Defending the Question

I agree with much of what Mark says.  And I'm certainly not trying to push that old anti-Catholic bias.  On the other hand, it does seem to me that Aquinas is often at his weakest when he is trying to defend some of the indefensible things (e.g., the execution of heretics) forced on him by the authorities of his day.

But just to defend the question, it seems to me that Randy Barnett (channelling Sanford Levinson) makes a similar move to the one I am raising (but not necessarily endorsing) in the context of constitutional theory when he says that one test of a good constitutional theory is whether it forces the theorist to embrace unhappy endings, i.e., conclusions that he does not really favor as a personal matter.  If Catholic theorists are not willing to accept the possibility of (certain) unhappy endings, then are we failing Barnett's test? 

UPDATE:  Reading Mark's post, it seems to me that he leaves room for Catholic scholars to (1) work out uncertainties left by authoritative teachings and (2) apply those teachings in concreate situations.  But, as I read him, he forecloses the possibility that Catholic scholars can (3) really call into question teachings at the level of basic principles.  So any argument that contradicted, say, the categorical sinfulness of homosexual acts or of abortion (both of which I assume to exist at the level of basic authoritative principle) would be ruled out in advance.  I'm not denigrating (1) and (2), which I agree leave a lot of room for scholars to work (though I question what the relevance of that scholarship would be to people not already convinced of the correctness of the first principles at work in (1) and (2)).  But what I'm really asking about is scholarship that operates on the level of generality and abstraction of (3).  And I think a great deal of Catholic legal theory does purport to operate at that level.  My question is, if the conclusions reached with respect to questions operating at the level of generality of category (3) are provided in advance by an external authority, does that undermine in some way the credibility of Catholic legal theory that addresses those questions?  An affirmative answer does not mean that Catholic legal theorists are somehow inferior, but it does perhaps call into question the relevance of our discussions of these issues for a wider audience. 

The fact that many non-Catholics kow-tow to their own "authorities" (something that I agree with Mark is surely the case) does not reduce my interest in the question I'm asking.  This is a question that could be asked in any number of contexts (the Cuban academy comes to mind).  I'm asking it with respect to Catholics because, well, I'm Catholic and this is a blog devoted to Catholic legal theory.  But I have no doubt that a great many scholars with any number of ideogical and religious commitments argue towards, what are for them, preordained conclusions.  In one respect, though, Catholics are in a different position: Catholic legal theory self-consciously embraces authority in a way that is different from, say, a liberal academic who, as an individual matter, refuses to question the correctness of Roe v. Wade.

Finally, I want to emphasize that this is a sincere question.  I'm really not sure what I think about this.  Obviously, I have my own biases that push against authority.  That is in part due to my personality, but it is also probably due in part to the fact that I've grown up in a society that places a great deal of value on intellectual autonomy.  Nevertheless, my mind remains open, and I'm just hoping to spark a discussion from which I can learn and, hopefully, deepen my thinking on this issue with the help of the diverse and smart group of scholars who write for MOJ.