Araujo on judges

I feel a bit chastened, thinking of how often my own contributions to this blog are in the "link and exit" mode, reading yet another detailed and thoughtful post from Fr. Araujo, this time on the CDF's instruction and judges.  I hope he'll follow up, with a few clarifications (or, rather, further explanations).  I (and a few others) have written here that it is a mistake -- and I am still convinced that it is -- to fail carefully to distinguish between legislators and judges when thinking about what the Church and her moral teaching demand of Catholics in public service.  Fr. Araujo writes:

I would like to take this opportunity to address some views that may have suggested that the role of judges may have been omitted from recent Church texts regarding the judicial role in democracy and public life. I believe that the CDF’s Doctrinal Note on the Participation of Catholics in Political Life does provide insight on the role of all Catholic citizens regardless of their role in political processes.

I should be clear that I certainly do not think (and have not understood anyone else to have suggested) that "the role of judges may have been omitted from recent Church texts regarding the judicial role."  As Fr. Araujo writes, the recent CDF note (and Church teaching more generally) speaks to the role of "all Catholic citizens."  I would emphasize, though, that the fact that the Church speaks to the "role of all Catholic citizens" in public service does not mean that Catholic citizens in public public service do not play different roles in the political and legal systems or that these different roles are not important in identifying what is morally and legally required of these citizens.

So, too, with Fr. Araujo's statement, "No one who claims to be a Catholic is excused. To argue that judges fall through a crack in the Church’s teachings would be a flawed position to take and to maintain."  Absolutely.  The claim that, for example, a Catholic judge is not required -- and, indeed, really should not -- exercise her judicial role for the purpose of bringing out policy outcomes that strike her as consistent with Catholic social teaching is not the claim that a judge is "excused" from moral responsibility, or that "judges fall through a crack in the Church's teachings."  As Fr. Araujo writes, the Church's teachings "indicate how a Catholic is to be well informed and exercise sound and right reason as he or she engages his or her proper role in political life."  I would want to highlight the words "proper role." 

So, to make all this a bit more concrete:  I am willing to take it as given that, all things considered, a Catholic politician in the present context should, in order to promote the common good, moral truth, and human dignity, probably work and vote to reduce the use of the death penalty. It would be a very different thing, though, to say that, given the same facts on the ground and context, Catholic judges should use the judicial power to invalidate death sentences or death-penalty statutes as unconstitutional.  This is because the death penalty is not unconstitutional [note:  I originally wrote "constitutional" here.  Apologies!], and it would certainly be a mistake for the Church to demand of Catholic judges that they declare otherwise.  And, in those cases where a judge should reverse a death sentence as having been imposed contrary to law, the reason for this reversal is not, and should not be, that the death penalty is immoral.  (Note that I am putting aside, for now, the question whether judges "cooperate  with evil" by even participating in death cases).

Does Fr. Araujo (or anyone else) disagree with any of this?

Rick