Great post at "Christian Legal Theory"

Thanks to Richard for alerting us to Kevin Lee's new blog, "Christian Legal Theory."  Right out the box, Kevin is providing some very thoughtful and helpful discussion of our favorite topic here at MOJ, i.e., Christian Moral Anthropology and the law.  Here is a taste:

This means, of course, that Catholic thought and life cannot be wholly reduced to philosophical propositions. In particular, the moral life of Catholics is structured by a robust conception of the human person. The Christian anthropology is irreducible—it cannot be expressed in secular terms. This dimension of Fides et Ratio should be read in light of recent hermeneutical thought, which has argued that religious propositions cannot be understood in isolation. For example, the idea of the Eucharist relies to some degree on the idea of the Trinity. It is not possible to grasp the meaning of the sacrament that is symbolized by the word “Eucharist” without grasping what is meant by “Trinity.” And, “Trinity” evokes a whole host of other symbols. A rose will have a special significance to a Carmelite, and to a Zen Buddhist, a cup of tea can be suffuse in meanings difficult to understand without years of study. These complexes of associations and meanings are typically referred to as “webs of signification” by which a worldview is communicated. A believing Christian interprets the world through a distinct set of significations which are web-like in their interrelation and world-embracing in their scope. . . .

There are significant implications of these passages for thinking about the nature of Catholic legal education and Catholic legal scholarship.

Kevin also touches, in this post, on a matter that we've addressed several times here, namely, the nature, characteristics, and purpose of a distinctively Catholic law school.  Commenting on, among other things, John Breen's recent article on Jesuit law schools, Lee writes:

Breen is suggesting that sensitizing the student to the moral relevance of the lawyer’s work is essential to the task of Catholic legal education. But, while this is necessary, it is not the sufficient feature to distinguish Catholic legal education. Breen argues that such courses in legal theory cannot be the centerpiece of a properly Christian education unless the legal theory presented engages the Catholic intellectual tradition. . . .  In short, Breen argues that legal education cannot be specifically Catholic without reference to the essential teachings of the Church regarding the nature of the person.

A question that might be put to Breen, however, is whether it is possible to set out the essence of the Church’s teaching on the person without using a specifically Catholic theological vocabulary. Aren’t rights and freedoms things that secular thinkers endorse too? Why not just teach these ideas in “non-offensive” secular language? This sort of apologetic approach has many supporters. . . .

It could be argued that a Christian account of the world and of the moral life must be rooted in theology that resists correlation and translation. While his argument is quite complex, it is worth noting here that Fides et Ratio gives some guidance about the limits that one can hope to achieve in the translation or correlation of Catholic thought. John Paul suggests that the Catholic mode of signification contains certain features that are irreducible in the sense that the meanings of these doctrines elude other modes of signification. The irreducible essence of the faith, he contends, requires understanding the meaning of human beings as creatures created in God’s image, yet fallen and redeemed in Christ. Studies on justice and human dignity take on unique significance from within this irreducible doctrine of the Catholic faith than is possible from secular rights theories and moral anthropologies. . . .

So, while I believe Breen is quite correct in insisting on the need among law students for a sustained study of justice, and that this study must include some conception of the human person, I think that for a legal theory to be recognizably Catholic, it must take as properly basic the irreducible claims of Revelation that John Paul points out in Chapter Seven of Fides et Ratio. And, turning to legal education as such, one might add a thesis to the first point of doctrine that John Paul identifies: that Catholic legal education must come to terms with the claim, repeated often in Scripture and among the Fathers of the early Church, that Jesus Christ is the Lord of all nations; that He is the truth which all nations desire. Working out the meaning of these claims is the essence of understanding the theological context of Catholic legal education, and without such understanding, the identity of the Catholic law school will remain forever adrift.

Please note that I am not saying that there is no room in Catholic institutions of higher learning for the study and teaching of other views. I am simply saying that they are OTHER, in the sense of not being essential to the Catholic faith. The problem is one of definition. If Catholicity has a meaning, then it must be defined by adherence to certain beliefs and practices. Failing to keep to these definitional features moves one beyond the boundaries of Catholicism. Just as a lion is distinguished from a tiger by its thick mane and lack of stripes, so too is a Catholic legal theorist to be distinguished from other theorists by a committed belief in the giftedness of creation, the intrinsic dignity of the human rooted in the imagio dei, and the ability of the human mind to know the meaning of human existence. Theories that are not derived from these claims are simply so different from Catholic teaching as to be unrecognizable to the Christian faith, no matter what other Christian features might be evident. Surely the grace and clarity with which the late pope expressed these insights will contribute to his lasting greatness.

What do people think?  Fr. Araujo?  The St. Thomas crew?  The Dean?

Rick