Yet another reply to Michael . . .

I wrote, a few posts ago, that:

I am perfectly happy to agree that responding legislatively to abortion in a just way would -- if the Supreme Court would permit such a response -- involve "prudential judgments," about which reasonable people (including faithful Catholics) could disagree.  (I'd be surprised if anyone denied this.) 

My friend Michael insists, though, that some do deny this, and as evidence cites Bishop Myers's observation:

One should not permit unjust killing anymore than one should permit slave-holding, racist actions or other grave injustices. . . .  Obviously, recognizing the grave injustice of slavery requires one to ensure that no one suffers such degradation.  Similarly, recognizing that abortion is unjust killing requires one--in love and justice--to work to overcome the injustice.

In Michael's view, "Archbishop Myers's position seems to be that the answer [to the question whether recognizing that abortion is unjust killing requires one to support the criminalization of early abortions] is yes and that there is no legitimate diversity of prudential judgments about the matter."

I guess I don't see Bishop Myers denying the fact that responding wisely in law to abortion requires prudential judgments.  Yes, as Bishops Myers says, we ought -- as a matter of strict justice -- to prohibit direct abortion, without regard to the gestational age of the fetus, fetal deformity, or any other factor.  Bishop Myers is right, it seems to me, that to "allow others to continue directly to kill the innocent is a grave scandal[.]"  Still, as Michael, I, and (I'm sure) Bishops Myers agree, designing just, reasonable, and prudent abortion laws would be -- if only the Court would let us! -- a difficult business.