Divorce, Euthanasia, and Double Effect

Cross-posted from my personal blog:

In an interesting post on the Schiavo case, Eugene Volokh takes Slate to task for calling into question the Catholic bona fides of Terry Schiavo's parents' effort to obtain a divorce for Terry from Michael. Eugene opines:

I'm by no stretch of the imagination an expert on Catholicism, but I would think that Catholic teachings recognize that even really important principles (such as "no divorce") may have to yield when they run up against a more important principle (such as "preserve human life"). This doesn't mean that the first principle is wrong or insignificant, only that even important moral rules that are usually stated categorically might have some extraordinary exceptions.

I'm not sure why that's right, although, as you'll see, it does appear to be correct.

The relevant ethical principle would seem to be the doctrine of double effect, which in Catholic theology ordinarily requires that four conditions be satisfied:

1. The action in itself must be morally good or at least indifferent.
2. The good effect, and not the evil effect, must be what is intended.
3. The good result cannot result from the bad effect: the good effect must precede or occur simultaneously with the bad effect.
4. There must be a proportionately serious reason for permitting the bad effect.

A classic example, with obvious relevance to the Schiavo case, is the use of painkillers at the end of life:

Suppose a dying woman is in severe pain. The normal dosage of pain relievers is not sufficient to control her suffering. The physician knows that in order to control that pain, the minimum effective dose might also hasten her impending death. However, her pain is so severe that the doctor gives her the drug in an amount sufficient to bring her comfort. Her breathing is affected by the pain reliever, and she dies a little sooner than might otherwise have been the case. (Link)

The doctrine of double effect is satisfied here. Importantly, the first condition is satisfied because the action itself, the administration of pain-relieving drugs, is ethically good and proper.

In contrast, as I understand the Slate posting, it suggests that Terry's parents want to obtain a divorce for her from Michael, which would remove him as her guardian, and allow the parents to decide her treatment.

I don't see how the first condition of the doctrine would be satisfied on those facts. The action - obtaining a divorce - is neither ethically good nor even neutral. It is ethicaly improper -- a moral wrong. (I think this follows ineluctably from Pope John Paul II's Discourse to the Roman Rota on Divorce.)

Moreover, is there not a problem with the third condition? The good result - a change in guardians to those who would reinsert the feeding tube - follows from the bad action. It does not precede or occur simultaneously.

On the other hand, there is this passage from the Catechism (para. 2383):

If civil divorce remains the only possible way of ensuring certain legal rights, the care of the children, or the protection of inheritance, it can be tolerated and does not constitute a moral offense.

If a civil divorce may be obtained to protect the rights of children, presumably it also may be obtained to protect the life of one of the spouses. (Note that all other avenues of protecting Terry seemingly must be exhausted, in light of the Catechism's reference to the "only possible way.") This would seem to be what the Pope was referring to in a passage of the Discourse quoted by both Slate and Eugene:

Lawyers, as independent professionals, should always decline the use of their profession for an end that is contrary to justice, as is divorce. They can only cooperate in this kind of activity when, in the intention of the client, it is not directed to the break-up of the marriage, but to the securing of other legitimate effects that can only be obtained through such a judicial process in the established legal order (cf. Catechism of the Catholic Church, n. 2383). In this way, with their work of assisting and reconciling persons who are going through a marital crises, lawyers truly serve the rights of the person and avoid becoming mere technicians at the service of any interest whatever.

So either I'm misapplying the doctrine of double effect or there's some other relevant doctrine that I've overlooked, because I still don't see how you can reach this result consistently with the first and third conditions of the doctrine.

Comments?