Children's Rights

Rob asks, "is there any persuasive reason why the Convention [on the Rights of the Child] should not be embraced by those concerned with the well-being of the child?  Should Catholic legal theorists be taking up the charge and advocating for its ratification?"  A few thoughts:

First, I have to admit that I am not particularly moved by the observation that "the United States is the only nation other than Somalia not to ratify the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child."  I don't believe that all of these countries have in any meaningful sense committed themselves to protecting the dignity, rights, and welfare of children.  I suppose those making decisions about the Convention on behalf of the United States might think that ratifying the Convention should actually reflect a commitment to be bound by it and might believe that, in the absence of such a commitment, they ought not to ratify it.

Second, and notwithstanding the declaration that Rob quoted, regarding the Holy See's views of the Convention, it seems to me that there might good reasons why a country committed to limited government, a diverse civil society, the integrity of the family, and the rights of parents to direct and control the upbringing, education, and religious formation of their children might hesitate before embracing the "rights talk" regime outlined in the Convention.  Such a country might well hesitate before agreeing that it had an obligation -- to say nothing of a right -- to pursue the various aspirations set out in the Convention.  The Convention provides, for example:

Parties undertake to ensure the child such protection and care as is necessary for his or her well-being, taking into account the rights and duties of his or her parents, legal guardians, or other individuals legally responsible for him or her, and, to this end, shall take all appropriate legislative and administrative measures.

Is it enough, do we think, to "tak[e] into account the rights and duties" of parents?  Also:

In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.

What are the implications of agreeing that "[i]n all actions concerning children" by "private social welfare institutions" the "best interests of the child" -- as understood or conceived, presumably, by state actors -- "shall be a primary consideration"?  And:

. . . Parties shall respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents or, where applicable, the members of the extended family or community as provided for by local custom, legal guardians or other persons legally responsible for the child, to provide, in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child, appropriate direction and guidance in the exercise by the child of the rights recognized in the present Convention.

What is the significance of (apparently) conditioning parents' rights and duties regarding the upbringing and education on their children on officials' understanding of what is "consistent with the evolving capacities of the child"?  Next:

Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own views the right to express those views freely [including, as the next provision makes clear, in legal proceedings] in all matters affecting the child, the views of the child being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child.

What would it mean for a child to enjoy this right, and for this right to be enforced?  The Convention provides:

The child shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of the child's choice.

The exercise of this right may be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary:  (a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; or (b) For the protection of national security or of public order . . . or of public health or morals.

Do we believe that children enjoy such a right to "receive . . . information and ideas of all kinds", subject only to the needs of public order (as understood by officials)?  Finally, there is this:

Parties shall respect the right of the child to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.

Parties shall respect the rights and duties of the parents and, when applicable, legal guardians, to provide direction to the child in the exercise of his or her right in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child.

Does this suggest that, at some point, as her "capacities" "evolv[e]", a child has a (legally enforceable) right to, say, opt out of her parents' insistence that she participate in religious instruction?

Now, I do not have a firm view on the question whether, all things considered, the United States should ratify the Convention.  I do suspect, though, that reasonable people -- and, what's more, reasonable people who are trying to think through policy in accord with Catholic thinking and teaching about the family, civil society, religious freedom, the common good, the duties and powers of government, etc. -- could have some concerns about the Convention's text, its premises, and its application.

I know that Patrick Brennan has been thinking a lot about children's "vocation" lately.  I wonder what he thinks . . . .

Rick