Punishment and Moral Desert

A thought for Rick, Rob, and anyone else interested:  If it would be wrong for us to punish a human being--any human being--in a certain way (say, by executing him), no matter what he has done--if, for example, it would be contrary to the charity with which we are called to treat every human being ("Love another just as I have loved you") to punish a human being--any human being--in a certain way, then it follows that no human being deserves to be treated that way.  That is, it follows that no human being ought to be treated that way--at least, by those of us who are committed to the relevant moral norm, which, in this case, is charity.  (The "at least" is for those of us who accept "internal" reasons for action but reject "external" reasons.)  I realize that this thought is compressed--I'm on the run.   I will soon post a paper--probably next week--that deals with some of this.  The paper, Capital Punishment and the Morality of Human Rights, is forthcoming in St. John's Universy School of Law's Journal of Catholic Legal Studies.  If Rick or anyone else has a different understanding of moral "desert", I'd like to hear about it.  Pending a response, it seems to me that if all things considered one (morally) ought not--if one ought not, for whatever reasons or reasons--to be treated in a certain way, then he does not (morally) deserve to be treated that way.  No one morally deserves what we morally ought not to do to him ... unless I'm overlooking some complication.  I'm eager to be tutored.