Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Tuesday, August 2, 2005

Chris Hitchens on "Catholic Justice"

I love reading Christopher Hitchens.  So, I just grin and bear it when he directs his quite potent rhetorical venom at folks I like, like Churchill, JP II, and Mother Teresa.  Here is an essay, on Slate, where he urges readers to "quit tip-toeing around John Roberts' faith."  In a nutshell, he tells people to stop pretending to be so shocked-and-chargrined by questions about Roberts' Catholicism -- or Catholicism generally -- and to face up to the fact that it is perfectly reasonable to worry about the Catholicism of public officials and the influence of Catholicism in public life because, well, Catholicism is worrisome.  He writes:

Why should this question [i.e., about the possibility of a conflict between a judge's legal duties and his or her faith] be asked only of Catholics? Well, that's easy. The Roman Catholic Church claims the right to legislate on morals for all its members and to excommunicate them if they don't conform. [RG:  Don't most religions, and most associations of any kind for that matter, claim pretty much the same "right"?]  The church is also a foreign state, which has diplomatic relations with Washington. In the very recent past, this church and this state gave asylum to Cardinal Bernard Law, who should have been indicted for his role in the systematic rape and torture of thousands of American children. . . .

[Q]uite apart from the scandalous obstruction of American justice in which the church took part in the matter of Cardinal Law, we have increasingly firm papal dogmas on two issues that are bound to come before the court: abortion and the teaching of Darwin in schools. So, please do not accuse me of suggesting a "dual loyalty" among American Catholics.  It is their own church, and its conduct and its teachings, that raise this question.  [RG:  Again, it is simply not clear why the possibility of exclusion from the Catholic Church and its sacraments is treated so differently by Hitchens, in terms of its possible corrupting influence on a judge's deliberations, than would be the possibility of exclusion from any other association, institution, or relationship.] . . .

If Roberts is confirmed there will be quite a bloc of Catholics on the court. Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas are strong in the faith. Is it kosher to mention these things? The Constitution rightly forbids any religious test for public office, but what happens when a religious affiliation conflicts with a judge's oath to uphold the Constitution?  [RG:  Well, this is pretty easy, isn't it?  If anything "conflicts with a judge's oath to uphold the Constitution," then we have trouble, right?  But there is no reason to think, or even to suspect, that Roberts's "religious affiliation" conflicts with his "oath to uphold the Constitution."  Nothing in Catholicism precludes Roberts from taking the following (perfectly reasonable) course:  (a) Upholding the Constitution by interpreting and applying, fairly and objectively, the laws, treaties, and Constitution of the United States, and (b) recusing himself or resigning, if necessary to avoid culpable cooperation with evil.]

Oh well, nobody's perfect.

Rick

Monday, August 1, 2005

Catholic judges and Catholic politicians

This op-ed by Michael McGough, "Catholic judges and a higher authority," is confused.  After noting that some Catholics have argued that some abortion-rights-supporting politicians should not receive communion, McGough asks, in effect, what about the judges?  "But for those bishops who do take a hard line against pro-choice legislators, there is no excuse in theology or logic for holding back from sanctioning Catholic judges — such as Supreme Court Justice Anthony M. Kennedy — who vote to affirm or apply Roe vs. Wade."

This is silly, of course.  True, McGough concedes that:

[N]ot targeting judges might be explained by the differences between legislators and adjudicators.  Judges (in theory anyway) are ruling on the basis of a disinterested reading of the law, not their personal beliefs. But pro-choice members of Congress can similarly argue that their pro-choice votes are a reflection not of their own views but of the desires of their constituents.  Whether the public official's defense is "the polls made me do it" or "precedent made me do it," isn't the moral issue the same?

What's particularly frustrating is that the asserted equivalence between (a) refusing to overrule Roe v. Wade and, say, (b) voting to fund late-term abortions is superficially appealing enough so that many readers will follow McGough into the error of thinking that McGough's point is clever or powerful.

On the other hand, there is something to the last line quoted above:  "[i]sn't the moral issue the same?"  I guess it is, in that both politicians and judges have a moral obligation to avoid scandal and to avoid culpable cooperation with evil.  It seems pretty clear to me that a judge who (mistakenly) concludes that the Constitution permits legislatures to permit abortion is in a very different position, cooperation-with-evil wise, than a legislator who votes to subsidize abortion.

Rick

More on Neo-Darwinism and Cardinal Schonborn

Here is an essay, "Darwinism and Catholicism Should Be Compatible," by Notre Dame's Professor Gary Belovsky.  The essay is critical of Christoph Cardinal Schonborn's recent New York Times op-ed, in which the Cardinal was, in turn, critical of "neo-Darwinian" evolution.  (For some earlier MOJ posts on this matter, click here and here).

There is much in Professor Belovsky's essay that strikes me as helpful and, well, right.  I'm not sure about this, though:   "Cardinal Schönborn is afraid of Neo-Darwinsism because he has advocated literal interpretation of biblical creation stories and proclaims God’s purpose in all events."  I would be very surprised if Cardinal Schonborn "has advocated literal interpretation of biblical creation stories"; if anyone has any evidence for or examples of such advocacy, please let me know.

He also writes:

Combining science and religion is dangerous, because science relies on observation and religion relies on faith.  God’s existence cannot be scientifically proven, because God cannot be measured; individuals must personally accept God’s existence on faith. 

I think Professor Belovsky might be overstating his case a bit here.  It seems fair to read him as claiming that, unlike "science," "religion [only] relies on faith [and not reason]."  That claim strikes me as off the mark.  Obviously, not all of the truths of religion are demonstrable; still, theology and "religion" do draw on "reason."  Catholics -- and Professor Belovsky is one -- are not fideists.

Professor Belovsky concludes:  "Do we now return to pre-Darwinian views that earth was created only 6000 years ago and fossils of long extinct animals and plants are not real, but are God’s test of our faith?"  Absolutely  not.  But Cardinal Schonborn certainly did not suggest or endorse such a return.  Belovsky's objections here seeem misdirected.

Rick