Reply to Michael Scaperlanda

Michael S. and I must have been posting messages at about the same moment. Actually, I was posting a revised version of my capital punishment message of last week. Please take a look at the revised message, which I drafted after an e-mail conversation with Notre Dame philosophy prof John O'Callaghan, to whom I am grateful.

Now, in response to Michael's questions.

1. As Brugger, in his book, carefully explains, one can sometimes rely on the doctrine of double effect to justify lethal acts of self-defense, lethal acts of combat in war, and the like. This is because one can (and should) engage in such acts without the intent to kill. However, to execute someone under a system of capital punishment is to kill him not merely with foresight, but intentionally. So, one can affirm the principle that it is morally forbidden in principle to kill any human being, innocent or not, without committing oneself to pacifism. As I said, Brugger discusses all this very carefully.

2. To conclude that an act is morally forbidden "in principle" is to conclude that it is morally forbidden for anyone ever to engage in the act, no matter what the circumstances. It would be not merely confusing but deeply confused for the Church or anyone else to teach that an act is morally forbidden in principle but that there may be circumstances--extreme circumstances--in which it would not be morally forbidden for someone to engage in the act.

I want to emphasize that I have not said, in my postings, that I agree--or that I disagree--with the position that it is morally forbidden in principle to kill any human being, innocent or not. I am still struggling to arrive at what I judge to be the most adequate position on capital punishment--the most adequate position, that is, even assuming that a system of capital punishment could be devised that would function perfectly: a system in which no innocent person would be executed, the rich would be just as likely to be executed as the poor, those whose victims are black would be just as likely to be executed as those whose victims are white, and so on.