear weapons. I've already given my thoughts on the comparison to slavery, which I find uncompelling. In an e-mail to me, MOJ reader Antonio Manetti objected to my reasons for distinguishing between the cases of abortion and slavery, noting:
While I agree with your point, I think it's also necessary to recognize that those who have made this comparison justify it on the basis that slavery and abortion are both offenses to human dignity. They seem to ignore the fact that slavery is wrong, not simply because it violates some abstract principle, but because of the cruelty and injustice inflicted on the person enslaved. It’s the recognition of that personhood which animated the abolitionists’ zeal. For me, and I suspect the public at large, no amount of rhetoric can bridge the ontological chasm between a person enslaved and a fetus, especially in its earliest stages of development. Those seeking a solid non-sectarian basis for placing restrictions on abortion need to look elsewhere.
This seems to come back again to our discussion of several weeks ago of the differences, notwithstanding the (in some sense) human status of the embryo, between our moral responses to the death of fully formed human beings and the death of human beings in the earliest stages of development. As Steve asked in an earlier post, for example, why isn't the failure of a large number of embryos to implant in the uterus considered a public health crisis? (My brother, a recent medical school graduate, tells me that medical students are taught that something on the order of 75% of embryos fail to implant. I have no idea whether that figure is accurate or where it comes from, but even if the true number is closer to 25%, the number of embryos lost is staggering.) I understand that embryo's failure to implant is not the result of intentional human intervention -- i.e., not killing -- but the question goes to the differences in our response to the death itself, a difference that seems relevant to the appropriate assessment of the moral status of embryos, and therefore of their intentional killing.
George wants to put the burden on Catholic Democrats to explain why they think the injustices perpetrated by this Republican government permit them to set aside their misgivings about the Democrats' position on abortion. In my view, what stands in need of greater justification is his catgorical rejection of the view that a Catholic voter might reasonably conclude that (given both the imperfect fit between abortion's legality and its
practice and the substantial uncertainty over how to weigh the
injustice of abortion) differences over abortion policy are less important than, say, Republican candidates' and strategists' not-infrequent appeals to racial hatred (a tendency that traces its roots back to Nixon's shameful "southern strategy"), this government's advocacy (and, as of yesterday, legalization) of torture, and its prosecution of an unjust war that has now claimed well over 100,000 lives. (I know that many on this site will disagree with my characterization of Republican positions or this government's policies, but I think that there is ample evidence that the characterizations are at least within the realm of reasonableness.)
Finally, a quick point of fact. George wheels out the tired meme that the Democratic party is intolerant of pro-life views:
Pro-life Democrats such as the late Robert P. Casey (for whom I had the
privilege of working as an advisor on pro-life issues) have sometimes
been subjected to ridicule and abuse by those in their Party for whom
support for abortion is a non-negotiable principle. Even small
victories for pro-life Democrats are few and far between.
In fact, in the current election cycle, Casey's pro-life son is the Democratic nominee for the Senate in Pennsylvania, and has been receiving unqualified support from the Democratic establishment. In addition, the pro-life Harry Reid is the leader of the Democrats in the Senate. I could go on, but the point seems clear.
First, thank you, Robby, for this deeply engaging and thought-provoking conversation.
I agree that understanding and defining abortion as a moral tragedy is not a distinctive of a “pro-life” position. I also agree with your richer articulation of the first point of agreement between pro-life republicans and pro-life democrats. I’m continuing to digest your description, and so will come back to this in a later post.
In this post I’d like to continue with the abortion as a moral tragedy point. I wonder if I might classify that as a preface to the discussion of more complex points of agreement. The reason that I keep coming back to this is because I think this preface might have important consequences for the tenor and the analysis of our search for points of agreement.
Regarding the tenor of the discussion: I wonder what would happen if everyone were to keep in mind that many people—both pro-choice and pro-life—agree that abortion is a moral tragedy, that it is not a good thing (and even a morally bad one), and that they wish that women contemplating abortion would choose a different option. I think it might have important consequences for how we talk with each other, and especially how we characterize each others’ arguments.
Thinking about the broader political debate (not this particular conversation, which I find very respectful and cordial), I think recognizing this point of agreement might help us to move away from a certain reductionism (e.g., democrats don’t care about unborn babies, and republicans don’t care about poor people). In and of itself, this could be a very helpful contribution that could help us to focus on the substantive points of disagreement.
OK, so say we agree on the point that abortion is a moral tragedy. This brings to mind a further substantive question: what happens, then, to the discussion about abortion as an intrinsic evil?
I’m not sure I can make this leap. But it seems that if the real heart of disagreement is not on the morality of abortion, and not on the question of whether the problem is extremely weighty, but on what we do about it, how we think about the social and legal tools for dealing with this evil—all essentially prudential political questions--then the “intrinsic evil” categorization becomes something of a non-sequetur in the conversation. The fact that abortion is an intrinsic evil does not resolve the fact that we still need to deal with prudential questions surrounding what to do about it, and on those there will be legitimate political debate.
Robby, I want to emphasize that I am genuinely struggling with these questions. I find the level of political polarization in the Church on this issue, and on other topics, deeply troubling and extremely painful, as I have written about here. As I blogged during the 2004 election here and here, I found the question of the connection between intrinsic evil and voting deeply problematic.
As many of you know, I am not shy about identifying myself as pro-life. But I am also deeply concerned about finding creative ways to heal international conflicts and solutions for international and domestic poverty—and based on deep reflection on Catholic Social Thought principles, I find myself drawn to approaches that might be closer to a democratic party line. So for me the viability of a pro-life democratic position is personally important. This is why I am very grateful for this kind of exchange. Amy