Response to Michael

Responding to Rob, I wrote:

[I]t seems to me that more than "hatred of 'the other'" might underly a view that homosexual conduct among teenagers is more of a concern to the public authority than heterosexual conduct among teenagers.

Michael writes, in response:

But the proper constitutional analysis does not stop there.  The question is whether any of the (non-hating) rationales for the differential treatment in question is plausible.  I cannot myself discern any plausible such rationale.

I should have been more precise:  I did not intend to make a claim about constitutional analysis.  I do not know what reasons or premises in fact motivated Kansas's legislators.  And, like Michael, I'm not surprised by the outcome of the case.  (That said, it is clear to me that "rational basis" scrutiny has come, in the context of sexual matters, to mean more than it means in other contexts.  It might be preferable for courts to own up to the fact that gay-rights cases now trigger something more exacting.). 

I do believe, though, that -- putting aside entirely my views about the wisdom of public-morals legislation having to do with sexual activity -- plausible, "non-hating" rationales exist for such legislation.  Of course, I have read Michael's work on this matter, and understand that he does not find such rationales compelling or morally attractive.  I would distinguish, though, when assessing these rationales and such legislation, between "hatred of the other" and "moral premises and arguments that strike us as unconvincing."

Rick