Defending Democrats for Life

Thanks to Richard for his post on the article (online here) by Kristen Day, executive director of Democrats for Life of America (DFLA).  Richard makes some important points, but I believe there is a fallacy in his post that means his argument against Kristen's piece is largely misdirected.  (Full disclosure: I am on the advisory board of the Minnesota state chapter of Democrats for Life, and I know and have consulted with Kristen Day, although not on the article in question.)

Richard's main claim is that Kristen (and DFLA generally?) improperly "confus[es] not killing babies with helping them and their mothers [through various safety-net measures]."  He then equates this with a confusion between (a) preventing killing and (b) merely saving lives or minimizing overall deaths (including deaths from natural causes) -- the latter of which, he argues, cannot be the foundation of the pro-life movement because it logically would entail the permissibility of taking one life in order to save several (he cites the castaways-in-the-boat scenario). 

But this argument is misdirected as against Kristen's article, for most of it (and most of DFLA's work) aim not just at saving lives or minimizing deaths in general, but at stopping or reducing abortions or other forms of killing/violence.  In the online PDF copy of the article linked to above, out of about 10 pages dealing with specific issues, more than 2 pages deal with the group's 95-10 proposal for reducing abortions through safety-net and other measures; about 2 pages deal with embryonic stem-cell research, almost 2 with euthanasia, almost 2 with the death penalty, and 1 with the justice of war -- all of them issues involving killing rather than the mere fact of death, to use Richard's distinction.  With respect to the content of her textual arguments, these too mostly concern preventing killing; see, e.g., pp. 3-4 (calling for legislation "providing women with the options they need to bring their pregnancy to term"); p. 11 (calling for stem-cell research " that does not harm or destroy human life"); p. 15 (pointing to the number of Iraqis and Americans "killed as a result of the [Iraq] war"); p. 12 (quoting the Catholic bishops' call, with respect to the death penalty, "'to abandon the illusion that we can protect life by taking life'").  Notice how the last quote runs precisely opposite to Richard's claim that Kristen's/DFLA's logic entails that one life could be taken to save several; such a consequentialist argument is more prevalent among death-penalty supporters than among pro-life Democrats. 

Admittedly, many of Kristen's and DFLA's proposals emphasize the importance of reducing abortion through a strengthened safety net -- attacking the economic pressures and vulnerabilities that make abortion seem necessary to many women -- rather than only through criminalization (though DFLA has worked to pass regulations against abortion, including in its 95-10 initiative, and has supported abortion bans like this one).  But trying to stop abortion through the safety net is still (no less than criminalization) trying to stop killing.  It's not the same as just trying to help people, or to minimize overall deaths in some purely consequentialist fashion.

Now, of course one can argue that we must respond to killing with criminal sanctions before all else, or that strengthening the safety net is misguided because it will encourage undesirable behavior, etc.  But Richard doesn't raise either of those challenges -- and if one accepts that a strengthened safety net would be effective in reducing abortions (as European experiences suggest), then one can rightly be quite concerned about the relative willingness of Republicans to cut the safety net, and conclude that this is one significant factor weighing in favor of Democratic policies.  (That's to say nothing of the pragmatic argument that the safety-net emphasis, as an incrementalist strategy, may be more effective than prompt criminalization in moving Americans ultimately toward an attitude of striving against abortion.)

It's also true that Kristen's article calls at various points for "a true culture of life that extends beyond abortion."  But that refers largely -- not exclusively, but largely -- to the other issues of killing that I listed above.  Of course, one can argue that the death penalty and war, although forms of killing, are not as fundamental in terms of life issues as is abortion because of the distinction between targeting innocent and non-innocent persons.  But again, since Richard does not make that criticism, for these purposes we are assuming that the death penalty and war are fundamental life issues -- and one can certainly conclude that there are significant differences between Republicans and Democrats on both of them. 

Admittedly, at various points in her article Kristen's call for a "broader culture of life" extends beyond preventing killing/violence to preventing deaths in general:  she mentions, for example, deaths from poverty and AIDS.  I would reemphasize that these arguments accompany the numerous arguments in Kristen's piece for preventing or reducing various forms of violence and killing -- and I would submit that in this overall context, it is not only perfectly understandable, but also morally imperative, to include a strong call for preventing such "non-killing" deaths.  It is morally right because deaths from epidemic or desperate poverty or severe environmental degradation, even if not morally the same as deaths from violence, reflect tremendous human suffering, stunting, and lost hopes and opportunities -- and moreover, the kind of suffering that is usually so pervasive and hopeless as not to be spiritually rewarding in any way.  We are certainly called, by explicit scripture and by moral reason, to try to minimize such things (which themselves are often a proximate consequence of civil wars, gang conflicts, or other violence).  We are also called, by God-given common sense, to recognize how various policy positions ultimately, even if indirectly, affect the extent to which such horrors occur.

Lest I be misunderstood, let me make a few things clear:  I know that Richard is committed to the full range of important moral issues, and I respect him both for that and for his emphasis on the foundational status of preventing violence and killing.  I also concede that one can reasonably disagree with DFLA's particular emphases, or with its judgment that pro-life goals can be pursued  within the Democratic Party (although I think that they can and that it's important for some people to do so).  I do claim that (1) DFLA's position makes sense and (2) the argument that Kristen Day and DFLA are embracing a principle of simply "helping people" is fallacious.

Tom