O'Brien on "so-called life issues"

Thanks to Michael for linking to David O'Brien's recent Commonweal piece.  I continue to think that the "will the bishops be 'consistent' by applying the same standard to Judge Roberts as they did to John Kerry" argument is quite weak:  John Kerry and Judge Roberts were / are seeking different jobs, with different powers and responsibilities.  In any event, though, O'Brien writes this:

Some early reports associated Roberts with the Federalist Society and its hankering to return to pre-New Deal restrictions on federal powers. That position is at odds with important elements of Catholic social teaching.

In fact, (1) there's nothing wrong with the Federalist Society; (2) the Federalist Society does not waste time "hankering to return to pre-New Deal restrictions on federal powers" (O'Brien has probably been duped by the silly "Constitution in Exile" bugaboo here); and, more important, (3) it is not the case that it conflicts with "important elements of Catholic social teaching" to believe that, the Constitution -- a legal document -- really means something that, let's concede for now, might make achieving certain Catholic-supported policy goals more difficult.  If it is a fact -- and, I think it is -- that the Constitution does not give Congress a general police power or general regulatory authority, then it is hard for me to see how this "fact" could conflict with "Catholic social teaching," any more than could the "fact" that, say, edible and nutritious grains don't grow everywhere. 

The Constitution, properly understood, permits John Kerry to oppose, and vote against, public funding for abortion, and to support reasonable regulations of abortion.  So (putting aside the Communion question), I see no reason why the Bishops should not urge Kerry to do so.  But if the Constitution does not, in fact, confer upon Congress a general police power, it would be inappropriate for Bishops to urge John Roberts to invent one.

O'Brien also writes:

In fact, if a nominee is prolife but supports a judicial philosophy likely to produce results at odds with Catholic teachings on human rights, social justice, or the common good, that nominee should not receive Catholic support.

I suppose my strong disagreement with this statement reflects, in part, my view that O'Brien's views about the content of "Catholic teaching" on these matters are not the only reasonable ones.  What's more, though, this statement reflects, I think, a disappointing failure to understand what constitutes good judging.

Still, there are a lot of points, claims, and reminders in O'Brien's piece that I think are worth taking to heart.