More on Boston College, Honorary Degrees, and Catholic Character of the University

Were I a member of the faculty at Boston College, I would applaud Professors Himes and Hollenbach for voicing an objection to an award of an honorary degree by Boston College at its commencement to a public official whose positions on public policy they sincerely believe to contradict fundamental Catholic values. And then, having welcomed the initiation of a conversation, I would argue on the merits that the proposed university recognition of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice nonetheless was appropriate.

Let me explain: First, I would appreciate the reminder by members of the faculty that a Catholic institution ought to behave in a manner consistent with its Catholic character. Second, I would encourage our educational community to regularly engage in dialogue about the Catholic mission of the institution. And, third, if I were a participant in that particular debate, I would submit that Secretary Rice’s support of the use of force in Iraq to remove a dangerous regime with a horrific human rights record constituted a legitimate and reasonable, even if mistaken, exercise of prudential judgment. In her message posted recently, my colleague Elizabeth Brown passionately and appropriately insists that the merits of this question—the propriety of extending an honor at a Catholic institution to Secretary Rice—not be side-stepped. I agree with my colleague on the importance of such an examination, although I do not arrive at the same answer. But even should my view of the merits of the honor not prevail, I still would regard the precedent of an affirmative institutional commitment to uphold Catholic values as an important victory.

In other words, whether at Boston College, at my own institution (the University of St. Thomas in Minnesota), or at another Catholic institution of higher education, I regard the sincere and persistent asking of mission-focused questions—e.g., how should this Catholic college or university uphold Catholic values and how should the distinct Catholic identity of this institution be invigorated—as being of greater importance than how the questions are answered on each occasion. Moreover, I expect the discussion that follows the asking of such questions to be enlightening to us all and to manifest diversity within the Catholic community about how basic and sometimes abstract principles of Catholic social teaching are to be applied to particular and often complex situations to arrive at an acceptable range of answers.

As we pursue this vital exploration of Catholic identity, I expect that we often will arrive at an institutional approach that respects faithful difference, humbly concluding that reasonable people of good faith are not of a single mind as to the implications of Catholic teaching. Whether we are considering issues of academic direction or matters of public controversy, we will find that analysis of many, even most, questions involves prudential judgment that must be guided by fundamental moral principles, but upon which persons of good will and common faith reasonably may differ. On a few occasions, despite sincere disagreement, we may be faced with an unavoidable choice, where tolerant non-action is not possible or is not advisable, thus requiring us simply to do the best we can, if imperfectly, to affirm Catholic character. And on still other occasions, we will be obliged to uphold fundamental Church teachings that cannot be compromised. For example, in contrast with the realm of prudential policy judgments that describes most issues of social justice, certain forms of societal behavior that implicate public policy are so manifestly and grievously wrong as to be categorically prohibited. In these instances of intrinsic evil—slavery, genocide, racist oppression, torture, and abortion—moral principle and policy effectively merge, sharply circumscribing prudential judgment. Because there is no room for equivocation, qualification, or compromise of elemental principles, the Catholic institution cannot subordinate these principles when making institutional decisions. In sum, while the project of affirming and refreshing Catholic character for the institution is a long-term and difficult task, and will not always achieve consensus, I again applaud Professors Himes and Hollenbach, as well as my colleague, Elizabeth Brown, in calling for concerted and faithful action by a Catholic university to adhere to and manifest Catholic teaching in its public disposition.

As we struggle with the question of Catholic character, we of course must also strive for consistency, both as a matter of faithfulness to the principles affirmed and as a matter of fair and equal treatment. This is the question which our former St. Thomas student Patrick Shrake honorably raised in his message posted on the Mirror of Justice. Pat’s posing of the pertinent inquiry about consistency in application of Catholic teaching when considering honors granted to speakers by a Catholic institution was not a diversion from the merits of a particular case. Rather, it was an appropriate supplementation to that question. Both sets of questions—the particular question pursued in Elizabeth Brown’s message about whether Secretary Rice’s position is in fundamental conflict with Catholic teaching and the consistency query offered by Pat Shrake—are well-presented.

Importantly, and in fairness, Pat Shrake’s introduction of a related but quite pertinent question should not be viewed as an “attack [on] the integrity” of anyone. Nor was Pat’s listing of pro-choice individuals who have spoken at Boston College commencements, apparently without objection, rendered unreliable because he identified his source as the Cardinal Newman Society’s report. If the list of speakers is accurate, which no one has contested, then the source of that accurate information does not detract from its accuracy. Facts, as John Adams said two centuries ago, are stubborn things.

Both my colleague Elizabeth Brown and our former student Pat Shrake wish to pursue legitimate and related if separable issues that deserve deliberative consideration on the Mirror of Justice and elsewhere in our diverse Catholic community. Elizabeth sincerely and plausibly wishes to press the argument that the Bush administration’s position on the war in Iraq is inconsistent with Catholic teaching and therefore that a Catholic college or university would betray its Catholic character by honoring a member of that administration. Pat suggests that any policy or approach that disqualifies some or another person from a university honor because of a fundamental conflict with Catholic values ought to be applied consistently—with special attention to the Church’s clear and emphatic teachings about such intrinsic evils as abortion. One could agree with both points (or not). That Elizabeth is more interested in the former question than the latter does not make Pat’s question any the less relevant. Pat admittedly (and forthrightly) does not address Elizabeth’s area of interest. But then neither does Elizabeth’s summation on the academic credentials of certain faculty members provide any answer to Pat’s query about principled consistency.

In the end, that little section of the public square that we call the Mirror of Justice is quite big enough to include both lines of inquiry, and both sets of questions are fairly explored here. We’re fortunate to have both Elizabeth and Pat wading into the fray about these issues.

Greg Sisk