More Comments on Kalscheur

Like Michael, I appreciate Greg's detailed and helpful thoughts. A few more of my own:

Greg suggests (quite reasonably) -- on the matter of "law getting ahead of opinion", etc. -- distinction between anti-discrimination law and abortion prohibitions. He writes:

"With respect to abortion, while all might agree that there is a basic moral consensus around the fundamental human right to life, whether or not (or at what point) the unborn are entitled to that protection remains the deeply contested moral issue in our society. The law may not be able effectively to call people to be faithful to the correct understanding of the answer to that moral question through a legal prohibition until there is more consensus. Pedagogical means other than legal prohibitions may have to be given priority as the most effective ways to clarify the public conscience on this issue."

I would add -- and I know that Greg is already aware of this -- that, in fact, there is broad consensus that the unborn child should be valued more in law than is the case at present, and that abortion ought to be more regulated than, at present, the Supreme Court permits. So, it would seem that -- but for quite mistaken Supreme Court rulings -- we could, taking to heart Kalscheur's (and St. Thomas's!) arguments, nonetheless employ, as a "pedagogical means", more restrictive abortion laws laws -- even if not, as Greg says, a prohibition -- precisely in order to help create a consensus that coincides with moral truth.

Greg also writes, with respect to my question about Rawls, etc.:

"Murray's work can be read with a Rawlsian public reason slant (see Leslie Griffin's interesting article, Good Catholics Should Be Rawlsian Liberals, 5 Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 297 (1997), but I think my own conclusions run in the same vein as Michael Perry's. In order to be heard in ways that will actually help to shape the public conscience, how the religious voice participates in public discourse is important. Perry is right, I think, to draw on the work of David Hollenbach and David Tracy in arguing that religious symbols and concepts can possess insights and revelatory power that might illuminate experience in an accessible and intelligible way, even for those not sharing a religious faith commitment, through a public dialogue of mutual listening and speaking. . . ."

I also agree with Michael that neither constitutional law nor liberal political morality, properly understood, constrain the use of religiously inspired arguments in public conversation. And, I agree that we might nonetheless -- for prudential, and even religious, reasons -- elect to frame our arguments in ways that are more "accessible." That said, I was not convinced by Leslie Griffin's paper, and believe that Rawlsian liberalism (unlike the value pluralism of, say, Galston or Taylor) is, in the end, unable to respect, welcome, or even tolerate religious commitment. But, as Dennis Miller would say, "I could be wrong."

Thanks again to Greg.

Rick