[A reader of this blog, who is also an alum of Notre Dame--Eric Kniffin--kindly answered the question I included in my most recent post. Here's the answer, from an online encyclopedia:]
Correlation implies causation, also known as cum hoc ergo propter hoc, is a logical fallacy by which two events that occur together are claimed to be cause and effect.
For example:
Teenage boys eat lots of chocolate.
Teenage boys have acne.
Therefore, chocolate causes acne.
This argument, and any of this pattern, is an example of a false categorical syllogism. One observation about it is that the fallacy ignores the possibility that the correlation is coincidence. But we can always pick an example where the correlation is as robust as we please. If chocolate-eating and acne were strongly correlated across cultures, and remained strongly correlated for decades or centuries, it probably is not a coincidence. In that case, the fallacy ignores the possibility that there is a common cause of eating chocolate and having acne.
For example:
Ice-cream sales are strongly (and robustly) correlated with crime rates.
Therefore, ice-cream causes crime.
The above argument commits the cum hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy, because in fact the explanation is that high temperatures increase crime rates (presumably by making people irritable) as well as ice-cream sales.
Another observation is that the direction of the causation is wrong and should be the other way around.
For example:
Gun ownership is correlated with crime.
Therefore, gun ownership leads to crime.
The facts could easily be the other way round: increase in crime could lead to more gun ownership with concerned citizens. See: wrong direction.
Another example illustrating this fallacy was a study which found that British arts funding levels had an extremely close correlation with Antarctic penguin populations.
The statement "correlation does not imply causation" notes that it is dangerous to deduce causation from a statistical correlation. If you only have A and B, a correlation between them does not let you infer A causes B, or vice versa, much less 'deduce' the connection. In fact, if you only have these two occurrences, even the most powerful inference techniques built on Bayesian Networks can't help much. But if there was a common cause, and you had that data as well, then often you can establish what the correct structure is. Likewise (and perhaps more usefully) if you have a common effect of two independent causes.
But while often ignored, the advice is often overstated, as if to say there is no way to infer causal structure from statistical data. Clearly we should not conclude that ice-cream causes criminal tendencies (or that criminals prefer ice-cream to other refreshments!), but the previous story shows that we expect the correlation to point us towards the real causal structure. Robust correlations often imply some sort of causal story, whether common cause or something more complicated. Hans Reichenbach suggested the Principle of the Common Cause, which asserts basically that robust correlations have causal explanations, and if there is no causal path from A to B (or vice versa), then there must be a common cause, though possibly a remote one.
Reichenbach's principle is closely tied to the Causal Markov Condition used in Bayesian networks. The theory underlying Bayesian networks sets out conditions under which you can infer causal structure, when you have not only correlations, but also partial correlations. In that case, certain nice things happen. For example, once you consider the temperature, the correlation between ice-cream sales and crime rates vanishes, which is consistent with a common-cause (but not diagnostic of that alone).
In statistics literature this issue is often discussed under the headings of spurious correlation and Simpson's paradox.
David Hume argued that any form of causality cannot be perceived (and therefore cannot be known or proven), and instead we can only perceive correlation. However, we can use the Scientific method to rule out false causes.
An entertaining demonstration of this fallacy once appeared in an episiode of The Simpsons (Season 7, "Much Apu about Nothing"):
Homer: Not a bear in sight. The "Bear Patrol" must be working like a charm!
Lisa: That's specious reasoning, Dad.
Homer: Thank you, dear.
Lisa: By your logic I could claim that this rock keeps tigers away.
Homer: Oh, how does it work?
Lisa: It doesn't work.
Homer: Uh-huh.
Lisa: It's just a stupid rock. But I don't see any tigers around, do you?
Homer: Lisa, I want to buy your rock.
I just read Ferguson's piece--the whole thing. Alas, I can't find any explanation for the suggested relationship bewteen "faith" and "work". Isn't there a formal name for the following fallacy:
1. A has more C than D does.
2. A also has more E than D does.
3. Therefore, A has more E than D does *because* A has more C than D does.
Maybe I'm missing something. Wouldn't be the first time.
(If I weren't so hard at work this Saturday afternoon in early August, I'd probably be able to think about this matter more carefully ...)
Historian Niall Ferguson ably summarizes the familiar data on how much less Europeans work than Americans and then offers a very provocative explanation:
I cannot resist suggesting another possible explanation - one that owes a debt to Weber's famous essay The Protestant Work Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, which he wrote almost exactly a century ago.
Weber believed he had identified a link between the rise of Protestantism and the development of what he called "the spirit of capitalism". I would like to propose a modern version of Weber's theory, namely "The Atheist Sloth Ethic and the Spirit of Collectivism".
The most remarkable thing about the transatlantic divergence in working patterns is that it has coincided almost exactly with a comparable divergence in religiosity.
It's the sort of theory tailormade for somebody with my particular set of biases, so I'm forcing myself to be very skeptical. In any event, do go read the whole thing. It's very well done.
The magazine Christianity Today reports that a British pastor is under police investigation for criticizing Islam. Here's an excerpt from a British news report:
POLICE today launched an investigation into comments by a Norwich religious leader branding Islam "an evil religion".
The Rev Dr Alan Clifford, pastor of Norwich Reformed Church, yesterday told the Evening News he backed the views of BNP leader Nick Griffin, who was shown in a TV documentary telling party members Islam was a "vicious, wicked faith."
His comments sparked outrage among fellow religious leaders and anti-racist groups.
The Evening News was today contacted by the Race Crime Unit of Norfolk police to provide further information about Dr Clifford's comments, after saying they were concerned his remarks could damage "community cohesiveness".
Abraham Eshetu, diversity officer at Norfolk police, said: "We will be investigating the comments made by Mr Clifford."
In addition to the obvious implications this has for religious liberty and freedom of speech, there are serious concerns raised for the social viability of mediating structures (and subsidiarity more generally) when the trump of state power is brought to bear on groups that are perceived to threaten "community cohesiveness."
Amy Welborn has an interesting post, and a link to a good New Republic article (requires registration), relating to the work of Evangelical mission-workers in Africa. The post and the article are relevant to a discussion we had here at MOJ, a few weeks ago, about proselytization and conversions in India.
Here is an interesting article about religious accommodations in the workplace.
A Central Florida woman was fired from her job after eating "unclean" meat and violating a reported company policy that pork and pork products are not permissible on company premises[.] Lina Morales was hired as an administrative assistant at Rising Star -- a Central Florida telecommunications company with strong Muslim ties[.] However, 10 months after being hired by Rising Star, religious differences led to her termination. Morales, who is Catholic, was warned about eating pizza with meat the Muslim faith considered "unclean”[.] She was then fired for eating a bacon, lettuce and tomato sandwich, according to the report.
Evidently, Morales was fired “for refusing to comply with company policy that pork and pork products are not permissible on company premises.”
According to Morales’s lawyer, her firing is “just un-American. . . . It’s a classic case of religious discrimination[.] They have not articulated a single reason other than [a] religious reason behind the policy.”
Putting aside the legal merits of this particular case, the more question I would pose is, “why should ‘they’ have to articulate a ‘single reason other than a religious reason’”? What would be so wrong – so “un-American” – with a regime that permitted Muslim-owned or Muslim-related businesses to require employees – Muslim or not – to respect Muslim dietary laws?
It is correct for a court to say the following: "That the political majority's morality supports challenged legislation does not entail that the legislation is constitutional." This proposition may be what O'Connor was trying to articulate in Lawrence. (Is that too charitable?) In any event, the truth of the proposition is easy to discern. For example, that the political majority's morality condemns interracial marriage does not entail that antimiscegenation legislation is constitutional. The point here is that the political majority's morality may itself be constitutionally offensive.
By contrast, it is incorrect for a court to say the following: "That the political majority's morality is the sole support for challenged legislation entails that the legislation is unconstitutional." I agree with Rick that a court should be embarassed to affirm that proposition.
MOJ readers are probably aware that a trial judge in the State of Washington has ruled that the State must, in accord with its own constitution, recognize same-sex marriages. The trial court's opinion tracks, in many ways, the recent same-sex-marriage decision in Massachusetts. The judge observes, among other things, that prohibiting same-sex marriage does not advance -- but in fact probably undermines -- the State's asserted (and clearly valid) interest in encouraging procreation, promoting stable families, and the "nurturance" of children.
The portion of the opinion that might be of particular interest to MOJ readers rejects the idea that "morality requires it" as a basis for prohibiting same-sex marriage:
"In our pluralistic society, in which church and state are kept scrupulously separate, the moral views of the majority can never provide the sole basis for legislation. [Citing and quoting Justice O'Connor in Lawrence]. [I]t is clear that Americans have differing views as to what morality requires in the definition of marriage. It is not for our secular government to choose between religions and take moral or religious sides in such a debate."
Whatever one thinks about the advisability or morality of same-sex marriage, or even about the legal validity of States' refusal to sanction it, this sort of reasoning is, in my view, depressing, or embarassing, or both. It strikes me as quite mistaken to claim either that (a) the First Amendment means that "the moral views of the majority can never provide the sole basis for legislation" (unless one believes that "moral views" and "religion" are identical) or (b) "secular governments" do not "take sides" in debates about matters about which "Americans have differing views."
Now, I am inclined to think that, given the Supreme Court's recent work, a result like the one reached in this case might be defensible. However, this particular opinion, in my view, is regrettably tedious, ponderous, and self-congratulatory -- but I'd welcome others' views.
I should add, by the way, that I do not understand the trial-court judge to be making anything like the quite different, and much more persuasive, argument that Michael Perry has made, namely, that religious believers sometimes ought to avoid -- for faith-based reasons -- relying on faith-based claims on matters of public policy.
A fair point. I was hoping, however, that you would summarize Outka's argument for the benefit of those of us - and our readers - who are curious (as I genuinely am) but no more.
