Obama and "religious reasons": Questions for Steve and Tom

Thanks to Steve and Tom for their recent posts about the place and role of "religious reasons" in public discourse and policy.  A few thoughts:

First, Steve says -- and I agree, I think -- that "[i]t is not the role of government to tell us what God has to say about any subject."  Does this mean, though, that government ought not -- or, even, may not -- reflect, through expression and legislation, what the political community thinks God has to say about various subjects?

Next, Steve writes -- and I agree -- that we do not want government "using state power to put forth theological propositions."  What counts, though, as a "theological proposition"?  What if, as Michael P. has contended, human-rights claim rest foundationally on propositions about human beings (e.g., that they are "sacred") that are, or can reasonably be, regarded as, in the end, "theological"?

Third, Steve and Tom agree that those enacting legislation must "provide secular reasons to meet constitutional requirements."  This is, of course, descriptively accurate -- in that it re-states Lemon's "secular purpose" requirement.  Do Steve and Tom think, though, that there is more to the word "must" here?  Would it be wrong, illegitimate, unjust, etc., for those enacting legislation to not bother providing "secular reasons" for legislation?  What if those enacting legislation are skeptical (having read, say, a lot of Steve Smith's work) about the distinction between "secular" and other reasons?

Happy Fourth!