Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Wednesday, November 2, 2005

CATHOLIC LAW SCHOOLS

[The following article is from the October 28th issue of the National Catholic Reporter.  I've reprinted the whole article below, because a link to the article won't do a nonsubscriber any good.  Among those quoted in the article:  MOJers Greg Kalscheur, Mark Sargent, and Susan Stabile.]

Catholicism and teaching law:
Catholic law schools grapple with faith's influence

By PATRICIA LEFEVERE

Increasingly law schools that call themselves Catholic are raising questions about the nature of their Catholic identity. Is it even desirable to have such an identity? Does the linking of Catholic and lawyer feel uncomfortable -- except when uttered by the local bishop from the cathedral pulpit at the annual Red Mass? And in what way -- if at all -- are graduates of Catholic law schools different from those who earned their degree from a state or public university?

Talk about what does and what should distinguish a Catholic law school from a secular institution fill law professors’ blogs and are the stuff of law reviews, conferences and classroom discussions at many of the 27 law schools that call themselves Catholic.

These institutions, located in 17 states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, are currently educating some 22,000 future lawyers -- the majority of them Catholic. Eight of the schools have been around over a century. The 27 schools employ more than 1,100 full-time faculty and some 1,500 adjuncts.

From such an infrastructure, one might expect a uniquely Catholic perspective on the law, a Catholic contribution to legal theory or an overriding Catholic moral voice on issues involving property, contracts, securities regulation or criminal procedure.

“Yes, it should be there,” said Thomas Shaffer, professor emeritus and former dean of Notre Dame Law School. “Catholicism has always copied too much in trying to come to terms with the secular university,” he said. “Some law schools may be still doing that.”

A legal ethicist, Shaffer has been looking at Catholic legal education and the making of the Christian lawyer for some 30 years. The question of Catholicism in Catholic law schools is undergoing a kind of revival, he said. The humanistic approach, dominant for four decades, now faces a challenge from religiously affiliated law schools, be they Catholic, Protestant or Jewish, he said.

Shaffer said he thinks the movement has less to do with the Vatican’s 1990 Ex Corde Ecclesiae -- requiring theologians in Catholic institutions to be in conformity with the church’s magisterium -- than it does with the keen interest Catholic law schools have always had in ethics. These schools are now expressing this concern through exploring Catholic social teaching, he said.

The shift toward distinctly Catholic law schools has “turned the corner” at Notre Dame in South Bend, Ind., Boston College and New York’s Fordham University, said Shaffer. “I scratch my head about Georgetown. It’s so urban and so large.”

Last semester Jesuit Fr. Gregory Kalscheur coordinated three evening conversations on the Jesuit, Catholic identity and mission of Boston College Law School, where Kalscheur, a lawyer, is assistant professor. About 30 faculty attended one or more of the series, which continued this past summer.

In addition, Kalscheur has conducted three retreats for 45 law students, introducing them to discernment skills, based on a model of St. Ignatius Loyola, founder of the Jesuits. A dozen faculty members took part in the retreats.

Many contemporary academics shy away from any admission of religion into the conversation, afraid it will make the religious voice “the predominant, privileged or the excluding voice,” he said. “My own fear is that prolonged failure to confront that fear explicitly and directly has helped to marginalize and exclude the religious voice.”

To make sure the voice of the Catholic tradition itself is not devalued, ignored or made invisible out of concern for offending those of other religious traditions or no religious tradition remains a challenge for law schools that seek to be “authentically Jesuit,” the priest said. “We have to be more explicit about the faith dimensions of our social justice mission. We have to move forward in ways that will generate increased trust, not anxiety or suspicion.”

Interfaith law

At Fordham Law School, hundreds of the 1,546 students are Jewish, Buddhist, Muslim, Hindu and of no faith at all. The same diversity applies to the nearly 300 full-time and adjunct faculty. -- Patricia Lefevere Russell Pearce Russell Pearce, an observant Jew, teaches at Fordham and codirects its Stein Center for Law and Ethics. He said he supports the school’s Catholic identity and its mission of educating the whole person “in the service of others.”

Fordham’s identity is “inclusive, respectful and supportive of all,” Pearce said. The fact that “a Catholic law school has placed a Jew in a position of leadership sends a signal that it’s living up to its mission.

“Jesuit universities are saying, ‘Catholics can learn from non-Catholics,’ ” said Pearce.

Throughout its 100-year history, Fordham Law School has been concerned with “access,” said Dean William Treanor. At first it was access to the bar for Irish Catholics, then it was access to a legal education for Jews.

Monthly dialogues on what it might mean to be a Catholic law school have drawn a third of the faculty in recent years -- the majority of them non-Catholic. Many have traveled to Fordham’s main campus in the Bronx to visit with Jesuits in their residence.

“This school was founded by those who saw diversity and dialogue as virtues -- as something to be cherished,” said Treanor. In the classroom that translates as “inclusion and dialogue,” not “imposition or indoctrination,” he said.

Fordham boasts the largest pro bono and community service program among the dozen New York City-area law schools. Last year 500 students volunteered more than 75,000 hours, serving the poor and those of limited means in such areas as domestic violence, unemployment, housing, family court mediation, immigration, police misconduct, environment and death penalty advocacy, and community service.

At Villanova Law School in Philadelphia, Dean Mark Sarget doubted that law schools have turned the corner in the direction of their Catholic identity. In the latest U.S. News & World Report ranking of the 100 best law schools, Villanova tied with the University of San Diego, a Jesuit law school, for 63rd spot, up from 76th in 2004. The 13 Jesuit schools account for 57 percent of students in U.S. Catholic law schools.

These ratings are “the life and death of law schools,” said Sarget. Of schools outranking Villanova in the current tally, Georgetown was at 14th, Notre Dame 24th, Boston College and Fordham among five schools rated 27th and Loyola in Los Angeles at 58th, “only Notre Dame has a Catholic identity,” he said. The others he found had “little or very little Catholic identity.”

“Every law school will say, ‘We’re Catholic, because we teach jurisprudence and ethics and we do clinic,’ ” Sarget told NCR. But all law schools require ethics courses and “they all have clinics,” he said.

Clinics allow student lawyers the chance to practice law with attorneys and professors and work with judges. Many involve outreach to the poor, immigrants and victims of discrimination. Villanova’s clinical law practice “is organized expressly for mission,” Sarget said. It is modeled after the school’s namesake, St. Thomas of Villanova, who said: “Anticipate the needs of those who are ashamed to beg, for to make them ask for help is to make them buy it.”

Sarget pointed to “a movement among Catholic law professors who are very self-consciously asking how our church tradition and teaching can influence Catholic legal theory.” The movement is most alive on the blog mirrorofjustice.com, where 25 or so academics at Catholic law schools meet to address issues that grew out of a conference on Catholic social teaching and the law, organized by Sarget at Villanova in 2003. Mass is held in St. Thomas More Chapel at the University of St. Thomas School of Law in Minneapolis.

Sarget said that a genuinely Catholic law school would have no qualms about the use of Catholic symbols in its buildings or publications. It would include prayer at law school functions, the observance of Christian holidays and a liturgical life.

The dean was quick to stress that Villanova’s law faculty is “very cooperative” even though many find the identity issue difficult. Traditionally law schools have had a much more secular faculty than other schools or departments of a Catholic university.

Indeed a chief reason why many Catholic law schools differ little from their secular counterparts is because committed Catholics are a minority on their staff. Many full-time faculty members are only nominally Catholic, of different faiths, or irreligious, Sarget said. “Some are even hostile to Catholicism, either as a matter of principle or of prejudice.”

Non-Catholic teachers at schools like Villanova, Notre Dame and the 13 Jesuit law faculties need not fear losing their jobs. These institutions will still employ the best constitutional law candidate who applies, regardless of his or her faith background, and will want to retain a diverse faculty, noted four deans interviewed by NCR. However, these schools are making candidates for jobs well aware of the school’s Catholic identity and asking new hires to respect their mission and to try to see how they can contribute to it.

Still, there is no shortcut to Catholic identity without a law school retaining “a critical mass of Catholics” both among its scholars and students, Sarget argued. This does not mean “affirmative action for Catholics,” but rather “hiring toward mission,” he said.

New law schools

The two newest Catholic law schools -- the University of St. Thomas in Minneapolis and Ave Marie in Ann Arbor, Mich. -- say that their students, even non-Catholic ones, enroll because of the faith-based identity that both schools seek to nurture.

The first thing one notices upon entering the spacious four-story atrium of the St. Thomas School of Law in downtown Minneapolis is a statue of Thomas More and a chapel where Mass is said daily. Close by is a meditation room.

Not an ordinary office block or learning center, the $36 million edifice, which opened in 2003, announces its mission: “Integrating faith and reason in the search for truth through a focus on morality and social justice.”

“You may think this is dean puffery, but there are lots of Catholic law schools in the U.S. Yet none of them is doing the variety of things to establish their Catholic identity that our law school is doing,” said St. Thomas’ law dean, Tom Mengler.

The model is that of servant-leadership, he said. “We’re integrating faith and reason throughout the curriculum. The school is committed to social justice and to service.”

According to Mengler, of the 200 lawyers graduated in 2004 and 2005, 14 to 15 percent of them are engaged in some form of public interest law. The national average is about 3 percent, he said.

Many of them found their vocation to public service law by fulfilling the 50-hour requirement for community service over their three years in law school. Others may have discovered it in jurisprudence courses where students get exposed to the Catholic intellectual tradition or at numerous colloquia where faculty staff and students learn about Catholic social teaching and its implications for law.

The school boasts of its Mentor Externship -- a program that requires every student to be paired with a working attorney or judge in the community. Some 450 lawyers take part, including 48 judges. Not only do would-be lawyers accompany a professional to a deposition, an appellate argument or client meeting, they also combine experiential learning with a focus on ethics and professionalism, said Lisa Montpetit Brabbit, who directs the mentor program.

The idea of legal training at a Catholic law school is not to get rich, but to serve God and the neediest among us, said St. Thomas law professor Patrick Shiltz, who believes that lesson has yet to be taught in most law schools that call themselves Catholic.

At St. Thomas the bulk of students and faculty have come because of the mission, said Virgil Wiebe, associate professor of law. “We’re highly mission-focused. If you want to pick a fight here, it’s about ‘You’re not living up to the mission.’ ”

Wiebe, a Mennonite, said, “I knew when I came to St. Thomas I’d not have to change my faith, hide it or apologize about it.” The faculty, while racially, ethnically and religiously diverse, supports the mission, he said.

Wiebe codirects the Interprofessional Center for Counseling and Legal Services, a clinical education program in which law students work in tandem with students from St. Thomas’ School of Social Work and Graduate School of Professional Psychology. Working with those from other disciplines helps law students to consider not only the legal obstacles of their clients, but also the emotional, spiritual and economic challenges they face, Wiebe said.

The standard St. Thomas has set for itself at times “gets thrown back in our face,” he said. “We get it coming and going. We’re not doctrinaire enough or we’re too religious.”

Mengler objected to being “pigeonholed” as a conservative law school. “We’ve a faculty of 25 -- conservatives and liberals, people of all perspectives. All of us are dedicated to the mission of formation, social justice and servant leadership.”

Comfortable conservative

Bernard Dobranski At Ave Maria School of Law, dean and president Bernard Dobranski is not uncomfortable being labeled “conservative.” He makes no apologies for the perspective of his institution, which was founded by Domino’s Pizza mogul Tom Monaghan in 1999: “We’re Roman Catholic and very insistent about what we’re doing here. You don’t come to Ave Maria unless you want to see the whole range of how Catholic moral and intellectual tradition affects the law.”

Critics who speak of Ave Maria’s “narrowness” and say that “all we do is defend the magisterium and talk about natural law haven’t been here,” Dobranski said. “We try to bring in something from our Catholic intellectual tradition, where it’s appropriate and relevant.”

In ethics, jurisprudence, even in commercial law classes, professors have been able to integrate the teachings of John Paul II, Aquinas and Augustine, he said. “We thought it would be impossible in procedure courses.” Then along came an Australian visitor, who was able to elicit Catholic teaching on subsidiarity when looking at the exercise of jurisdiction in federal and state courts.

Dobranski cited “a wealth of Jewish and Protestant scholarship” that has been summoned when professors look at the nature of individual and communal property rights.

Discussions about the use of law to enforce moral standards are ongoing -- particularly after the recent Supreme Court ruling striking down Texas’ sodomy laws. Dobranski held that the legal debates of the late 1950s and early 1960s that led to the decriminalization of prostitution and homosexuality were not guided by morality.

Dobranski said the school’s graduates pass the bar at the rate of 92 percent -- the highest among six law schools in Michigan. In each of the first two graduating classes, 20 percent of students got jobs as clerks in trial and appellate courts.

While Dobranski has yet to survey students, he said, “Lots leave here thinking they can overturn Roe v. Wade.”

The student body is more than 75 percent Catholic, with most of the others representing evangelical and mainline Protestant denominations. Last year eight Mormans chose Ave Maria, as did four Muslims, at least one Buddhist and “one self-proclaimed pagan hedonist,” Dobranski said. Racial minorities make up 16 percent of the 222 students including several Koreans and Mexicans, but few African-Americans. The dean said efforts were underway to attract more African-Americans.

Urgent moral issues confront society, said Susan Stabile, law professor at St. John’s School of Law in Jamaica, Queens, N.Y., and emerging lawyers would do well to view them enlightened by two millennia of church teaching. She cited Leo XIII’s 1891 encyclical, Rerum Novarum, which called for the outlawing of child labor. “Still it exists,” she said.

In her first year course, “Introduction to Law and the Legal Profession,” Stabile has looked at the church’s just war theory and at the ethical dimensions of the “torture memo” that defined treatment of prisoners of war being held by the U.S. military at Guantánamo Bay.

Religious, racial and ethnic diversity thrive at St. John’s, she said, recalling that it was poor Jewish students from Brooklyn who came to the Vincentian Fathers asking them to build a law school so they might attend. Working-class Catholics, Jews and persons of other beliefs still predominate at the law school.

In the last several years, 15 to 20 percent of graduates took jobs in government or public interest law while 55 to 60 percent of them have gone into private practice.

Raising the Catholic identity issue at faculty forums has its critics. “The concern that gets expressed is that we not proselytize students and that students be free to disagree with what’s presented,” she said.

Next May Stabile and other academics from Catholic law schools will gather at Fordham for a conference on Catholic social teaching and the law. The event will be interdisciplinary and is designed to support those who want to see Catholic social thought have a bigger part in Catholic law curriculums.

“My bet is no one besides St. Thomas and Ave Maria is doing this across the board,” Stabile said.

Some Thoughts on Catholic Thought and Precedent

In response to my post asking what Catholic social thought has to say about the issue of following judicial precedent, reader (and former student of mine) Pat Shrake writes:

I tend to be in the Michael Paulsen camp on the very limited use of stare decisis in determining constitutional matters. Although I'm sure he has articulated it far better than I can, my main reason for this is my understanding that the court's role in interpreting the constitution is limited to the particular case (or controversy) before the court. . . .

What I was surprised to learn is that this appears to be the approach that the Catholic Church takes in canon law matters. That is, the decision of a particular canon law case does not decide the interpretation of the canon for future cases. Which leads me to an unresearched hypothesis of why this is so.

I hypothesize that the reason for both approaches is that the law in both cases is NOT the interpretation given it by the judge. Rather, in both cases, the law is written down (either as a Constitution or a canon) and then applied by the judge to the particular facts. The judge does not have the role of law giver in either circumstance. Or, more precisely, the judge only gives the law of the case.

In contrast, in the common law, the judge is either accepted as the law giver or, at the very least, the law "revealer"-when he or she writes down and/or pronounces what the law is. As many of the issues decided upon by the common law are an attempt to balance one interest against another, this method of determining "the law" fits within the broad variations of ordering society acceptable under Catholic social thinking.

So, in summary, I'm suggesting that one of the key insights that Catholic thinking and practice can give is that defining WHO the law giver is becomes vitally important. If the law giver has spoken (via the canon or Constitution) then the law interpreter (the judge) has a very limited role and only decides a particular case-with that decision having only a persuasive impact on the next judge. If the law giver IS the judge, then the judge's view of the law obviously becomes very important.

This is a very interesting and insightful point, and probably has a lot of truth in it.  But a couple of quick thoughts in response:

1.  It doesn't seem to me that respect for precedent is irreconcilable with respect for a written Constitution or code whose force derives from an act of the people.  Even though Henry Monaghan argued that we essentially have a "constitutional common law," I don't think that one needs to turn constitutional law into common law in order to affirm the relevance of precedent.  Stare decisis is, of course, a presumption that can be overcome.  It could rest on the idea -- compatible with a written Constitution, especially one whose phrasing (like ours) is often broad -- that often the written words do not clearly dictate the result, and that in such cases a backup principle of following what previous courts have done can be useful in guiding current courts, even though at some point a precedent will be so inconsistent with the true meaning of the provision (revealed by text, original understanding, etc.) that it must be overturned.  Hamilton's Federalist 78 certainly assumes a written Constitution as the subject of judicial review, but it also says that the judges engaging in such review will be bound by "strict precedents" that will constrain their imposition of their own will.  It seems to me it's unlikely that the framing generation thought a defeasible principle of stare decisis was inconsistent with a written Constitution reflecting a supermajority decision of the people.

     As for the Court's authority being limited to the particular case before it, that likewise is consistent with respect for precedent.  Stare decisis is not res judicata; the prima facie duty to follow precedent is not a matter of the binding, authoritative force of a previous decision.  Rather it follows from other sources, such as a duty to be consistent in rulings (not deciding cases under the same provision under entirely different principles, without a good reason for doing so) and a concern for stability in the law.

2.  I'm very interested in the canon-law point Pat makes, and I'd love to hear from canon lawyers about it.  Again, however, even if it is the practice that decisions on canon law (like those on other codes) advert directly back to the Code rather than to precedent, I'm not sure that this is logically compelled by the nature of a written text (i.e. a non-common-law situation).   Again, the U.S. practice under the Constitution has combined the two: a written Constitution together with substantial (though defeasible) respect for judicial interpretations of it.  And if we're going to look at written texts in the Catholic tradition, what about the Bible?  That's a statement of a lawgiver, for sure (at least the orthodox view would say) -- which the Church is not modifying but merely interpreting -- and yet in the Catholic tradition interpretation of it is substantially committed to an ongoing community reflected in the magisterium's teachings.  I know that, as I said before, the Church understands itself to have the Holy Spirit -- but doesn't the principle of giving respect to tradition in interpreting a text cut more broadly than that?  Isn't part of the Church's approach to the Bible that it is a complicated text (as we could also say of the Constitution), and therefore its interpretation over time by those with a special vocation to interpret ought to be quite relevant.  Remember that Mike Paulsen is, in the words of Sandy Levinson in Constitutional Faith, a "constitutional Protestant" (as well as a real one!) rather than a "constitutional Catholic."

I threw a lot of themes quickly into those three paragraphs, which may need disentangling (and in some cases correcting).  I'd be interested in hearing from others.

Tom 

Hello, Catholics. Goodbye, Catholics

A few days ago, Eduardo and I had a conversation about, among other things, changes in Catholics' voting patterns and practices.  In a related vein, check out these two essays -- "Hello, Catholics" and "Goodbye, Catholics" -- in the latest issue of Commonweal.  I have some thoughts about the essays, and will blog about them later.  With respect to Daniel Finn's "Hello, Catholics", though, my immediate impression is that he (like many other Catholics who think and write about the current political situation) works from a premise that it is only on abortion where the Republicans' stated position and actions are obviously preferable -- to conscientious, reasonable Catholics -- to the Democrats'.  I do not accept this premise.  But . . .more later. 

Oral Argument on Ritual Tea and Religious Freedom

As I've blogged before (here and here), the Uniao do Vegetal case -- on the application of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) to the sacramental use of tea with a small amount of hallucionogenic substance in it -- raises vital issues across the board about the scope of religious freedom in America, and what kind and quantum of evidence the government must provide to justify serious restrictions on religious freedom.

The case was argued in the Supreme Court yesterday, and the argument appeared to go very well for the religious group and badly for the federal government (HT: SCOTUS Blog):

Perhaps the most telling development of the argument was that Justice Antonin Scalia displayed almost no sympathy for the government’s position. Noting that Congress has created an exception to drug policy for Indian tribes’ ritual use of peyote, Scalia told [Deputy SG Edwin] Kneedler: “This demonstrates you can make an exception without the sky falling.” Kneedler did not do well in trying to explain away the peyote exception as limited to Congress' special concern for Indian tribes. Scalia, of course, was the author of the Court’s 1990 decision (Employment Division v. Smith) allowing states to ban the tribal use of peyote – a decision that Congress essentially overturned in passing RFRA, and enacting a separate exception for Indians’ use of peyote.

If indeed the justices are overhwlemingly in favor of protecting the group under RFRA, then the view of Justice O'Connor versus Judge Alito won't matter, and the case won't need to be held over until a new justice is seated.

I have an article on the case in the November 1 issue of The Christian Century.  It's at your local newsstand, but despite the date, it's not posted online yet; I'll provide a link when I can.  My article describes the background of the case and the importance of RFRA to religious freedom in America.  It also takes on some of the arguments against religious accommodation made by Marci Hamilton, whose position was discussed here at MOJ a while back.

Tom

The Catholic Second Amendment

Here's some ammunition for Rick's effort to put the Reformation in its place: Over at the Volokh Conspiracy, David Kopel has posted his new article, "The Catholic Second Amendment."  Here is an excerpt from the conclusion:

One of the values of understanding the debt that the Declaration of Independence and the Second Amendment owe to the Summa Theologica, to Policraticus, and to other great works of Catholic resistance theory is that we can better understand that the American principles of revolution and the right to arms are not novelties that spontaneously arose in 18th-century America or in 17th-century Great Britain.  Rather, they are the natural results of an intellectual tradition that was in many ways far older and broader -- and much more Catholic -- than the American Founders may have realized.

Rob

Questions on Abortion

MOJ reader and prominent law professor Steve Shiffrin sends along these questions, prompted by my recent post about abortion law in Portugal:

Your MOJ post on Portugal got me thinking. Because Europe does not have Roe v. Wade, abortion politics have taken a less strident tone there (as they tended to before Roe in the U.S.). The result of the democratic processes is that second trimester abortions are regulated far more strictly in Europe than here, and, of course, restrictions in some (many?) European countries exist in the first trimester.  Portugal is one of the most restrictive. Support for those restrictions has declined for at least two reasons. First, there is substantial evidence that the restrictive laws in the first trimester are ineffective: Portuguese women still have abortions either in other countries or illegally. Second,  the government made the mistake of prosecuting some women who secured illegal abortions (in addition to the doctors). . . .
What I am wondering is this: 
A. If Roe were overturned (I am not sure this will happen in the next decade), what would be the range of views of the posters on MOJ on what the post-Roe policies should be?
(1) Should abortion be outlawed in all circumstances? Life of the mother? Physical health of the mother? Rape? Etc.
(2) What should the penalties be? Should they be different from murder?
(3) Should abortion patients be prosecuted?
(4) Should the failure to pass restrictive abortion legislation be considered a violation of the  equal protection clause?
(5) Should a constitutional amendment be passed enacting restrictive policies on abortion nationwide?
B. As a separate, but related  matter, one might discern from some statements of the American and European bishops that pragmatic considerations should play no role in determining whether the criminal law should be employed to deal with moral evils. Yet, my understanding is that there is a longstanding counter tradition in the Church. If there is, how does that tradition relate to abortion politics?
Steve has asked for our views.  What do people think?

Torture

I was interested to read Tom's question whether one can make an argument, consistent with Christian moral thought, that torture should be treated as a question of prudence rather than an intrinsic evil.  It is the asking of the question that I find interesting.

I teach a  first semester/first year Introduction to Law and the Legal Profession course, a couple of classes of which are devoted to an introduction to Legal Ethics.  I have used different vehicles for teaching this part of the course.  This year, I decided to use the DOJ's torture memo as a basis for discussion, thinking it would offer a good tool to think broadly about lawyers' obligations both to and beyond the client.  It did not work as well as I had hoped it would.

The reason it did not is that for the discussion about the lawyer's behavior to work effectively, there needs to be a shared starting point understanding that torture is wrong.  I went into the discussion (naive as I can sometimes be) assuming that such a shared understanding exists.  I know that we live in a world where most things seem to be up for grabs, but really did not think torture is one of them.  I thought we were all sitting in horror about the reports of Abu Ghraib etc.

Based on the responses of my students, I was wrong.  Their responses suggest to me that there are a significant number of people (of varying religions; my class is quite mixed on that score) who accept the prudence over evil way of thinking about the issue.   It is difficult for me to see how that view can be squared with Catholic moral thought and I share Tom's interest in hearing the thoughts of others on the question. 

The Archdiocese of Philadelphia, the Grand Jury, and Villanova

Yesterday Villanova Law School hosted the panel discussion Mark Sargent mentioned in an earlier posting, "Reflections on the Grand Jury's Report on the Archdiocese of Philadelphia."  The event was a real credit to its organizer, the same Mark Sargent.  James Post, Professor of Management and Public Policy at B.U. (and a Villanova Law alumnus), offered a general appraisal of the ongoing scandal and some specific insights into what went wrong in Philadelphia; his comments were nuanced and passionate both.  Chuck Zech, Professor of Economics at Villanova and Director of the University's Center on Church Management, reported the results of his pollings on the effects of the scandal on the life of the Church in the U.S.; his evidence on the growing disengagement of American Catholics from their Church on account of the scandal was sobering.  The still same Mark Sargent gave a masterful sketch of the civil law, criminal law, and bankruptcy issues facing (or not)the Church in Philadelphia today and in the coming years.  More than a hundred people were in attendance:  many members of Voice of the Faithful, parish priests from across the Archdiocese (many sans Roman collar), "Philadelphia lawyers," law students, law faculty, and, yes, a reporter from the Philadelphia Inquirer.  The discussion was predictably lively and remarkably productive; a particular emphasis was the American hierarchy's decades-long failure to follow the governing canon law procedures.  I moderated the event; my introductory comments follow below, for whatever their worth.  I would just add that this sort of event seems to me to exemplify what Catholic law schools can do that is true to their charism and different from what other places can do.  As the event unfolded, I was thinking, "Here is the Church thinking and reflecting; here are Catholic lawyers and scholars gathered together to work on behalf of their Church."

___________

I should like to begin by setting a broader than America-in-the-first-half-of-the-first-decade-of-the-new-millenium perspective that may be of assistance in approaching and focusing the questions of the day.  On one view of the world, societies (such as churches and families) exist by right within a given state only by concession of the state; this is the view embodied, for example, in the following statute of the Third French Republic:  “No religious congregation may be formed by without an authorization given by law that determines the conditions of its exercise. . . .  The dissolution of a congregation or the closing of any religious establishment may be declared by a cabinet decree.”  This statute, mind you, was in effect in first half of the twentieth century.  On another view of the world, and it is the one we grope toward in the United States today, societies, still including religious societies, exist by right that precedes the state.  Bound on the one hand to recognize the freedom of action and development of the legitimate societies that precede it, the state is also bound, on the other hand, to regulate all societies as the common good of the whole body politic may require.  The balance between the primordial authorities of the societies that precede the state and the state’s mandate to care for the common good remains, if we are lucky, a work in progress.  Totalitarianism is one premature resolution of the tension; the failure of plural societies to work together for the common good is the other.

In the current engagement between the Grand Jury that works for the common good of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the society that is the Catholic Church in the particular church that is the Archdiocese of Philadelphia, we confront a paradigm instance of the challenge and its temptations.  It would be wrong to grab either horn to the exclusion of the other.  The Church should govern herself with the legitimate authority that is uniquely hers, and she should seek to govern in a way that supplies no reason or pretext for outside forces to feel justified to enter in and run things “better;” the state, in any event, must never usurp the authority that is irreducibly the Church’s, must never insinuate itself into the Church’s internal life.  The Commonwealth, however, must insist that the Church (and other such societies) be held to a uniform application of the law that is necessary and beneficial to the common good.  The Church never asks, as Pope Benedict has been firm in saying, any special privileges for herself, though she does of course hope for and call for a state that will permit her the internal freedom that is necessary to the authority that is the hallmark of a distinct society.  Clearly, the Church should be among the first to follow the legitimate laws of the state that, as a matter of concrete fact, makes her ministry possible. 

It is the genuine blessing of this Catholic law school that we can come together to talk openly, passionately, and rigorously about what has happened and the way forward to mutual respect between Church and state, and full protection by both Church and state of the youth who are our collective charge.

There is no question but that many priests of the Church in Philadelphia acted very wrongly, and that high officials of the Church in Philadelphia, whatever their good intentions, mismanaged the life of the Church.  Through acts of mismanagement  at the top, and through violence and other abuse in city and suburbs, untold harm was visited upon dozens and dozens of young people, as well, it should be added, as upon innocent Catholics, lay and clergy both, in the Archdiocese and far beyond. 

It is a fundamental truth of the Catholic moral tradition that what atonement must be for the sins we commit and harms we cause depends upon our culpability.  The extensive report of the Grand Jury, the Response of the Archdiocese, and the Grand Jury’s Examination of that Response illuminate a serious discrepancy on the issue of culpability as it concerns various individuals and the Archdiocese itself.   On these issues I find the three documents remarkably unhelpful; the Grand Jury’s Report obscures important points through its rhetorical excess and ultra vires opining; the contents of the Response of the Archdiocese are sometimes irrelevant, frequently conclusory, and often lawyerly (in the bad sense).  Atonement that fits the true culpability is a necessary step in the way forward, and the letter that Cardinal Rigali sent recently from Rome indicates the Archdiocese’s movement in that direction. 

Also necessary to going forward is a fair and workable plan for preventing harm to young people.  The Grand Jury report recommends many expansions of the civil and criminal law.  Law, whatever its greatness as a tool to human living, is also necessarily a crude tool, particularly in its operation and application in the criminal context.  The Grand Jury Report’s repeated invocation of “criminal conduct” that is “not criminally indictable” fits uncomfortably within the Anglo-American criminal law that refuses to elide acts that are mala in se with crime, a creation of the positive law.  As a student and teacher of the criminal law, I have long held reservations about expanding the scope of the criminal law; my general view has been that application of the criminal law should be our last resort, and I retain that view.  The question then, fairly presented today, is whether we have reached the point at which expanded statutes and reduced statutes of limitations are called for.  Something needs to be done.  Some people respond only to the threat of punishment, and certainly, consistent with the moral teaching of the central tradition, the body politic deserves to impose retribution for harm caused to itself and its members. 

In the first reading for last Sunday’s Mass, from the Prophet Malachi, the Lord flared up with anger toward his priests for their straying ways.  The prophet then asked of the people: “Why do we break faith?”  The question we are here to discuss today, as Catholics and other people of good will working in and around the law, is how faith can be restored in the life God’s people, the Church.  In this important work, we have the assistance of three distinguished panelists, whom I shall introduce according to the order in which they will speak.  All three are exceedingly prolific authors, so I have opted to omit even a sketch of their writings from my introductions. . . . .

Tuesday, November 1, 2005

Anti-Torture Amendment, Veto Threat, and Intrinsic Evil?

The administration continues to push (see here and here) to weaken -- and threatens to veto -- the McCain Amendment that forbids the use of "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" against anyone in U.S. government custody anywhere.  Is there any argument that the administration's position can be squared with Catholic, or more generally Christian, moral thought?  Can defenders of the administration make any argument -- as they did concerning the invasion of Iraq -- that this is a question of prudence rather than intrinsic evil?

Tom

What if they gave a Reformation ...

Imagine if I had been Luther and Rick had been Pope Leo X (or the other way around).  We would have ended up getting together for beers somewhere in Switzerland, and the whole Reformation would have had to be called off.

I appreciate Rick's comments about fairness and moderation, because he consistently displays those qualities too (even when he shows up on National Review Online!).  I must admit, though, that then another voice keeps chiding me that it's only the wild, anti-moderate people -- of whom Luther surely was a prime specimen -- who change the world.

Tom