Monday, August 7, 2006
We've blogged before about the reasons for and implications of the Catholic majority on the Supreme Court. If you're interested in the topic and have plans or just an inclination to be in the Twin Cities on November 10 (even though ice fishing season probably won't start for few weeks thereafter), you might want to check out this symposium at St. Thomas Law. Judge O'Scannlain from the Ninth Circuit will give the lunch address, and there's a good roster of other speakers.
Tom
In regard to my question on whether faithful Catholics must assent to the judgment that the Church lacks authority to ordain women, in 1997 the Catholic Theological Society of America overwhelmingly endorsed the conclusions of this paper expressing skepticism that the reasons "given by the Congregation [for the Doctrine of the Faith] justify the assertion that the definitive assent of the faithful must be given to the teaching that the Church has no authority whatsoever to confer priestly ordination on women."
Rob
Sexually explicit music is just reflective of teenage social reality, right? Wrong.
Rob
Sunday, August 6, 2006
The culture of life property has been given a boost by the trend (15 states in the last year) of expanding the right to kill home or vehicle intruders, as states eliminate the duty to retreat and the requirement of proving that the shooter feared for her own safety.
Rob
The fundamental principle of Catholic Social Teaching ― that taxes necessary to generate government revenue should be imposed in proportion to capacity to pay ― often is mistranslated into a supposed precept that a tax is properly “progressive” only when it involves an escalating sequence of rates that increase with income or whatever is the subject of the tax. Likewise, some appear to believe that the presence or absence of a graduated scale of rates is the crucial or even solitary measure of tax virtue. Neither presupposition is correct.
First, the magisterial teaching of the Church directs that taxes be imposed by governments in a manner “proportioned to the capacity of the people contributing.” Pope John XXIII, Encyclical Letter Mater et Magistra ¶ 132 (1961). Proportionality, not progressivity as re-defined to be synoymous with higher marginal rates, is the standard of tax equity. As long as taxation falls fairly upon those capable of paying, in proportion to that ability to pay, escalating rate brackets are not an essential feature. The expectations of Catholic Social Teaching are satisfied by a tax that exempts those unable to pay, that requires a reasonable contribution from the average taxpayer (considering the rate, deductions, and exemptions), and that collects a larger amount from those with higher capacity to pay (although not necessarily at an enhanced marginal rate). Graduation of rates may well be appropriate in some circumstances and to some degree and may be consistent with proportional capacity to pay, but progressive tax rates are neither necessary nor even sufficient in evaluating fair proportionality.
Second, and more importantly, the true burden of a particular tax upon demographic groups in society requires nuanced and critical analysis. A simple reference to tax rates set forth in legislative text in the abstract of political debate cannot substitute for careful study of the real consequences on real people in application in the fact-bound contexts of economic, social, and cultural activity. The empirical question is whether the tax oppresses the poor, unduly burdens the middle class, and unfairly advantages the wealthy. Expanding ratios and varying rates may be a factor, but such elements are not always conclusive and do not always unfold as expected. Whether a particular system of tax rates or particular type of tax offends principles of Catholic Social Teaching cannot be decided in the abstract.
For example, any sales or consumption tax would appear on its face to be hopelessly regressive in nature (and many may well be). But if the necessities of daily life are exempt from sales tax (such as food, clothing, and housing), if sales tax is not imposed against basic human services (medical care, etc.), and if other appropriate adjustments are made, a sales tax may become somewhat more progressive in application (as it would attach more directly to the wealthy who spend more both in real dollar terms and as a share of income on non-basic goods and services). For example, the Catholic bishops of Tennessee report that the regressive impact of the sales tax on the poor in that state is driven primarily by its application to food. My point here is not that any particular sales tax regime passes muster, or that alternatives may not be prefereable, but rather that any critique on Catholic Social Thought grounds must move beyond simply identifying the type of tax.
On the other side of the coin, what appears to be a progressive tax in theory may be much less so in reality. An income tax, even one with graduated rates, may be constructed in such a way that the wealthy are able to shield sufficient income through tax shelters that the actual tax burden is shifted down the income ladder. Again, my point here is not to offer a commentary on the progressive or regressive nature of the present federal and state income tax regimes. Nor do I mean to discount the potentially beneficial nature of certain deductions and exemptions that may greatly enhance positive incentives, additional factors beyond mere progressivity that cannot be neglected. Rather, I mean here only to insist that reciting the formula of a tax as set down on paper does not necessarily describe its application in the real world.
As another example, many people across the political spectrum have questioned the wisdom of the corporate income tax and challenged its purported progressivity. After all, only natural people pay taxes, not artificial entities such as corporations. The corporate income tax thus is merely a conduit for collecting revenue from people, specifically owners of corporate stock (many or most of whom today are workers saving for retirement) and consumers who pay higher prices for goods as the corporate tax is tacked on as part of the cost of doing business. Again, my point today is not that the corporate tax does or does not pass the proportionality test for tax equity. Rather, I mean to insist that any evaluation of its supposed progressivity must focus on who actually pays what, not on the assumption that this tax must be progressive because it is calculated by graduated rates and imposed against publicly-held corporations which are regarded as proxies for the wealthy.
In a final posting, tomorrow or the next day, I’ll introduce a further and vital dimension in evaluating tax policy. Moving beyond the equities of the formulation of a tax scheme in collecting revenue, I’ll emphasize the need to consider as well the secondary and frequently unanticipated consequences of taxation. Before we may pronounce any social justice verdict upon any tax system, we must consider as well the dynamic effects of taxation upon the economic and cultural sectors of our society.
Greg Sisk
Feminists for Life received a lot of press attention at the time of Chief Justice Roberts' nomination, due to the fact that his wife, Jane Roberts, had been a board member and provided them with pro bono legal advice. I just received a delightful announcement from FFL:
Lisa
Pro-Life Feminist Purchases Birthplace of Susan B. Anthony
The birthplace of suffragist organizer Susan B. Anthony was sold at auction today, August 5, 2006, after unsuccessful efforts to find a buyer for the historic home in Adams, Massachusetts.
Carol Crossed, a member of the Board of Directors of Feminists for Life of New York, a Chapter of Feminists for Life of America, purchased the historic house.
While Feminists for Life of America will not own the house, the pro-life feminist organization will manage and care for the birthplace. FFL’s national office will remain in the Washington, D.C., area. A panel of experts will be assembled to determine the best use for the dwelling. Others who care about Susan B. Anthony will be provided a means to contribute ideas.
Feminists for Life continues the tradition of Susan B. Anthony and other early American suffragists who fought for women and children—born and unborn.
“Susan B. Anthony challenged us to address the root causes that drive women to abortion—the same problems that face women who parent today,” said FFL President Serrin M. Foster. FFL is dedicated to systematically eliminating the reasons that drive women to abortion—lack of practical resources and support—by challenging the status quo. “Women deserve better than abortion,” she added.
Feminists for Life uniquely works with people on both sides of a contentious debate to redirect energy toward woman-centered solutions. FFL focuses primarily on college campuses to address the unmet needs of pregnant and parenting students, including housing, child care, maternity coverage and telecommuting options. FFL’s College Outreach Program inspired federal legislation currently being considered, the Elizabeth Cady Stanton Pregnancy and Parenting Act. Stanton, together with Anthony, led the first women’s movement.
FFL has also worked alongside other women’s organizations for the passage of the Violence Against Women Act, for enhanced child support enforcement and against the child exclusion provisions in welfare reform. FFL also championed Laci and Connor’s Law, as well as health care coverage for poor and pregnant women through the State Child Health Insurance Program.
My friend and colleague from UST's Philosophy Department, Mary Lemmons, offers this additional explanation of her argument against female priests, in response to Susan's question:
The gist of the argument is that due to Original Sin, men are plagued with a reluctance to respect the equality of women; and, women are plagued with a tendency to expect their men to satisfy all their needs. As a result, men tend to oppress women and women tend to take it--just as described in Genesis. Christ opposes these tendencies by teaching men that love requires self-sacrificial love even to the point of death and by teaching women that only Christ is able to satisfy the deepest longings of their heart. If Christ had been a woman, her death on the Cross would have sent men the message that self-sacrificial love is a "woman's thing." It would not have altered the tendency to regard women as a resource to be managed and controlled. (Watch John Wayne's McClintock for an illustration of this prejudice.) And if Christ had been a women, women would never have known that men could love them without subordinating them and that God is the one who meets their desires for all-consuming love. For these reasons, the Gender Mission of Christ requires Christ to be a man. I then extrapolate this argument to give support to the Roman Catholic Church's decision not to ordain women priests in its Latin rite.But since I've been warned by Lisa not to be lengthy, I can only invite those who cannot access the Godspy article or the Logos article to contemplate the mystery of an institution that sees the refusal to ordain women as a way to support sexual equality. If this seems oxymoronic, then it is because we are making various assumptions that make it so, e.g., the assumption that unless an institution refuses to distinguish between male and female gender roles, it is committed to sexual inequality. If we prescind from these assumptions, the possibility that the refusal to ordain women is prophetic becomes pressing. It may well be the case that in a few decades, the only institution that distinguishes between the work of men and women will be the Roman Catholic Church.
Saturday, August 5, 2006
I am not sure if anyone's blogged it, but C. John Sommerville's essay, earlier this summer, in the Chronicle of Higher Education, called "The Exhaustion of Secularism," is well worth a read. George Marsden's excellent book, "The Outrageous Idea of Christian Scholarship," features prominently. Here are Martin Marty's thoughts on the piece. And, here is a link to the book (available in September) from which it is taken.
Friday, August 4, 2006
As evidenced in our recent thread on Mirror of Justice about the estate tax, the invocation of “progressive” taxation as a canonical precept of Catholic Social Thought is repeated so often as to have become something of a mantra (if you’ll forgive my introduction of semantical religious syncretism). The underlying principle (“fair tax = good tax”) has considerable force to it, when genuinely understood, empirically verified, and qualified by other factors and principles. However, when cited by advocates on one side of a particular debate about taxation, the supposed progressivity standard frequently is misstated, overstated, or uncritically employed.
What looks progressive or regressive in the abstract simply may not be such in the actual application of a specific tax to real people and activities in a complex society. Progressivity is not a trump card or substitute for careful contextual analysis. When evaluating any scheme for procuring revenue to the government, progressivity (or more precisely, proportionality) is but one factor (an important factor to be sure) among many others to be considered (including economic disruption, consistency with dynamic social, cultural, and economic conditions, positive and negative incentives, reduction in liberty, etc.). And the progressivity of a tax is no answer at all to the ultimate question about the prudence of any proposed enlargement of the public fisc, which requires us to consider the wisdom of any expansion of government that may contract or suppress other beneficial social, cultural, and economic activities.
In three posts over the next few days, I will suggest and invite critique of certain general guidelines for evaluating tax policy in the light of Catholic Social Thought. In doing so, it is not my intent to focus upon or highlight any specific tax controversy or insist upon specific answers to any debate. Rather, in these three posts, I will suggest (1) baseline principles drawn from authoritative Church teaching about taxation; (2) the absolute necessity for empirical evaluation of the real-world impact of any tax upon real people before drawing conclusions about tax equity; and (3) prudential considerations involving other important principles and the secondary effects of taxation upon society.
The authoritative teachings of the Catholic Church about taxes are rather simple but often neglected in economic and political debates, even among those interested in Catholic Social Thought.
First, and most fundamentally, tax evasion is wrong. See Catechism of the Catholic Church ¶ 2436 (1994) (“It is unjust not to pay the social security contributions required by legitimate authority.”). (Michael Perry recently highlighted the “tax cheats” aspect of this subject). Beyond the dishonesty and fraud involved in evading the required report about taxation, complying with the tax laws is part of our obligation to support the common good, that is, the “social security” of the society in which we live.
Second, taxes should be collected from those who have the capacity to pay, a vital corollary of which is that those with no capacity to pay should be exempt. See Pope John XXIII, Encyclical Letter Mater et Magistra ¶ 132 (1961) (“In a system of taxation based on justice and equity it is fundamental that the burdens be proportioned to the capacity of the people contributing.”) While the pertinent papal encyclicals make no claim to infallibility, certainly we can agree upon the baseline proposition that a tax that is regressive in nature, falling more heavily upon those who can least afford it, simply cannot be squared with Catholic teaching regarding the preferential option for the poor.
Third, excessive taxation is improper, by draining the productive energies of the economy, dangerously expanding the power of the government, and unfairly confiscating the resources of those who have earned them. See Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum ¶ 47 (1891) (“The right to possess private property is derived from nature, not from man; and the State has the right to control its use in the interests of the public good alone, but by no means to absorb it altogether. The State would therefore be unjust and cruel if under the name of taxation it were to deprive the private owner of more than is fair.).
Fourth, no one may claim that any particular political proposal bears the magisterial imprimatur of the Catholic Church. Every economic proposal, of which tax policy is but one example, must be evaluated in light of prudential considerations, well-grounded in the context of the society in which it is proposed. See John Paul II, Centesimus Annus ¶ 43 (1991) (“The Church has no models to present; models that are real and truly effective can only arise within the framework of different historical situations, through the efforts of all those who responsibly confront concrete problems in all their social, economic, political and cultural aspects, as these interact with one another.”).
Fifth, in evaluating any proposal to create government program, regulate the economy, or tax economic activity, the ultimate goal is not aggrandizement of government, control of private economic activity, or forcible creation of artificial equality, but rather bringing about “a society of free work, of enterprise and of participation.” See John Paul II, Centesimus Annus ¶ 35 (1991). Politics is not the end but only a tool toward the end of a free society with opportunity for all. Liberty as well as opportunity is an essential element of this vision.
Greg Sisk
I'm not saying anything here about the "imaging Christ" rationale for the male-only priesthood. But it seems to me that there is a fallacy in C.S. Lewis's argument (quoted by Bill Castle in Rob's post) that
[t]o say that men and women are equally eligible for a certain profession is to say that for the purposes of that profession their sex is irrelevant. We are, within that context, treating both as neuters.
But surely this doesn't follow. In supporting the equal eligibility of men and women for any profession, one could be saying (in whole or in part) that women and men as different sexes would each bring distinctive contributions, perspectives, and natural or experience-based qualities. Far from "neutering" persons of the two sexes, this argument affirms the differences in qualities but adds that both sets of qualities are valuable for the position in question. It's my sense that many of those who want to see women priests think that women would offer distinctive qualities that would bring important aspects of the priesthood to the fore that tend not to be brought out with an all-male cohort. To put it in terms of recent legal theory, Lewis's criticism addresses only "sameness feminism," not "difference feminism."
Again, it can still be that some particular difference between men and women -- e.g. that Christ was male -- is dispositive for the question; that's a separate dispute. I just don't think that Lewis's "neutering" argument works.
Tom
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