population stability: more thoughts

I appreciate Eduardo's further thoughts on this issue. There are at least 2 questions here. The first relates to population. I am not an expert on this by any means but I have read enough on this to agree with the writings of folks like the late Julian Simon. Simon demonstrated that most of what we "know" about population issues is wrong. A lot of his writings are available at this website.  His basic idea, backed by mounds of evidence, was that people are "the ultimate resource," and that as he put it in the title of one article on that website, "more people, greater wealth, more resources, healthier environment." This is inconsistent with what we all "know" about these issues but Simon documents the points extensively. According to Simon, "human beings are not just more mouths to feed, but are productive and inventive minds that help find creative solutions to man's problems, thus leaving us better off over the long run." The West is committing cultural suicide because many of us lack this faith and appreciation for the great gift of human life. We see human life as a threat because we have lost this faith and optimism in the value of each and every human person. So, I guess I'd reject the premise that seeking population stability is a good. Usually when people seek this goal, they (and I'm not suggesting that Eduardo falls into this camp) resort to coercive measures that violate basic human rights. The United Nations and China have been at this for quite some time.      

The second question is about permissible means, and this, as I understand it, is Eduardo's question. If we thought that population stability were a good, what means would we be entitled to use to pursue this objective. I haven't checked the Grisez reference but I suspect that he is upholding the point made by John Paul the Great in Veritatis Splendor that "it is not licit to do evil that good may come of it." The question, for Grisez and the late Holy Father, then would be about whether the morality of the means chosen. This moral question doesn't turn conclusively on "the weighing of the goods and evils foreseeable as the consequence of an action." (V.S. 77.) Grisez and Pope John Paul defend the view that there are certain acts that are objectively immoral. They would put contraception in this category, and, under this view, contraception is a means that may not be chosen, even to achieve a good (and again I think it is highly debatable that overall population stability would fall into this category).          

Richard