"Mere clusters of cells"

Notre Dame philosophy prof John O'Callaghan shares my reaction to the New York Times editorial on human cloning; he observes that labeling an embryo as a:

"mere cluster of cells" is not a scientific judgment, even if uttered by a scientist, no more so than if a scientist were to look at a painting, Seurat's "A Sunday on La Grande Jatte" for example, and utter the claim "that is a mere cluster of pigments."

We call people like that ignorant, however much specialized training they may have in some field. What we want to know is why it is in fact more than just "a mere cluster of pigments." It stretches the bounds of credulity to imagine praticing scientists doing their jobs in their labs walking around talking about the "mere clusters of cells in my petri dish." In fact, I do not believe many at all would say this. Look at their practice. The very fact that they are in their petri dishes presupposes they are not "mere clusters of cells."

If they were mere clusters of cells, why are they in their petri dish? Why are they so interested in this "mere cluster of cells" and not some other one? Why as a part of good scientific practice do they attempt to use sterile petri dishes in their studies, the sterility of which requires that they eliminate any "mere clusters of cells" from the environment of the petri dish? No. They know that they are studying no mere cluster of cells, but a certain kind of cluster of cells exhibiting a biological unity ordered toward a certain kind of physical development. In their actual scientific practice, they want to know why it is in fact more than just a "mere cluster of cells." One will learn nothing specific about the cloning of human beings by studying a mere cluster of cells that happens to be a labrador embryo, and even less from a "mere cluster of cells" that has no biological unity to it. Indeed, that is why it is even silly to refer to this supposed "mere cluster of cells" as "potential life." It is identifiably a certain kind of life undergoing biological processes of life distinctive of the kind of being it is in the stage of development it is. If it were not such an identifiable kind of life, the scientist would not be studying it.

If someone who happens to be a biologist says that what he is studying is a "mere cluster of cells," he is not speaking or acting as a biologist when he does so. No biologist studies "mere clusters of cells." He is speaking and acting politically. And the history of our culture tells us that when someone starts saying that a living thing is "a mere X" we should watch our wallets, and even more so our backs.