a few thoughts on intention and the moral object

I'll begin by noting that I am not a philospher and so my comments should be taken with that in mind.

I agree with Richard Stith that the debate on condoms and AIDS is largely about the proper way to think about intention and the moral object. (This is true at least for those who accept the teaching of Humanae Vitae; for those who do not accept the Church's teaching in Humanae Vitae the issue of condoms and AIDS would not be that difficult.) Another example that raises this issue is the case of craniotomy. Some who defend the morality of craniotomy (John Finnis, for example) do so by saying that the surgeon does not intend to kill the fetus. The surgeon is simply rearranging the skull in order to save the life of the mother. Critics of this position (Kevin Flannery, Steven Long, and Basil Cole, for example) claim that this is too abstract and that it is necessary to take account, in the words of Long, of the "nature or physical species of the act...in determining the moral species." Under this view, the physical character of what is done (in the craniotomy case that would be producing the crushed skull of an innocent person) must be considered. That is why May and others who reject the use of condoms to attempt to prevent AIDS take account of the physical charcteristics of the act in question (using condoms) and do not simply focus on what might better be viewed as the motive of the actor (to prevent disease, to save the life of the mother in the craniotomy case, or to relieve the pain of the terminally ill for doctors who are trying to assist in a suicide). If the moral object of the act is wrong (and as Michael notes that is how May and others view the use of condoms by married couples), then the doctrine of double effect is of no help. One may not do evil that good may come of it, and this is not what the doctrine of double effect allows.

Richard