Thick and thin: A response to Dwyer and Harris

In a recent post, Jim Dwyer said that “the state’s view of what a person is must be relatively thin.  The view currently reflected in the law of western societies is not much more than that a person is a living, post-birth human being.”

In my view, this thin conception suffers from several short- and long-term problems.  In the short-term, liberalism (or, at least Jim’s form of liberalism) cedes to the state the power to decide a) who is a person entitled to dignity, respect, and protection and b) what rights will be “conferred” on persons. 

Why are unborn or partially born human beings not entitled to the state’s protection?  Why are newborns, the elderly, or those with Down’s Syndrome entitled to the state’s protection.  Under Jim’s reasoning, as I understand it, the line between protectable and nonprotectable human life is drawn by nothing more than how different categories of human beings are viewed in western society at any given time.  If the state has the authority and the power to determine personhood, then it can redraw the boundaries as it sees fit.  From this perspective, slavery in American history wasn’t “wrong” it was just a different view at a different time.  Operating from a thin conception of the person, one cannot even say that we have a more evolved understanding of personhood than our slave owning ancestors because that would suggest that those enslaved ought to be free, which in turn requires a thicker conception of the person than Jim would allow.

Additionally, if it is the state that confers rights, it can also take away or limit rights.  Jim’s thin conception of the person leaves no room for inalienable rights, which transcend the state’s power.

In the long-term, I think it is extremely naïve to think that the liberal state can continue in perpetuity built upon a thin conception of the person.  It is hard enough for cultures with a thicker conception of the person to live in faithful accordance with that thicker conception.  (A person –or society - can know what the right thing to do is but not have the will to take the right action because of the cost).  In a culture where there is no right or wrong built upon the Truth (with a capital “T”) about the human person, the temptation will prove too great, and society will redraw the line between protectable and nonprotectable human life when the existing line becomes too inconvenient.  It will also recast the “certain basic rights” conferred on all persons when the existing set of rights proves too costly. 

And, this brings me to the question:  “Catholic Legal Theory”:  What is it good for?  Dave Harris wrote, “the key element of CLT seems to be ‘the dignity of the human person and respect for the common good.’  I’m all for that, as I’ve written before.  I think it should be fairly uncontroversial that ‘community [i]s indispensable for human flourishing’ and that ‘authentic freedom’ is a good thing.’  And I’m an atheist.  Thus I’m not sure what CLT has to add….”  As Rorty points out there are many atheists and agnostics who prefer these things – freedom, equality, dignity – but they don’t (and can’t) have reasons grounded in Truth for this preference.  One of the things (and I think it is one of the most important things) that CLT proposes is a reason grounded in Truth for human dignity.  And, CLT proposes an avenue (through the natural law) for non-Christians to access these truths through reasoning apart from revelation if only the person is open to the possibility of Truth with a capital T.

In short, I think that both Dave Harris and Jim Dwyer fail to fully appreciate the truly radical nature of Catholic Church’s claim that each and every human person has a dignity worthy of respect by the state and others.  Living out consequences of this claim is always an imperfect struggle.  Denying the foundation for this claim (as Jim and Dave do), makes the struggle all but impossible.