Further on Punishment and "Desert"

Thanks to Rick Garnett for calling our attention to some recent comments on the issue of punishment and desert by Notre Dame philosopher John O'Callaghan (here)--comments prompted by some questions and thoughts that Rob Vischer, Rick, and I had posted to this blog.

O'Callaghan makes the sensible point that even if it is the case that A deserves a punishment, in the sense that under ordinary circumstances we would do no wrong to impose that punishment on A, it might also be the case that under the actual circumstances we ought not to impose that punishment on A.   For example, it might be the case that to impose the punishment in question on A would work a devastating harm on the members of his family.  In that case, we could say that although A deserves the punishment, we ought not to impose it on him, not because A doesn't deserve it, but because we ought not to treat the members of his family that way.  Again, this is a sensible point.  But it is not a point that engages what I said in an earlier posting.  Or perhaps I should say:  It is not a point that engages what I tried to say in an earlier posting.

So let me try again:  If it is the case that we should not impose--that morally we ought not to impose--a particular sort of punishment on A or on any other human being, because to do so would for us to violate the human being--any human being--on whom we imposed the punishment, then it cannot be the case that A or any other human being  deserves that punishment.  (What sort of punishment--besides torture--fits that profile?  The death penalty?)  That was my point.  And John O'Callaghan, as I read his comments, does not contend to the contrary.

But as I said before, I may be missing something.  I remain eager to be tutored.

Michael P.