Briefs in Ritual-Tea Religious-Freedom Case

Initial briefs for both sides have now been filed in the Supreme Court in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, the case involving the federal government's threatened prosecution of a religious sect (the UDV) that ingests a tea at its worship services containing a small amount of a natually occuring hallucinogenic substance.  As discussed in a previous post here, the sect obtained a preliminary injunction against application of the federal drug laws based on the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), and this case raises questions about the scope and vigor of RFRA's interpretation that are potentially vital to a wide range of faiths.  (The constitutionality of RFRA is not likely to be an issue, since the government has not questioned it.)  Oral argument is November 1.

Briefs for the federal government and the UDV are here.  A number of amicus briefs supporting the sect are at this site.  They include a brief that I co-wrote (downloadable here) on behalf of 17 religious and civil-liberties organizations ranging from the ACLU to the National Association of Evangelicals and including among others Muslims, Orthodox Jews, and Sikhs (the kind of broad ideological coalition that supported RFRA in the first place).  The brief argues for a strong interpretation of RFRA's requirement that when government imposes a "substantial burden" on sincere religious exercise, the application of that burden must be justified as the least restrictive means of serving a compelling governmental interest.  Excerpts from the summary of argument:

The Government’s challenges to the UDV’s request for an injunction conflict with RFRA’s text and logic and, if accepted, would seriously undercut the statute’s purpose of protecting the religious conscience of all faiths. . . .

First, as RFRA’s plain language provides, the Government must establish that it has a compelling interest in applying the law in question "to the person"—that is, to the claimant’s own particular religious conduct—not merely a compelling interest in the law in general. Requiring the Government to prove the need for regulating the individual claimant is crucial if RFRA’s protections are to be meaningful. Indeed, without such a requirement, the "compelling interest/least restrictive alternative" analysis becomes a tautology: The Government can always claim (despite its present attempt to limit this case to illegal drugs) that it has a "compelling interest" in the uniform application of the law, and on that basis establish that a policy of denying all religious exemptions is the "least restrictive means" of furthering that interest.

Thus, in this case, the Government cannot meet its burden merely by contending that the Controlled Substances Act requires uniform enforcement. Rather, the Government must show a compelling interest in prohibiting the importation and use of hoasca in the specific context of the UDV’s rituals. As a corollary, the Government may not simply rely on generalized congressional findings about a controlled substance but must "demonstrate," with real evidence, that the substance poses compelling dangers in the context of the sacramental use. . . .

Second, given the stringency of the compelling interest test, the Government must prove that the harm to the governmental interest from the claimant’s religious exercise will be serious and likely, as shown by concrete evidence rather than speculation or even general congressional findings. That is why the district court was correct in requiring the Government to show that the UDV’s use of sacramental hoasca tea would create "serious risks of harm" to its members or "a significant risk of diversion to non-religious uses." Given the district court’s finding that the evidence concerning these harms was merely "in equipoise," the courts below properly held that the Government had not met its stringent burden.

When I find a site with amicus briefs supporting the government, I'll pass it on.

Tom B.