What Should We Do With John Couey?

The conversation sparked by Eugene Volokh's post on executions in Iran is an important one.  The conception of human dignity underlying Catholic legal theory should have a discernible impact on our understanding of criminal law.  Public safety, deterrence, and perhaps restitution are fairly uncontroversial, but the role of retribution may be contested.  Rick asserts that "punishment is justified because and only to the extent that the criminal deserves it and it will redress the disorder introduced by his offense."  Michael Perry emphasizes that "[w]e are called to love--to treat with charity as well as with justice--even the most depraved criminal."

I'm wondering if we can bring the conversation to bear on a particular, heartbreaking case.  John Couey stands accused of kidnapping, sexually abusing, and killing a 9 year-old Florida girl.  The sheriff has referred to Couey as "trash," and the girl's father has expressed his (understandable) desire to see Couey "rot in hell."  Putting capital punishment to the side and assuming that Couey is proven guilty, what is the proper role for retribution in Couey's punishment?  How can the state redress the disorder caused by this unspeakable crime?  How should the state show charity (and justice) to Couey?  Is a lifetime of physical suffering (e.g., chain gangs) or a lifetime of opportunities to cultivate his own personhood (e.g., prison art classes) more compatible with Catholic legal theory?  Should the state aim to rehabilitate Couey so that he could rejoin society, or does retribution trump rehabilitation in some egregious contexts?

In other words, if Catholic legal theorists were asked to advise the prosecutor, court, and prison warden on the just and humane treatment of Couey, what would we say?

Rob