Subsidiarity and Children's Rights

Jonathan Watson continues our conversation by suggesting how subsidiarity might play into the evaluation of the UN's Convention on Children's Rights:

It seems to me . . . that subsidiarity is intended not only as a warning to higher bodies, but against abdication of responsibility by lower orders as well.  Just as it would be a violation of this principle to interfere with state government who are having no problems dealing with. . . say . . . education, so it would be for a lower organization to willingly sign a document which abdicates responsibility or permits a higher organization to interfere where not necessary.

With these in mind, some aspects of the UN Children's document are salvageable. The parts dealing with international cooperation in situations where children need to move between states, where child slavery or prostitution is involved, or where international drug traffic is involved strike me as situations in which no lower order institution (state government) could possibly act effectively. On the other hand, those clauses previously discussed which allow for the possibility of state interference in the moral fiber of the family run afoul of the principle of subsidiarity.

But subsidiarity would give more leeway than this, wouldn't it?  Especially if the Convention's enforcement will stem primarily from moral sausion and public shaming within the international community (at least among those states for which shame is a possibility), it seems to me that the norms to be espoused could prudently go beyond "spillover" situations.  For example, couldn't the Convention stake out claims in favor of access to education (without necessarily mandating the substantive ends of that education) even though that impacts directly on the life of the family?  Certainly there are some fundamental truths that trump the deference given to lower bodies' decision-making authority under subsidiarity (the right to life, most obviously).  Maybe the scope and depth of the truths to be "operationalized" will vary with the degree of coercive power backing them.  But if the Convention is understood as embodying truth claims embraced by the signatory states, isn't there a subsidiarity-friendly benefit to encouraging/pressuring states (and consequently, the subcommunities within those states) to adopt certain practices that they are in fact disregarding, even if there is no discernible reason why those subcommunities could not decide to adopt such practices on their own?  In other words, subsidiarity seems to contemplate top-down action when lower bodies fail -- as a matter of fact -- to adhere to principles consistent with human dignity, not just when they are incapable of adhering to those principles.  (To be clear, I'm putting to the side the question of what the substance of those principles should be.)

Rob