Moral Quietism, in Response to Richard and Rick

In accusing Justice Scalia (along with Andrew Sullivan) of "moral quietism,"  I meant to be mischievously provocative (in Justice Scalia's own grand tradition).  I certainly don't believe that he would want the Church's shepherds (a) to be silent in all cases involving moral questions.  And I don't even believe that he would want the Church's shepherds (b) to be silent in all cases involving moral questions where it has moral propositions to advance that are unpopular but it is not willing yet to label those moral truths as fundamental and non-negotiable.  However, (b) is precisely what he argued concerning the death penalty.  He did not argue just that the Church shouldn't make opposition to the death penalty a non-negotiable teaching; that would be a quite defensible argument.  Rather, he argued that if it is not a non-negotiable teaching, then the Church should not advance it as a moral teaching at all, and beckon Catholics to follow it, if it would be unpopular and Catholic officials following it would have trouble getting elected as a result.

My problems with this position are two-fold.  First, I can't imagine that Justice Scalia (or anyone else) would consistently apply it.  There are lots of moral issues on which the Church has something to say that is morally important and valuable, and on which both Catholics and their fellow citizens ought to be challenged, but that doesn't rise to the level of non-negotiable teaching.  And after all, the permissibility of the state taking life as a penalty is a far more basic moral question than whether section 106 of the Something or Other Act ought to have a cost-benefit standard or a best-available-technology standard -- the kind of question on which the Church can indeed exceed its competence and call its moral seriousness into question by crying wolf too much.  For these reasons, I don't think that Richard's and Rick's worries about the absolutizing of mere "policy positions" are implicated by the Church taking a basic moral stand against the death penalty.

This, it seems to me, is the fundamental flaw in Justice Scalia's argument.  It looks to be premised on there being two rigid categories of moral-political questions:  a few non-negotiable ones, on which the Church's leaders should advance the Church's beliefs zealously, and others, on which the Church's leaders should stay quiet as a matter of prudence (meaning "caution") if the moral position that they are convinced follows from the faith is unpopular.  Stated in that way, the position may seem like a caricature, but I think that has to be the logic underlying Justice Scalia's position that the Pope and bishops should not be setting forth opposition to the death penalty.  The question of how fundamental are various moral teachings in Catholic thought surely must be more nuanced than this.  BY THE WAY:  This is a good juncture at which to suggest that our April 2006 conference at St. Thomas on "Public Policy, Prudential Judgment, and the Catholic Social Tradition" will be a great opportunity to explore these issues, and to encourage the submission of academic paper proposals for that conference.

Moreover, in response to both Richard and Rick, I would hope that the Church would be able to explain to people that -- as with any other sophisticated moral outlook on the world -- Catholic moral reasoning does not just consist in a few rigidly binding principles with everything else morally up for grabs.  If people can't or won't understand that fact about Catholic moral reasoning, then the prospects for the Church's contributions to American public life really are quite dim.

ONE SUPPLEMENTAL THOUGHT:  If there is a prudential concern that pushing Catholic officials toward flatly opposing the death penalty may make them unelectable, there is also a prudential argument that cuts the other direction.  Susan Stabile mentions it at the end of her piece on abortion and John Courtney Murray's thought.  Opposition to the death penalty as part of a "consistent ethic of life" may increase the Church's credibility with many Americans on life issues such as abortion and euthanasia: it may convince people, for example, that the anti-abortion position is not rooted in a desire to confine women only to traditional roles.  Of course for a lot of people this "consistency" won't change their views -- and I don't mean to reopen the general debate on the advisability of a "consistent ethic of life" -- but one should weigh in the potential that a "consistent life" position can bolster the Church's moral credibility among moderate Americans of good faith.

Tom