Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Monday, November 7, 2005

Schmitt Lecture on Cloning and Truth-Telling

My colleague, Carter Snead (formerly General Counsel to the President's Council on Bioethics), is giving this year's Schmitt Lecture, sponsored by the Notre Dame Center for Ethics and Culture, at 4 pm in McKenna Hall at Notre Dame.  Here is more info.  Professor Snead's lecture is called, "Speaking Truthfully about Stem Cell Research and Human Cloning."

Rick

Sunday, November 6, 2005

Karl Rove, Joe Wilson, and the Body of Christ

Last night I caught a short part of CNN's re-run Larry King interview with former Ambassador Joe Wilson, one of the people at the heart of the Plame-Libby affair.  In it Wilson noted that he and Karl Rove go to the same church (I think it's Protestant but am not sure), although to different services so they don't see each other, and needless to say they aren't reconciled as fellow Christians.  It just struck me as a particularly visible scandal of Christian disunity and "un-community" that (1) these two fellow church members are on opposite sides of such an intensely public fight (not just a good-faith disagreement), and (2) that it didn't seem even in the realm of options that their clergy would play any particular role in reconciling them and/or in calling one or both of them to account as Christians.  (I have my own view about who looks more out of step with Christian norms in this and certain other matters, but that's not my point.)

Back during the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal, theologian Stanley Hauerwas wrote a chapter in this book arguing that Christians should be more concerned with whether Clinton was disciplined by his church than whether he was impeached.  I'm not a fan in general of Hauerwas' theological ethical approach, but I do think that it properly reminds us to ask questions about whether the Christian church is playing any public role as a "polis" or "society" itself, rather than merely commenting on what goes on our civil polis or (even more inadequate) serving as an escape from the civil polis or society.  I realize that there can be things happening out of the public limelight in any situation, and that any such efforts can also be hampered by uncertainty as to the facts, by the consequences of pending legal investigations or proceedings, and simply by the recalcitrant will of one or both of the persons involved.  Nevertheless, this just struck me as a particularly visible example of how we, and American society in general, don't really expect the Christian church to play this role.

Tom

    

Bainbridge on Catholic judges

Here is an essay by MOJ-er Steve Bainbridge, "Judges' Faith Does Matter," that is must-reading.  Discussing the obligations of Catholics in public life, and our obligation to avoid culpable cooperation with evil, Bainbridge notes:

We see that there are cases--albeit only in those limited class of cases in which a judge’s decision constitutes formal cooperation with evil--in which a Catholic jurist is religiously obligated to put his faith-based beliefs ahead of, say, his views of precedent. Conversely, however, it seems clear that judicial decisionmaking--even with respect to issues, like abortion, that raise very profound questions--under Church teaching does not per se constitute formal cooperation with evil.

Steve goes on to discuss a really good article by my friends John Garvey (of Boston College) and Amy Barrett (Notre Dame) on Catholic judges and death-penalty cases.

Steve also has a great post up in which he smacks down the latest by Amy and Andrew Sullivan, who are both unclear on the distinction between legislating and judging and on the relevance of that distinction to questions of culpable cooperation with evil.  Andrew Sullivan, I'm sorry to say, concludes his own intervention with this nonsense-laden paragraph:

[W]e are seeing . . . the political consequences of the Catholic hierarchy's slow collapse into fundamentalism. Once a Catholic is denied the moral capacity to separate her public duties from her private faith - or risk exclusion from the sacraments - then she is in an acute conflict between public duty and private conscience. Recusal may be her only option. But we now have five Catholics on the court. In Benedict's church, on critical Constitutional questions, we might face five recusals in abortion cases, which would make any ruling largely meaningless. This is the consequence of the Vatican's retreat from the Second Council's acceptance of religious freedom and conscience, and Benedict's deep qualms about a clear separation of church and state. The theocons want to reverse the Kennedy compromise. And in doing so, they may be forcing Catholics in public life to withdraw altogether or face the charge of a religious conflict of interest. In their zeal, the theocons are unwittingly breathing new life into anti-Catholic prejudice, and new force behind the exclusion of Catholics from public life in a pluralist democracy.

As regular Sullivan readers know, he has lost the ability in recent months to resist any opportunity to whack Pope Benedict with the "fundamentalism" club.  But, as he should know:  (1) There has been no "retreat" from the Council's "acceptance of religious freedom and conscience"; (2) that "acceptance" was never the same thing as the "Kennedy compromise"; and (3) Pope Benedict has no "qualms" about the "separation of church and state."  Sullivan is simply confused about what "separation", properly understood, is.

More on "Hello, Catholics"

As I mentioned a few days ago, Daniel Finn has an essay in the latest issue of Commonweal called "Hello, Catholics:  Republicans and the Targeting of Religious Voters."  Finn observes that "the Republican Party [won the last election" by a margin of passionately religious-minded voters who cite moral concerns as their chief reason for voting" and asks "[w]hy has this happened? And why didn’t it happen a generation or two ago? "  Finn suggests (following a recent Harvard study) that the answer has to do with "strategic extremism," "the choice of an extreme political stance designed to attract more voter support."  According to this study, at this particular time, it is religious voters who are most attractive to politicians considering this strategy.  That is, churchgoers are useful to politicans. Finn continues:

But are politicians useful to churchgoers? Has the churchgoing public’s large political investment in moral issues, especially abortion, been duly rewarded? . . .

Let us examine how this applies to the politics of abortion. For all the principled talk about the right to life, the evidence suggests that opposing abortion is a strategic issue for the Republican Party. Republicans have held the White House during five of the seven four-year presidential terms since 1980, and have controlled one or both houses of Congress through most of that time. Has the party ever really made abortion a legislative priority? [RG:  Yes, I think it has.  Remember, Roe limits what legislatures can do.]  The number of abortions has remained about the same under Democratic and Republican presidents, even apparently rising somewhat since George W. Bush’s election.  [RG:  This "ris[e]" did not, in fact, happen.]  Republicans remain perennially the champions of Christians opposed to abortion-without actually bringing about any change. (Even partial-birth abortion legislation doesn’t reduce the number of abortions; it just requires that another method be used.) [RG:  There have been many changes in abortion-related policy under this Administration].  President Bush puts far more personal energy and White House clout behind tax cuts and Social Security “reforms,” and it is hard not to interpret his tepid follow-through on abortion as a Republican attempt to retain the support of its religious coalition without taking substantive action on the issue.  [RG:  What, exactly, could have been done -- consistent with Roe -- that has not been done or, at least, attempted?]

For Catholics, the question boils down to this: How many decades of inaction on abortion would be sufficient evidence for us to conclude that political mobilization on the issue is a misuse of scarce ecclesial resources-resources that should be directed to support a wider range of goals? With the appointment of a new chief justice for the Supreme Court, and the nomination of Harriet Miers to replace Sandra Day O’Connor, it is possible that the new Court will overturn Roe v. Wade. But if the Court does not overturn Roe, will Catholics then decide they’ve misallocated their political capital?

[RG:  It is worth flagging the possibility that abortion is not, in fact, the only issue on which a conscientious Catholic might conclude the Republicans are preferable to the Democrats.  It is also worth turning the tables and asking, "looking back on the Clinton years, and on the Clinton Administration's policies and actions relating to, say, the death penalty, welfare reform, military force, trade, etc. -- was enough progress made toward these other "goals" to justify supporting that Administration's absolutist abortion stance and policies?]

Some will reply that unsuccessful efforts in support of a just cause are warranted, even necessary, perhaps, for living a moral life. But those who recognize that politics is “the art of the possible”-and that moral people can at times be badly used in the political process-may better conclude that moral responsibility requires accountability for a broad range of issues.  [RG.  Agreed.  But to agree to this claim does not require one to agree with Finn's conclusions about voting.]

. . .  Moral perfectionists take the position that if abortion is the most fundamental moral issue today, then striving for political change on abortion should outweigh pressing for change on all other issues. So powerful and pervasive is this mistaken belief that I would not be surprised if at least some of these moral perfectionists misunderstand this essay and claim that it indirectly advocates abortion simply because it questions the political judgments the church has made in opposing abortion.  [RG:  To be clear, I do not so misunderstand Finn's essay.  I only mean to suggest that Finn is -- without being explicit about it -- relying heavily on a claim that, on every issue other than abortion, the Democrats are to be preferred by conscientious, faithful Catholics, who in good faith want to live and vote in accord with the Church's social teachings.]

Fundamental values should, of course, be protected by law. But in our efforts to use public policy to do so, good Catholic moral theology and Aquinas himself require that we avoid the pitfalls of singlemindedness.  [Fair enough.  On the other hand, abortion is more than just another issue, and one might think that concern about our tolerance -- even our celebration -- of abortion on demand is not a narrow, "singleminded" focus on a particular, but more of a worry about deeply rooted moral blindness in our culture.]

Let me be clear. . . . I do not intend to take Democrats off the hook on abortion. They have too often sided with extreme voices, badly overstating the claims of individual autonomy. The point here, though, is to put both parties on the hook for the full range of issues that Catholic moral analysis addresses.

Finn concludes with several "cautions":

The first is that prolife Christians who take religious perfectionism into politics act irresponsibly if they do not count the moral cost of demoting other issues of Catholic social thought.  [Fine.  And, it is also irresponsible to overstate the progress -- from a CST perspective -- that might be achieved on other issues by demoting abortion, or to downplay the progress that has -- within Roe's limits -- been made by Republicans on abortion, or to overlook the Democrats' own failures -- from a Catholic perspective -- on issues other than abortion.]  The second is that while Christians may take moral perfectionism into politics, the politicians appealing for their support surely do not. Decades of political promises without discernibly different results for abortion under Republican and Democratic administrations should be treated as prima facie evidence of the strategic use of Catholics and other Christians by politicians whose narrow interests are served by allowing the current impasse on abortion to continue while appearing to work for a resolution. Statements of support come cheap; pay attention to results.

I'm sorry for the long post.  Finn's essay is well worth reading, and it raises important questions. 

Friday, November 4, 2005

Catholic Law Schools: Thoughts on History and a Suggestion

I’ll throw in my two cents for our discussion on the recent National Catholic Reporter piece on Catholic Law Schools. 

First, a couple thoughts on “how did we get here?”  Some might describe the trajectory of the history of Catholic legal education as the gradual loss of a beautiful synthesis between legal education and the Catholic intellectual tradition – and I can see how this leads to a certain pessimism.  But I just can’t find much evidence for that story – please help me out if you have other sources which could support that theory.  I think the more solid account is that Catholic legal education was about access for an ethnic minority that otherwise would not have made its way the professional sphere.  I think this changes how we see our project significantly.  Efforts to work out what the Catholic intellectual tradition means for legal education then becomes a challenging and rather new project, in large part flowing from the teachings and insights of the Second Vatican Council.  I think that makes a big difference in the tenor of our conversation.

On the question of why the symbol of the cross is problematic and even offensive for some: history is helpful here too.  As theologian Mary Boys put it in a beautiful article—“The scandal of the cross consists in this: Christians in their history have made it a sign of conquering hate rather than sacrificial love.” (Mary C. Boys, The Cross: Should a Symbol Betrayed Be Reclaimed?, Cross Currents, Spring 1994: 44:1).  I’m with John Paul II in the need to recognize the ways in which we have completely blown it as a community—we need to both recognize the damage and working for healing.  Religious symbolism is complex for many reasons, and I don’t think it is necessarily an expression of an outright rejection of Catholicism or the tradition as a whole. 

I don’t mean to say this is the end of the story.  Last year we had a beautifully profound and transformative discussion with some of the faculty here about the meaning of the cross.  Our discussion included articulation of both the fears and anxieties that the symbolism of the cross has generated for non-Christians, as well as its profound and central meaning for Christians.  Even on these tough topics, we can listen to one another and learn from each other—even with the painful weight of history and need for reconciliation on many levels.

And with that, I’d like to make a suggestion.  What would happen if the focus of our conversations about Catholic identity and education became… love?  I have the sense that love might help us find a way through and beyond students’ and colleagues’ awkwardness in how they express themselves, so that we can understand what might be fear, anxiety, or perhaps just lack of understanding behind their comments or questions… I have seen how love does create a space of trust which leads to a genuine exchange of gifts through which Catholics and non-Catholics can learn from each other.

My favorite litany of Mary is not “mirror of justice,” but “refuge of sinners”—because how many times have I experienced God’s unconditional love in the very midst of my own limitations and lack of love?  Often when I walk into school I ask Mary for something of her love, so that whoever crosses my path—colleagues, students, whoever—of whatever religious background or political stripe—can find in me a space—even a refuge—of welcome and understanding.  And I believe this then can create the most fertile ground for an exchange on the place for the treasures and depths of the Catholic intellectual tradition in the law school curriculum.

Amy

"Sacred Mountains and Beloved Fetuses"

A work in progress by NYU philosophy prof Elizabeth Harman has been posted on the Legal Theory blog.  In the paper, Harman argues that attitudes that attribute moral status do not endow moral status.  Why then should we respect the wishes of members of an indigenous tribe who believe that a particular mountain is sacred and is harmed by hiking, but not the wishes of abortion clinic protesters who believe that protecting a fetus is of vital moral importance?  Her explanation: "the anti-abortion protesters' love of [the woman's] fetus does not bring the fetus's death to be bad for the protesters, while by contrast the hikers' hiking on the mountain is bad for the tribe members in virtue of their worship of the mountain."   

Rob

Upcoming Book: Self-Evident Truth?: Catholic Perspectives on American Law

In the spring of 2007, Catholic University of America Press will publish a book tentatively titled "Self-Evident Truth?:  Catholic Perspectives on American Law."  The book is co-edited by MOJ friend Teresa Collett and yours truly.  Contributers include MOJ bloggers Robert Araujo, Rick Garnett, Amy Uelmen, and Rob Vischer.  Other contributers include Lorenzo Albacete, Benedict Ashley, John Coughlin, Cardinal Dulles, Robert George, Mary Ann Glendon, Jim Gordley, Tom Kohler, Kevin Lee, Vince Rougeau, and Chris Wolfe.

A starting assumption of the book is that before we can discuss law we have to have some grasp of the nature of the human person.  Therefore, after a chapter on the foundations of Catholic Legal Theory, the book has two anthropological chapters, one theological and the other philosophical.  The next section of the book has three chapters covering foundational issues in Catholic thinking, covering the relationship of freedom to truth, solidarity, subsidiarity, and the common good.  This is followed by two chapters on Catholic dialogue with secular perspectives in political and legal theory.  The final section of the book contains eight chapters addressing Catholic Perspectives on particular substantive areas of the law, including all of the subjects (except Civil Procedure) traditionally taught in the first year of law school.

In the future I'll post the table of contents and blog more about the book and its potential audience and uses.  I will probably assign it (in pre-publication form) for my seminar in Religion and Democracy next fall and hope others at both the law school and undergraduate level will consider it for their students. 

For me, this has been a labor of love, which I hope finds a wide audience. Our Sunday Visitor Institute was instrumental in getting the project off the ground by providing funding to host a conference addressing these issues several years ago.  And, Bob Destro, then interim Dean at Catholic, was gracious enough to host us.  The book, which has changed significantly in the intervening years, is a direct result of that conference.

Michael

Federal Tax Policy and Judeo-Christian Ethics

[This piece should be of interest to many MOJ readers.  --mp]

"An Evaluation of Federal Tax Policy Based on Judeo-Christian
  Ethics"
       Virginia Tax Review, Vol. 25, Winter 2006

       BY:  SUSAN PACE HAMILL
               University of Alabama School of Law

Document:  Available from the SSRN Electronic Paper Collection:
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=824907

Paper ID:  U of Alabama Public Law Research Paper

  Contact:  SUSAN PACE HAMILL
    Email:  Mailto:[email protected]
   Postal:  University of Alabama School of Law
            P.O. Box 870382
            Tuscaloosa, AL 35487  UNITED STATES
    Phone:  205-348-5931
      Fax:  205-348-3917

ABSTRACT:
  This article severely criticizes the Bush Administration's tax
  policies under the moral principles of Judeo-Christian ethics. I
  first document that Judeo-Christian ethics is the most relevant
  moral analysis for tax policy because almost eighty percent of
  Americans and well over ninety percent of the Congress,
  including President Bush, claim to adhere to the Christian or
  Jewish faiths. I also show that evaluating federal tax policy
  under Judeo-Christian principles not only passes constitutional
  muster but is also appropriate under the norms of a democracy. I
  then provide a complete theological framework that can be
  applied to any tax policy structure. Using sources that include
  leading Evangelical and other Protestant scholars, Papal
  Encyclicals and Jewish scholars, I prove that tax policy
  structures meeting the moral principles of Judeo-Christian
  ethics must raise adequate revenues that not only cover the
  needs of the minimum state but also ensure that all citizens
  have a reasonable opportunity to reach their potential. Among
  other things, reasonable opportunity requires adequate
  education, healthcare, job training and housing. Using these
  theological sources, I also establish that flat and consumption
  tax regimes which shift a large part of the burden to the middle
  classes are immoral. Consequently, Judeo-Christian based tax
  policy requires the tax burden to be allocated under a
  moderately progressive regime. I discuss the difficulties of
  defining that precisely and also conclude that confiscatory tax
  policy approaching a socialistic framework is also immoral. I
  then apply this Judeo-Christian ethical analysis to the first
  term Bush Administration's tax cuts and find those policies to
  be morally problematic. Using a wealth of sources, I then
  establish that the moral values driving the Bush
  Administration's tax policy decisions reflect objectivist
  ethics, a form of atheism that exalts individual property rights
  over all other moral considerations. Given the overwhelming
  adherence to Christianity and Judaism, I conclude that President
  Bush, many members of Congress and many Americans are not
  meeting the moral obligations of their faiths, and, I argue that
  tax policy must start reflecting genuine Judeo-Christian values
  if the country is to survive in the long run.
            

Thursday, November 3, 2005

Susan Stabile on John Courtney Murray and Abortion

"John Courtney Murray and the Abortion Debate"

      BY:  SUSAN J. STABILE
              St. John's University
              School of Law

Document:  Available from the SSRN Electronic Paper Collection:
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=825164

Paper ID:  St. John's Legal Studies Research Paper No. 10-0028

Contact:  SUSAN J. STABILE
   Email:  Mailto:[email protected]
  Postal:  St. John's University
           School of Law
           8000 Utopia Parkway
           Jamaica, NY 11439  UNITED STATES
   Phone:  718-990-1579

ABSTRACT:
This paper explores the contribution of the foremost Catholic
theologian in the church in the United States - John Courtney
Murray - to the issue of abortion. Although Murray never
directly spoke on the question of abortion, his distinctions
between morality and civil law and between matters of public and
private morality contribute to our thinking about that question.
Indeed, Murray's views on how the Church should respond to
legislative efforts to decriminalize contraception, as well as
his statements generally about religious freedom, the separation
of law and morality and the distinction between public and
private morality have been influential in forming arguments
concerning the abortion controversy.

In the mid-1960s, Murray wrote a memorandum containing
recommendations regarding how Catholics should respond to a
proposal to amend Massachusetts law to decriminalize
contraception. In response, Murray wrote a memo arguing against
Catholic opposition to the law, despite his view that artificial
contraception was immoral. Because that memorandum has been used
by others in an attempt to use Murray to justify a pro-choice
position, I use it as a framework for exploring Murray's
thought. This paper considers to what extent Murray's statements
about how the Church should respond to contraception carry over
into the development of a workable position regarding abortion
and evaluates arguments that have been made based on his
writings. I argue that Murray has something to say to both
public policymakers and the Catholic Church about their approach
to abortion. More specifically, I argue that abortion is a
matter of public morality, making it a matter that the state is
justified in regulating, but also that prudential considerations
must be taken into account in deciding whether and how the law
should intervene. Separating the questions of whether abortion
is a proper subject for the law to address and what constitutes
a good law with respect to abortion is a necessary step in
moving from confusion to productive debate.
          

"Catholic" Law Schools

My thanks to Michael for posting the most interesting article by Patricia Lefevere on Catholic Law Schools.

Catholic Law Schools? Do they exist? This is a suitable topic for MOJ exploration, since CLT is well suited to address the topic and the issue. Father Hesburgh once said that the Catholic university is the place where the Church does its thinking. Can the same be said of the Catholic law school? Ms. Lefevere is quick to bring this question into focus when she raises her own inquiry about whether it is “even desirable to have such an identity?” Her rhetorical point brings up the further question: if an institution were accused of being a Catholic law school, would there be sufficient evidence to convict?

Initially, I was reluctant to write this post, but two immediate points in the article necessitated a response. The first was our introduction to the new dean of Villanova Law School, Mark Sarget. I immediately wondered what happened to our dear friend, Mark Sargent. But my initial concern about Mark Sargent’s fate was quickly relieved when I realized that the spelling of his surname was a typographical error! Following his point about Catholic mission, I would hasten to add that I cannot find any law school that asserts missions for social injustice and academic laziness when Catholic schools are said by some to be distinctive in their demands for social justice and academic rigor. And when it comes to symbols, why is the symbol of the cross deemed offensive by some? Yet, at the same time displays of other symbols which have no connection with Catholicism, e.g. rainbow colored banners, do not seem to raise any questions at all?

The second point was the statement that “Villanova tied with the University of San Diego, a Jesuit law school, for 63rd spot…” The University of San Diego is not a Jesuit institution, so I was perplexed to learn that it has a Jesuit law school. But this would raise another question best left for another time knowing that John Breen and others have looked at the issue: is there such a thing as a Jesuit law school today? Do any exist? Ms. Lefevere states that there are thirteen in the US, but there are fourteen schools which claim to be in this group. In 1994, the University of Puget Sound’s law school was acquired by Seattle University, and it became “Jesuit” law school number fourteen. Once I decided to comment briefly on these two points, I succumbed to the lure of writing more.

I begin with my thanks to Mark, Greg, and Susan for their observations. At the outset, I will let MOJ readers know that I am inclined to agree with Mark’s assessment about the problems and challenges that face Catholic identity in legal education today. I applaud Greg’s and Susan’s work. I know Russ Pearce at Fordham and congratulate him, too, knowing that Amy Uelmen is also responsible for much of the good work that takes place at Fordham Law in the name of Catholic identity and mission.

I also agree with Tom Shaffer that one might expect a uniquely Catholic perspective on the law that could be available in addressing not only property, contracts, securities regulation, or criminal procedure, but Constitutional Law and everything else as well. Admittedly, the task is not always quite the same for each substantive area of law, but if Feminist Theory, Critical Race Theory, and GLBTQ Legal Theory, etc. are acceptable lenses for examining substantive legal disciplines across the board, why not Catholic Legal Theory? The MOJ discussion group was established to pursue this point and to examine the role of the Catholic intellectual tradition’s contribution to the underpinnings of legal theory. I believe that Tom is onto something when he states that Catholicism “has always copied too much in trying to come to terms with the secular university…” I wonder if this is behind Russ saying “Jesuit universities are saying, ‘Catholics can learn from non-Catholics…’” But is the reverse true today: can non-Catholics also learn from Catholics? I should hope so, and I should further hope that this is what the Catholic universities, including Jesuit ones, are all about. Tom indicated in his interview that he scratched his head about one school that has not been able to turn the corner, but I wonder if that is the only one over which one can scratch heads? Some schools have yet to approach the intersection where they can turn a corner; for others, the corner is pretty big, and I wonder if they will come out of the turn if they have ventured into the intersection?

Greg also makes some solid points when he stated that many contemporary academics “shy” away from discussing religion. I think that would be more difficult at secular, state-sponsored institutions, but even many of them have religious studies departments. Why should this be difficult at an educational institution that claims to be Catholic? He perceptively makes two additional points: the first is that by raising discussions about the religion, would some consider themselves excluded when a particular religious view, let’s say Catholicism, predominates? But when measures are taken to make the institution welcoming of others who are not members of this religious community, his second astute observation comes into play: the religious perspective, over time, becomes marginalized. And with that occurrence, is there not the threat of this perspective becoming lost? Greg’s next statement about offending those of other or no religious traditions then comes into play. Several years ago, I visited a “Jesuit” law school, and I was asked in a public forum by one of the faculty members if I always wore “that” as this teacher pointed to my clerical shirt. I was surprised by the individual’s question which generated embarrassment and offense to me. Whether either was intended, I do not know. I wonder how this individual would have reacted if I had raised the same question about the soiled T-shirt this person was wearing. Would such a question have been off limits, and would asking it generate offense? This brings me to another observation about Greg’s statement about those schools which “seek” to be “authentically Jesuit.” Are they not “authentically Jesuit” now? If not, why? What has happened? Why must the Catholic/Jesuit school seek to be Catholic/Jesuit? It is not simply building trust and avoiding suspicion and anxiety about the faith dimension of the school’s social justice dimension as he states; it is about the ability to define the soul of the institution as Catholic or not. If the Catholic soul is no longer present, what has happened to it? I gather that is why there must be seeking today.

Bill Treanor of Fordham is quoted on points about diversity and dialog as virtues. Yes, indeed, his perspective has merit, and it is “something to be cherished.” But do law schools in general, and those which claim to be Catholic in particular, practice “inclusion and dialogue” and avoid “imposition or indoctrination”? I wonder. What would happen in a law school Constitutional law school discussion where someone, be it teacher or student, questioned, from the perspective of the Church’s teachings, the underpinnings of Justice Blackmun’s Roe opinion or Justice Kennedy’s Lawrence opinion, for example? Would such a person “feel” included? Would such a person be welcomed into “dialogue”? Maybe, but then again, perhaps not. It becomes problematic when a religious perspective quickly becomes suspect of “imposition or indoctrination” but other views escape or are immune from such labeling. The problem intensifies when it is the Catholic perspective at the Catholic law school that is the object of suspicion. This raises one side of the coin presented by Susan’s helpful discussion about proselytizing and enabling students and faculty to disagree with particular views they find objectionable. Somehow the Catholic perspective seems to be the one that gets labeled “proselytizing” whereas vigorous advocacy for relativism or the exaggerated autonomy identified and addressed by Mary Ann Glendon in her “Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse” again is immune. But if some have a problem with what appears to be proselytizing, I hope we can agree that a Catholic institution, including a Catholic law school, is called to evangelize. If that is still a problem for some, then the institution's Catholic identity is not simply diluted, it is expunged.

This brings me to one last point I would like to offer about Ms. Lefevere’s article. She raises a discussion about the important questions surrounding who gets to teach at the Catholic law school, and she addresses issues surrounding hiring for mission. Hiring for mission discussions once prompted a colleague of mine to raise the issue if there could be such a practice as “firing for mission,” but I will put that aside for the time being. It appears that faculty members who have been hired, regardless of their views, have little to fear; moreover, tenure brings additional security. But a dimension of this important discussion about faculty hiring was not addressed, and this concerns those who share in the Catholic mission of the institution but face hidden obstacles to being hired. If a person cannot he hired, how can he or she contribute to the school’s Catholic mission? If the faculty candidate who is interested in contributing to the Catholic identity of the school and publicizes this aspiration has his or her application sidelined, this is a further problem. I am aware of hiring practices where some Catholic law school hiring committees have said: we must replace a woman who leaves with a woman; we must replace a racial minority who leaves with a racial minority; we must replace a sexual minority who leaves with a sexual minority. Is the same true about replacing a Catholic who leaves with a Catholic? A Jesuit with a Jesuit? Does simply asking the candidate whether he or she will “respect” the Catholic mission and identity of the school suffice? This makes Mark’s comment about “hiring toward mission” all the more important to the vitality of Catholic legal education.

I have gone on at some length, and I am grateful to MOJ readers for their patience. I would like to conclude on this note. For those who may view my remarks as expressions of dissatisfaction, I must add this counsel form St. Paul, whose wisdom I labor to follow. In his letter to the Romans, he reminds the faithful not to be overcome by evil; rather, the charge is to overcome evil and that which is wrong with good. That is often easier said than done, but when this exhortation becomes the course directing one’s life, that person’s discipleship has a greater claim to authenticity. It is also the direction that the Catholic law school and all associated with such an institution are called to pursue. Any thoughts anyone?    RJA sj