(I apologize in advance.I know this is too long and involved, but this is my first post, and I’m nervous.I suppose this is the virtual equivalent of talking too fast.)
Being of almost pure Polish extraction (Poland being the birthplace of 7/8 of my great-grandparents), I grew up with a strong emotional attachment to John Paul the Great.This was deepened over the past couple of years when I actually started reading his writings.Even though I was born and raised in Germany, and the 1/8 of my blood that isn’t Polish is German, I’m still having trouble getting used to Benedict XVI.
A few weeks ago, I participated in a wonderful, interdisciplinary St. Thomas summer seminar on “The Theology of Joseph Ratzinger --- Benedict XVI.” Reading incredible books like Ratzinger’s Introduction to Christianity certainly deepened my appreciation for our new Pope. What I read and learned at this seminar raised for me two particular questions about the potential influence of Benedict on Catholic Legal Thought.
One of the things I loved most about JPII is what he has to say about women, some of which I explore in Sacrifice of Motherhood and Motherhood and the Mission .I know that much of what he wrote was written either by or in collaboration with then-Cardinal Ratzinger, and I’ve been reading some of the earlier stuff by Ratzinger on women.How could a working mom like me not love a guy who would write (from Mary: The Church at the Source):
In my opinion, the connection between the mystery of Christ and the mystery of Mary . . . is very important in our age of activism, in which the Western mentality has evolved to the extreme.For in today’s intellectual climate, only the masculine principle counts.And that means doing, achieving results, actively planning and producing the world oneself, refusing to wait for anything upon which one would thereby become dependent, relying rather, solely on one’s own abilities. It is, I believe, no coincidence, given our Western, masculine mentality, that we have increasingly separated Christ from his Mother, without grasping that Mary’s motherhood might have some significance for theology and faith.This attitude characterizes our whole approach to the Church. We treat the Church almost like some technological device that we plan and make with enormous cleverness and expenditure of energy.. . .
What we need, then, is to abandon this one-sided, Western activistic outlook, lest we degrade the Church to a product of our creation and design.The Church is not a manufactured item;she is, rather, the living seed of God that must be allowed to grow and ripen.This is why the Church needs the Marian mystery;this is why the Church herself is a Marian mystery.There can be fruitfulness in the Church only when she has this character, when she becomes holy soil for the Word.We . . .must once more become waiting, inwardly recollected people who in the depth of prayer, longing, and faith give the Word room to grow.”
My first question is whether this Marian dimension of the Church finds much (or any) expression in Catholic Social Teaching or Catholic Legal Thought.Or do we run the professional risk, as legal academics trying to change the world through our blogging, conferencing, and even old-fashioned paper articles, of “treating the Church almost like some technological device that we plan and make with enormous cleverness and expenditure of energy”?
My second question is about St. Augustine.At the UST Summer Seminar, much was made of the fact that Benedict is very “Augustinian”, in contrast to JPII, who was apparently much more Thomistic. Indeed, Benedict certainly does seem to quote Augustine a lot in the things I’ve read so far.As someone whose familiarity with Augustine consists of having read The City of God in college, and more recently reading Gary Will’s biography of Augustine, I was too timid to ask what that meant in the roomful of philosophers and theologians at the seminar.Do any of you have any thoughts about this distinction between JPII and Benedict?More importantly, though, is this distinction likely to make any practical difference with respect to any of the issues of interest to MOJ?
The movement of Amnesty International toward supporting a “right” to kill unborn children has been a matter of great distress among its consistent-life constituency. The sample form letter from AI found below details this movement toward supporting abortion.
All those who report on having called AI’s national office in the United States received curt responses stating that AI is maintaining neutrality, in contradiction to the form letters the same people receive afterwriting to AI. We have found no indication that the phone calls or the letters are being tallied in order to give decision-makers an accurate assessment of the widespread dismay their decisions can cause. The "policy consultation process" the form letter claims to be underway must be problematic when those who call are not having their names and addresses taken down, while being told emphatically that this process is nothing but a rumor.
Accordingly, Consistent Life (an international network for peace, justice and life--of which I am a board member) is organizing a drive to allow this constituency to be registered and counted (see text at link after next sentence). All those who have ever supported Amnesty International financially or in any other wayare invited to sign it at:www.petitionspot.com/petitions/consistentlife
We ask sympathizers to forward this message on to all individuals and listserves who may be interested. Links on web pages and notices in newsletters and newspapers would be much appreciated, along with any other ideas for getting the word out.
The on-line format allows a running tally to be seen by anyone at any time. Tallies will be announced to the media periodically at appropriate points.
Please send this message on to interested others! Thanks.
Richard Stith (for Consistent Life)
Here is Amnesty International’s form letter detailing its movement toward possibly endorsing a “right” to abortion:
> >From: Betsy Ross <[email protected]> > >Sent: May 5, 2006, 10:04 AM > >Subject: Re: AIUSA and Abortion > > > > > >Thank you for taking the time to share your concerns. > > > > Although AI does not currently take a position on abortion, you are > > correct that the AI movement is contemplating whether and how to address > > it. > > > > As you probably already know, our policy agenda, and the policies > > themselves, are determined by AI members through a democratic process. > > The reason that abortion is being discussed right now is that members > > throughout the movement felt that AI's work to stop violence against > > women and promote women's human rights necessitates that we consider > > whether a more comprehensive policy on sexual and reproductive rights, > > potentially encompassing certain abortion-related issues, would enable > > AI to be more effective in these areas. This was expressed in a > > decision taken last August at AI's 2005 International Council Meeting > > (ICM), which is AI's highest decision-making body. > > > > The 2005 ICM decided that AI will develop a policy statement and a > > strategy for defending and promoting sexual and reproductive rights. At > > the same time, the ICM decided that an extended consultation process > > should be undertaken to determine whether AI should adopt a policy on > > abortion and how such a policy should be formulated. We have just > > embarked on this process. The first stage involves considering whether > > and when AI should develop policies on three specific issues that have > > been identified as particularly urgent in the context of AI's campaign > > to stop violence against women: 1) access to health care for the > > management of complications arising from abortion; 2) access to abortion > > in cases of rape, sexual assault, incest or risk to a woman's life; and > > 3) the removal of criminal penalties for those who seek or provide > > abortions. > > > > All other abortion-related issues, including whether a woman's right to > > physical and mental integrity includes a right to terminate pregnancy, > > will be considered by the 2007 ICM. The extended timeframe for > > consultation and decision-making is a reflection of the recognition that > > these are profound decisions that require reflection and discussion so > > that the AI movement can move forward as one. > > > > Please let us know if you would like to receive an update on how this > > process is unfolding. We expect that we may have some new information > > in about six months or so.
Peter Steinfels wrote, a few weeks ago in the New York Times, that universities might "matter" less today precisely because they compromised or abandoned their religious character and roots. Here is Rod Dreher's post on the column (which also excerpts the column heavily, in case the Times cuts off access). Here is a quote from the Steinfels column:
Having made natural science's standards for the exploration of physical reality the model of all true knowledge, that secularism, in the author's view, has simply not been able to replace religion in giving plausible answers to questions about the natur of humanity, its distinctinveness from other life forms, the value and goals of a life or the basis of morality.
Another web site worth watching is "Godspy: Faith at the Edge." It's more a magazine than a blog. The content is varied, but almost all interesting. Here is its mission statement. (It appears that the enterprise is informed by, if not connected with, the Communion and Liberation movement.)
Rod Dreher has an interesting post on one of my favorite authors, and about why so many Christians in modern America have not warmed to her work. Here is a bit:
Here's the rub: her stories might be more palatable to modern Christians if she were just writing shock-jock horror stories. Frank Peretti sells, after all. That sort of writing goes down easier because we don't really believe it. It feels like someone else's world. It's alien enough that we're not truly threatened. But O'Connor's world is too close. And if her picture of dark grace is right, then our typical take on life fails.
Since Victorian times, Christians have tended to picture grace as cottony and covered with rubber. Grace always comforts and smoothes our furrowed brows; it always, always wipes away our tears, so sorry for them. We believe God is all-good; He's pretty much a nursery-school attendant, pink and white, who doesn't want anyone to get cut. In fact, we're surprised when people actually bump their heads. Pain seems unnatural to us. It's a no-no, and God is on our side. He never touches the stuff Himself.
In short, we believe deeply that all evil is bad. That's the heart of modern Christian faith. All evil is bad. It permeates our day-to-day lives, our work, our sermons, our struggles, our analysis of disasters. All evil is bad. And if so, then grace has to be Nice. Grace and niceness become interchangeable, and Flannery sees this as a (if not the) chief source of wickedness in the modern world. It's a lie about grace.
I have said it before (I think), but Christianity Today's blog -- it gathers links, rather than providing home-grown commentary -- is a fabulous way of keeping up with religion-and-culture events. Definitely bookmark-worthy.
Here is a site dedicated to what appears to be a wonderful exhibit and set of programs at Duquesne. It's called "A Blessing to One Another: Pope John Paul II and the Jewish People." Here is a very moving op-ed by someone who has seen the exhibit. The author writes:
I remember that my father had an abiding affection for Pope John XXIII. My daughters will remember that their father had an abiding affection for Pope John Paul II. Jews have had many enemies over the centuries, but we have had many friends as well.
Let me add one thought more, a Sunday morning reference to First Corinthians. The greatest of these was John Paul II.
The late pope lived, moved, studied, played and prayed among Jews. He grew up with Jews, he watched Jews being taken off to Nazi captivity and then cruel death, he returned the love that many Jews had for him. It is not too much to say, and perhaps to use the phrase for the first time ever without irony, that many of his best friends were Jews.
That is why a remarkable exhibit, originated, with the help of Cincinnati's Jewish community, by one Catholic institution, Xavier University, and now appearing in another Catholic institution, Duquesne University, is so moving a midsummer experience. It reminds us of the brotherhood of man, of the common faith of humanity, and of the capacity of people of different religions and outlooks to be, as the pope put it on the 50th anniversary of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising, "a blessing to one another."
Consider how extraordinary this is. Imagine telling someone in the years just after World War II -- in the chilliest days of the Cold War -- that in the coming decades the Catholic Church would select as its pope a man ordained a priest behind the Iron Curtain who would undermine the very foundations of the Soviet bloc, a cleric dripping with Polish nationalism and marinated in the traditions of the Polish church who would be a beacon of hope for Jews -- a light, you might say, among the nations. You would be dismissed as a dreamer.
And yet in a century that was not congenial to dreamers, all this became true. It is evidence, perhaps, that there is a God. We need not debate that question. There was a Karol Wojtyla.
Thanks to Michael for linking to Professor Jeff Murphy's review of William Ian Miller's "An Eye for An Eye." As I have mentioned before, I am a big fan of Murphy's work. (Check out, for example, his essay, "Law Like Love", or his recent short book, "Getting Even."). Here is an interesting bit:
Most (but not all, see note 1) philosophers who defend retributive theories of punishment -- philosophers from Kant to Michael Moore -- insist that what they call retribution -- giving wrongdoers what they deserve -- must be sharply distinguished from such unsavory or even evil practices as revenge or vengeance. They also want to insist, as a point in moral psychology, that the motivation that prompts one toward retribution is a sense of justice, something admirable, whereas the motivation that prompts one toward revenge or vengeance is vindictiveness, something quite vile -- some primitive and savage emotion that civilized people have outgrown.
Miller believes that this sharp distinction between retributive justice and revenge cannot be maintained and that those who seek to maintain it have a grossly uninformed view about the nature of revenge -- a view they would not have if they actually knew something about revenge cultures instead of starting with a variety of ignorant assumptions about such cultures:
The whole distinction [philosophical literature] mobilizes between retribution and revenge is untenable given any serious account of revenge as actually instituted in revenge cultures. Invariably, revenge is caricatured as a crazy, imbalanced response to injury. No real revenge culture would put up with this kind of revenge for a second. (p. 206)
Murphy closes his review with some thoughts on an issue that supplies (I hope!) one of the organizing (!) themes of my first-year criminal law course, i.e., the role of "harm" in punishment theory:
Why does actual harm caused play such a large role in determining the severity of punishment that a criminal receives?
The role of harm may pose an interesting challenge to those who think that civilized criminal law has moved beyond vengeance. Consider this: We punish attempted murder that fails through a fortuity (the gun jams, for example) far less severely than actual murder. Why is this? Why should they not be treated with equal severity? Is our attempted murderer less evil (less malicious in heart) than the successful killer? Surely not, since one does not become a better person simply in virtue of having a faulty gun. Is he less dangerous, less likely to pose a future threat? Probably not since he has now learned to use a better weapon. So why then do we punish him less? The best explanation may simply be that, since no harm occurred, there is no payback due -- nothing to get even for. So unless one wants a radical redesign of the criminal law so that actual harm caused plays no important role, one might want to be a bit cautious before confidently asserting that payback or getting even has no legitimate role to play here. If we had a very different and sophisticated concept of harm -- viewing harm simply as having our right not to be put at unjustified risk violated -- we could then perhaps justify treating our attempted murderer the same as our murderer, since both acted to impose the same unjustified risk. This is not our actual concept of harm, however, and I do not think that it is likely to be so in the future. I never will hate the negligent driver who (out of pure good luck) just misses killing my child nearly as much as I will hate and want to hurt the equally negligent driver who (out of pure bad luck) does kill my child. I do not think I am at all atypical in this regard, and I know that I (and many others) would want the state, through its criminal law, to ignore all pious sermons against vindictiveness and revenge and to treat the child killer much more harshly than the one who misses the child. Wanting to hurt the person who wrongfully killed my child probably should not always be my last word, but it surely has every right to be my first word. Those to whom this seems correct will thus be forced to admit that Miller has been correct in seeing some virtues for revenge even in our contemporary world. (A query: Can honor explain the desire for revenge in cases such as the death of one's child at the hands of a wrongdoer? Might not love or wounds to love sometimes provoke the desire for revenge?)
Miller does not strike me as a victim of nostalgic fantasies about the past (he always notes problems in the cultures and practices in which he also sees merit) nor does he strike me as someone who would like totally to abandon all aspects of the modern world and make a return to the past. He is fascinated by revenge and ancient revenge cultures, not because he wants us to live in one, but because he sees that they did contain some real virtues -- a kind of nobility -- that it might benefit us to recognize and recapture to some substantial degree. At the very least, he has warned us not to shrink in horror when we find remnants of these cultures in our present practices and assume that these remnants could contain nothing but evil and must immediately be discarded. In this regard, I will let the final paragraph of his book be the last word here:
Though we have progressed in some domains . . . it is not obvious to me that we are better psychologists and social scientists than humans were in centuries past. Indeed it is obvious to me that we are not. Nor are we better educators and scholars. And with no irony I can attest to my belief that when it comes to understanding human motivation -- no less than to understanding justice and what it means to get even -- we are not as smart now as we were when people worried more about their honor than about their pleasure. (p. 202)
It is my view that punishment is justifiable only for restributive reasons. That is, punishment is not justifiable -- I'm not sure it is even "punishment" -- if it is not deserved. But, since we know that part of what it means to be a "person", made in the image and likeness of God, is to be something toward which the correct attitude is "love", it seems crucial that a plausible and meaningful distinction be maintained "retribution" and revenge. For me, Murphy is very helpful in this regard.
A couple of weeks ago, Rick mentioned James Dwyer’s new book, “The Relationship Rights of Children.”He ends his post saying, “notwithstanding my very strong disagreements, I have found Dwyer’s work challenging and instructive.”I have not yet read his new book, but his previous books were challenging and instructive to me because they reveal the logical workings out of a certain strain of liberalism, which I have said elsewhere, is a new form of totalitarianism.In Dwyer’s state as in Castro’s
Cuba
, the state must limit parental freedom to raise children so that the children can be educated to conform to the state’s conception of the human person – the autonomous self-definer and self-chooser in Dwyer’s state and the economic man of communism in Castro’s state.
We see that this strain of liberalism stands for the freedom to make right choices (according to the dictates of the liberal state).The freedom of those who make wrong choices must be sacrificed at the altar of the liberal state and in the name of freedom.Parental freedom to raise children in a religious home must give way so the state can teach children to act on their sexual feelings unencumbered by the feelings of guilt and shame imposed by unforgiving religious doctrine.Dwyer’s dream for education and child-rearing is working itself out in other areas of American life.The freedom of conscience of doctors and pharmacists must, according to some, be sacrificed so those who desire contraceptives can receive them as easily as possible.The freedom of the Catholic Charities to refuse to cooperate in the contraceptive mentality is sacrificed so that some of its employees can receive contraceptives at lower cost.The list goes on – nurses and abortion, adoption by gay couples and Catholic Charities in
Boston
.The freedom of the wrongheaded is subordinated to maximize freedom and minimize inconvenience for the rightheaded.What I like about Dwyer is that he doesn’t mask the goal of his brand of liberalism.And, although I strongly disagree with his goal, I appreciate his forthrightness.
I am interested in learning Dwyer’s views about the nature of the human person – its origins, purpose, and destination.In other words, I would like Dwyer to make his anthropological assumptions explicit.As Meira Levinson says in her book, The Demands of Liberal Education, “one must know to what end(s) one is educating, and these ends cannot be given by the concept of education itself.Thus, education can function as a substantive, directed practice only if it is embedded within broader practice or set of goals.” (p.4).These goals, should, I suppose, correspond to the nature of the human person.I will email Professor Dwyer in the hope that he is willing to comment for us on who are what is being educated when we educate the human person.
My colleague, law-and-bioethics expert Carter Snead, has an op-ed in the Indianapolis Star on the recent veto by the President of the embryonic-stem-cell-research-funding bill. Check it out.
