Legislation, objective morality, and majority rule

Mike points out that it is up to the prudential judgment of the legislator whether or not to restrict behavior based on objective morality. I want to raise a related, but more skeptical line of inquiry: Given that the discernment of morality in the legislative realm is inherently driven by majority rule, shouldn’t that make Catholics leery of appealing to the legislature to adopt a morality-based conception of the common good where such adoption would limit others' ability to pursue contrary conceptions of the good? For those who believe in the moral anthropology’s objective truth, to what extent should their efforts be aimed at persuading their fellow citizens of this truth, as opposed to persuading the legislature to require their fellow citizens to abide by this anthropology whether or not they believe it to be true? Put more particularly, are American Catholics well-served in seeking top-down implementation of the common good on contested moral issues?

Certainly legislation always reflects some sort of moral vision, usually cast in terms of the avoidance of harm. Where the harm's existence is discernible only through the lens of disputed anthropological presumptions, though, legislative initiatives seem more problematic to me. When Catholics ask the legislature to adopt and enforce a particular conception of the common good, my concern is with what happens when the majority’s view of the common good no longer comports with the moral anthropology or perhaps even intrudes on Catholics’ own ability to act consistently with the moral anthropology. In Western Europe, we see that conceptions of the common good are largely up to majority vote. One recent outcome is France’s ban on religious garb in public schools.

So if America is perpetually doomed to follow Europe’s trends, is there an argument that Catholics’ own self-interest compels them, for example, to support, at least instrumentally, the Supreme Court’s morally agnostic reasoning in Lawrence v. Texas? If the majority’s conception of the common good is imposed on gays, what is to prevent a contrary conception from being imposed on Catholics in the future? (After Employment Div. v Smith, I’m not sure the Free Exercise Clause provides an easy answer.) We already see states requiring Catholic employers to cover prescription contraceptives and Catholic health providers to offer abortions. In states adopting school voucher programs, we’ll undoubtedly see a greater effort to secularize Catholic schools. It’s widely agreed among Catholics that they should try to carve out rights-based enclaves from the imposition of the majority’s conception of the common good in these areas, but shouldn’t Catholics be equally hesitant to impose their conception of the common good in areas where the majority’s view currently comports with the moral anthropology? Does the rapidly changing moral landscape suggest that our legislative agenda should reflect a robust moral pluralism, leaving the ultimate questions of the good (and corresponding conduct) to the marketplace of ideas, rather than the trump of government dictates?

Rob