The American Life League statement

Thanks to Rob for posting, and raising questions about, the recent statement by the American Life League in opposition to the nomination to the Supreme Court of Attorney General Gonzales.  I share what I take to be Rob's doubts about the statement.  Here, again, is what the Attorney General said, as reported by ALL:

"[My] own personal feelings about abortion don't matter… The question is, what is the law, what is the precedent, what is binding in rendering your decision. Sometimes, interpreting a statute, you may have to uphold a statute that you may find personally offensive. But as a judge, that's your job."

In my view, Rob is right to question ALL's complaint that "Gonzales' position is clear: the personhood of the preborn human being is secondary to technical points of law, and that is a deadly perspective for anyone to take."  In fact, it is a judge's job, sometimes, to apply and uphold "offensive" statutes.  (That said, laws authorizing abortion -- that is, laws excluding unborn children from the protection of homicide laws -- are, in my view, not merely "offensive"; they are also unjust.  But I assume -- I welcome correction on this point -- that a judge sometimes may uphold and apply even an "unjust" law without culpably cooperating with evil).

It strikes me that, in fact, nothing in the Attorney General's statement is inconsistent with what I take to be the truth of the matter, namely, that Roe and Casey were wrongly decided and are incorrect interpretations and understandings of the relevant "law" and "precedent" that are "binding" on a Justice.  As a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, it seems to me that Gonzales's "personal feelings about abortion" in fact wouldn't (and shouldn't) matter (with the exception, of course, that Gonzales -- like anyone else -- would have a moral obligation to avoid culpable cooperation with evil, and so he would need to attend to the possibility that, in participating in an abortion-related case, he might fail to act in accord with that obligation.).  Gonzales could reasonably (and morally) believe, it seems to me, that, as a lower-court judge or executive official, his opposition to abortion does not authorize him to ignore "binding" law and precedent -- even offensive and wrong law and precedent -- though it might require him to recuse himself or resign in order to avoid scandal or sin.  This does not (necessarily) mean that he would not vote to reverse or cut back on Roe.

The ALL should also remember that, as a Justice, Gonzales could believe that "technical points of law" do trump "personal feelings", and also that (a) Casey should be interpreted, as Justice Kennedy advocated in Stenberg, to permit restrictions on the abortion "right" (e.g., the partial-birth-abortion ban); that (b) Roe was wrongly decided, and should not be expanded or extended; and / or that (c) Roe and Casey should be overruled, not because abortion is immoral, or because of Gonzales's "personal feelings", but because the considerations that usually weigh in favor of stare decisis are outweighed by the egregiousness of Roe's error and its pernicious effects on our law and politics.

I'm not advocating the nomination of Attorney General Gonzales.  There are, I believe, strong reasons to believe that the President would do better to nominate someone else.  I hope the next Justice(s) on the Supreme Court have a firm commitment to rule-of-law values, a well-developed "judicial philosophy," and a clear understanding both of the structural features of our Constitution and of the constraints on the Court's power and right to second-guess democratic decisions regarding moral questions.  But my impression is that some on the pro-life side (i.e., my side) are reading too much into Gonzales's opinions as a Texas judge in a few parental-notification cases, and are too quick to assume that statements like the one quoted by ALL necessarily mean that "Justice Gonzales" would perpetuate, or fail to remedy, Roe's error.  It is, it seems to me, perfectly reasonable to oppose the nomination of Attorney General Gonzales, and to advocate the nomination of someone who has spoken correctly and clearly on the question of Roe specifically and constitutional interpretation more generally.  It is mistaken, though, to set up as the touchstone for an acceptable nominee a willingness to put "personal feelings" above "technical points of law."   

I could be wrong, of course; I would appreciate others' takes.

UPDATE:  Here, from "Wired Catholic," is a long complaint about and objection to Rob's post.  It seems to me that the author misunderstands, and overreacts to, Rob's questions.