on Miers and substantive due process

On the Miers' nomination and whether her possible (increasingly dubious?) confirmation will mean another vote to overturn Roe, I have come to feel increasingly and even substantively nearly as concerned about that, as I am about having a Justice who will cease reading passing opinions into constitutional family law jurisprudence.  This, when one considers how very far the constitutional rights of families have moved away from Pierce and Myers, and even Griswold,  to the point where Justice Kennedy's Lawrence opinion can locate the right to homosexual intercourse within the group of constitutional rights concerning parents' care, custody and control of their children, and even rights which at least contemplate children (even while supporting a right to prevent their conception, or terminate their unborn lives).  He makes a passing attempt to link non-procreative sexual relations to the "family" in dicta assuring the reading public that surely such behavior indicates a longer term relationship of real significance.  It is embarrassing on its face. 

Whether the near-equal status I give to this process of finding substantive due process rights flows from a commitment to subsidiarity, or from a continuing, stubborn  belief in the truly human aspirations of the large mass of the electorate, I cannot say.  But my continued exposure to this line of constitutional cases only strengthens it.