Reply to Michael S. Concerning the Death Penalty and the Doctrine of Double Effect

I fear I am beginning to sound like a broken record: Brugger, in his book, answers Michael S.'s question.

Here's my answer.

Assuming, for the sake of discussion, that it is morally forbidden in principle to kill a human being, innocent or not, intentionally, the doctrine of double effect cannot be used to justify capital punishment. This is because, whereas to commit a lethal act of self-defense, or a lethal act of combat, is not necessarily to kill intentionally, to carry out a sentence of death under a system of capital punishment *is* necessarily to kill intentionally. This is true even if one also has other intentions in carrying out the sentence of death.

Consider this: If an act (my act) of self-defense, which I foresee will in all probability be lethal, does not in the end kill the aggressor (who may not be morally culpable; he may be psychotic) but merely disables him, then I can rejoice that he did not die, because my intention was to disable him, not to kill him. Similarly, if an act of combat , which I foresee will in all probability be lethal, does not in the end kill the enemy combatant but merely disables him, then I can rejoice, because my intention was to disable him, not to kill him.

HOWEVER: If an act of carrying out a death sentence (which, of course, I foresee will in all probability be lethal) does not in the end kill the criminal, then I do not rejoice that he did not die; rather, I try again (unless the law forbids it), because my intention, or one of my intentions, was to kill him, and not merely to disable him.

Michael