CST at Yale, Week 5

This week, we had a lively discussion about religious freedom and doctrinal development.  In light of the discussion, and our differing takes on the issue, I invited one of my students, Tom White (who also happens to be a regular MOJ reader), to write up a post summarizing the discussion and giving his take on the questions it raised.  Here's his post:

In Monday's installment of Catholic Social Teaching, we discussed Church teaching on religious freedom and its doctrinal development. For example, can Dignitatis Humanae's bold declaration that "the right to relgious freedom has its foundation in the very dignity of the human person as this dignity is known through the revealed word of God and by reason itself" be reconciled with Pius IX's condemnation as error the notion "in some Catholic countries, that persons coming to reside therein shall enjoy the public exercise of their own peculiar worship. (78)"

Of particular interest of the class was Pope Leo XIII's statement in the Longinqua that acknowledged the growth of American Catholicism, but opined "she would bring forth more abundant fruits if, in addition to liberty, she enjoyed the favor of the laws and the patronage of the public authority."

What kind of accomodation to the American Church does Leo envision here? Is it in tension with Dignitatis Humanae? If so, does it undermine the Church's claim to infallibility in this area?

One theory might be that any attempt to reconcile the Church's teachings is too much of a stretch and that we should simply embrace the change in this area.

My own view, however, is that positions are not inconsistent. While some degree of establishment (i.e., "favor of the laws") has always been held out as the ideal, DH stands for the simple proposition that freedom of conscience is absolutely inviolable regardless of one's religion. To some extent this reading would adopt the Establishment-Free Exericse distinction, so long as establishment is not seen as erecting a "wall" between church and state, and free exercise is subject to the reasonable restraints of public order.

It seems to me that (as Pius's condemnation shows) the "public order" proviso on free exercise is where the most significant change has occurred. In America we treat the use of peyote as proscribable because it is an offense against public order; in Pius's day, non-Catholic public worship was seen as such a threat. I would be curious to know what type of worship he had in mind when he condemned the absolute right to free exercise in public as "error."

But in any event, to the extent that there has been a change in Church teaching in these areas, I think it is less radical than most suppose.