### BY EMAIL AND POST

Senator Brian E. Frosh, Chairman 2 East Miller Senate Bldg. 11 Bladen Street Annapolis, MD 21401-1991

### Re: Religious Liberty Implications of Legalizing Same-Sex Marriage, Senate Bill 241

Dear Chairman Frosh:

We write to urge the Maryland General Assembly to ensure that any proposed bill legalizing same-sex marriage does not infringe the religious liberty of organizations and individuals who have a traditional view of marriage. Maryland's very founding was premised on religious tolerance as evidenced by its Toleration Act of 1648. Providing religious protections in any same-sex marriage bill honors this long and rich tradition.

If the General Assembly legalizes same-sex marriage, it is possible to do so without infringing on religious liberty. The contentious debate in New York, Maine, California and elsewhere surrounding same-sex marriage proves the wisdom of constructive, good-faith attempts both to grant legal recognition to same-sex marriage *and* to protect religious liberty for conscientious objectors.<sup>2</sup>

This letter analyzes the potential effects of same-sex marriage on religious conscience in Maryland and concludes that while the current text of Senate Bill 241 offers far more protections than the failed 2011 legislation, Senate Bill 116, did when introduced, it nonetheless fails to provide specific, much-needed protections for certain actions of religious groups, as well as for individuals. This letter proposes a solution to address possible conflicts: a specific religious liberty protection that should be an integral part of any proposed legislation, clarifying that individuals and organizations may refuse to provide services for a wedding if doing so would violate deeply held beliefs, while ensuring that the refusal creates no substantial hardship for the couple seeking the service. We write not to support or oppose same-sex marriage in Maryland. Rather, our aim is to define a "middle way" to address the needs of same-sex couples while honoring and respecting religious liberty.<sup>3</sup>

As this letter details, the conflicts between same-sex marriage and religious conscience will be both certain and considerable if adequate protections are not provided. Without adequate safeguards, many religious individuals will be forced to engage in conduct that violates their deepest religious beliefs,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Maryland Religious Toleration Act of 1648, *available at*http://religiousfreedom.lib.virginia.edu/sacred/md\_toleration\_1649.html.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> An attached Appendix summarizes the core religious liberty protections afforded by jurisdictions that currently recognize or recently considered enacting same-sex marriage legislation.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> While we have a range of views on the underlying issue of same-sex marriage, we wholeheartedly share the belief that when same-sex marriage is recognized it should be accompanied by corresponding protections for religious liberty.

Senator Brian E. Frosh, Chairman January 31, 2012 Page 2 of 228

and religious organizations will be constrained in crucial aspects of their religious exercise. We urge the Maryland General Assembly to take the time and care to ensure that the legalization of same-sex marriage does not restrict the inalienable right of religious liberty. Doing so is entirely consistent with the text of the Maryland State Constitution that each member of the Legislature has sworn to uphold and protect. From its first constitution in 1776 to the present text, the Maryland Constitution has protected religious freedom in the strongest of terms.<sup>4</sup>

Part A of this letter proposes a specific religious conscience protection that will defuse the vast majority of potential conflicts between same-sex marriage and religious liberty. Part B provides examples of precedent for the protection we propose. Part C details the sorts of legal conflicts that will arise if same-sex marriage is legalized without strong protections for religious liberty. Part D explains the needs for robust religious liberty protections, identifying specific protections for religious conscience now incorporated into Senate Bill 241 and those that continue to be absent. More specifically, Part E outlines the value of Senate Bill 241's protection against government penalty, but notes that it covers some, **but not all** actions that religious organizations may undertake, while Part F urges the General Assembly to include protections in Senate Bill 241 for ordinary individuals in commerce or government employment who adhere to a traditional view of marriage, who now receive **no protections whatsoever**.

## A. Proposed Religious Conscience Protection

The many potential conflicts between same-sex marriage and religious liberty are avoidable.<sup>5</sup> But they are avoidable only if the Maryland General Assembly takes the time and effort to craft the "robust religious-conscience exceptions" to same-sex marriage that leading voices on both sides of the public debate over same-sex marriage are calling for.<sup>6</sup> The juncture for balancing religious liberty and legal recognition of same-sex unions is now.<sup>7</sup>

Any proposed marriage bill can provide reasonable, carefully tailored protections for religious conscience by including a simple "marriage conscience protection" modeled, in part, on existing conscience protections in Maryland's anti-discrimination laws.<sup>8</sup> The "marriage conscience protection" would provide as follows:

<sup>5</sup> See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, University of Virginia Law School, *Afterword* in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS, Douglas Laycock, Anthony R. Picarello, Jr. & Robin Fretwell Wilson, eds. 191-97 (Rowman & Littlefield 2008) (detailing the scope of "avoidable" and "unavoidable" conflicts).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> See, e.g., M.D. CONST., Declaration of Rights, art. 36.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> See David Blankenhorn & Jonathan Rauch, A Reconciliation on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2009, at WK11, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/22/opinion/ 22rauch.html?\_r=1 (arguing for recognition of same-sex unions together with religious conscience protections).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Though conscience protections should also extend to existing civil unions, we do not address civil unions here. We anticipate far fewer conflicts regarding civil unions, since for many conscientious objectors civil unions bear less religious significance than marriage.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> See, e.g., Md. Code. Ann. art. 49B, § 18(2) (2010) (exempting any "religious corporation, association, educational institution or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion or sexual orientation to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution or society of its activities" from the prohibition on discrimination in employment.)

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### (a) Religious organizations protected.

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no religious or denominational organization, no organization operated for charitable or educational purposes which is supervised or controlled by or in connection with a religious organization, and no individual employed by any of the foregoing organizations, while acting in the scope of that employment, shall be required to

- (1) provide services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges for a purpose related to the solemnization or celebration of any marriage; or
- (2) solemnize any marriage; or
- (3) treat as valid any marriage

if such providing, solemnizing, or treating as valid would cause such organizations or individuals to violate their sincerely held religious beliefs.

## (b) Individuals and small businesses protected.

- (1) Except as provided in paragraph (b)(2), no individual, sole proprietor, or small business shall be required to
  - (A) provide goods or services that assist or promote the solemnization or celebration of any marriage, or provide counseling or other services that directly facilitate the perpetuation of any marriage; or
  - (B) provide benefits to any spouse of an employee; or
  - (C) provide housing to any married couple

if providing such goods, services, benefits, or housing would cause such individuals or sole proprietors, or owners of such small businesses, to violate their sincerely held religious beliefs.

## (2) Paragraph (b)(1) shall not apply if

- (A) a party to the marriage is unable to obtain any similar good or services, employment benefits, or housing elsewhere without substantial hardship; or
- (B) in the case of an individual who is a government employee or official, if another government employee or official is not promptly available and willing to provide the requested government service without inconvenience or delay; *provided that* no

judicial officer authorized to solemnize marriages shall be required to solemnize any marriage if to do so would violate the judicial officer's sincerely held religious beliefs.

- (3) A "small business" within the meaning of paragraph (b)(1) is a legal entity other than a natural person
  - (A) that provides services which are primarily performed by an owner of the business; or
  - (B) that has five or fewer employees; or
  - (C) in the case of a legal entity that offers housing for rent, that owns five or fewer units of housing.

## (c) No civil cause of action or other penalties.

No refusal to provide services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges protected by this section shall

- (1) create any civil claim or cause of action; or
- (2) result in any action by the State or any of its subdivisions to penalize or withhold benefits from any protected entity or individual, under any laws of this State or its subdivisions, including but not limited to laws regarding employment discrimination, housing, public accommodations, educational institutions, licensing, government contracts or grants, or tax-exempt status.<sup>9</sup>

This proposed legislation has several important benefits. First, this language parallels existing protections in Maryland's anti-discrimination law for "a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion or sexual orientation to perform work connected with the activities of the religious entity." This language also significantly mirrors, in part, the express protections provided in the New York, Vermont, Connecticut, New Hampshire, and District of Columbia same-sex marriage laws for religious organizations. The laws of all five jurisdictions protect, among other things, the conscientious refusal "to provide services,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Some have expressed concern that the proposed text would permit objections to interracial marriage. Although such objections are likely to be rare, if not non-existent, this concern is readily addressed by a simple proviso that would read: "Notwithstanding any of the foregoing provisions, this section does not change any provision of law with respect to discrimination on the basis of race."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> MD Code, State Government, § 20-604 (2008).

Senator Brian E. Frosh, Chairman January 31, 2012 Page 5 of 228

accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges . . . related to the solemnization of a marriage."  $^{11}$ 

Second, this proposed legislation lists the primary areas of Maryland law where the refusal to treat a marriage as valid is likely to result in liability, penalty, or denial of government benefits ("laws regarding employment discrimination, housing, public accommodations, educational institutions, licensing, government contracts or grants, or tax-exempt status").

Third, this proposed legislation provides protection only when providing services related to a marriage, solemnizing a marriage, or being forced to treat a marriage as valid would "violate . . . sincerely held religious beliefs." This phrase is drawn from numerous court cases discussing the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and ensures that the religious conscience protections will apply only to a "violation" of "sincere" beliefs that are "religious"—not to situations that merely make religious people uncomfortable, not to insincere beliefs asserted as a pretext for discrimination, and not to non-religious moral beliefs.

Fourth, this proposed legislation provides vital protections in subsection (b) for individuals of religiously informed conscience who own sole proprietorships and small businesses. We explain the need for such protection in Parts C and F below.

Finally, this proposed legislation recognizes that religious accommodations might not be without cost for same-sex couples, such as the need to find a different wedding photographer or caterer if their original choice must decline for reasons of conscience. In order to address this issue, subsection (b)(2) ensures that a same-sex couple can obtain the service, even from conscientious objectors, when the inability to find a similar service elsewhere would impose hardship on the couple. But because this hardship exception could force organizations or individuals to violate their religious beliefs, it should be available only in cases of substantial hardship, not mere inconvenience or symbolic harm. The language in subsection (b)(2)(B) also ensures that no government employee or official (such as a county clerk) may act as a choke point on the path to marriage. So, for example, no government employee can refuse on grounds of conscience to issue a marriage license unless another government employee is promptly

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> See N.H. REV. STAT. § 457:37(iii) (2011) (exempting religious organizations from "provid[ing] services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges . . . related to" the "solemnization," "celebration," or "promotion" of a marriage); CONN. PUBLIC ACT NO. 09-13 (2009) §§ 17-19, available http://www.cga.ct.gov/2009/ACT/PA/2009PA-00013-R00SB-00899-PA.htm (exempting religious organizations from "provid[ing] services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods or privileges ... related to" the "solemnization" or "celebration" of a marriage, and providing separate exemptions for religious adoption agencies and fraternal benefit societies); 9 VT. STAT. ANN. § 4502(1) (2011) (exempting religious organizations from "provid[ing] services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges ... related to" the "solemnization" or "celebration" of a marriage); Religious Freedom and Civil Marriage Equality Amendment Act of 18, 2009, effective Mar. 3, 2010), available at 2009, D.C. Law No. L18-0110 (enacted Dec. http://dcclims1.dccouncil.us/images/00001/20091218103236.pdf (exempting religious societies and religiously affiliated non-profits from providing "accommodations, facilities, or goods for a purpose related to the solemnization or celebration of a same-sex marriage, or the promotion of same-sex marriage through religious programs, counseling, courses, or retreats..."); N.Y. DOM. REL. § 10-b(1) (2011) ("a religious entity... benevolent [order] . . . or a not-for-profit corporation operated, supervised, or controlled by a religious corporation . . . shall not be required to provide services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges for the solemnization or celebration of a marriage").

Senator Brian E. Frosh, Chairman January 31, 2012 Page 6 of 228

available and willing to do so. These sorts of override protections are common in other laws protecting the right of conscientious objection, especially in the health care context.<sup>12</sup>

## **B.** Precedent for Religious Conscience Protections

There is ample precedent for the type of conscience protection we have proposed. As noted above, New York, Connecticut, Vermont, New Hampshire, and the District of Columbia have already enacted religious exemptions as part of their same-sex marriage implementation legislation. Similarly, Maryland's existing nondiscrimination laws on employment provide exemptions for religious organizations in certain circumstances. And federal nondiscrimination statutes provide protection for religious and conscientious objectors in many different contexts. In short, protecting religious conscience is very much a part of America's, and Maryland's, tradition. We urge the Maryland General Assembly to continue that "middle way" accommodation of interests.

The religious conscience protection that we have proposed would alleviate the vast majority of the conflicts between same-sex marriage and religious liberty. It has ample precedent in both Maryland and U.S. law. And it represents the best in the American and Maryland tradition of protecting the inalienable right of conscience.

## C. Conflicts Between Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Liberty

In the only book-length comprehensive scholarly work on same-sex marriage and religious liberty, <sup>16</sup> legal scholars on both sides of the same-sex marriage debate agreed that codifying same-sex

<sup>12</sup> See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 146.1 (2005) ("An individual who may lawfully perform, assist, or participate in medical procedures which will result in an abortion shall not be required against that individual's religious beliefs or moral convictions to perform, assist, or participate in such procedures. . . . Abortion does not include medical care which has as its primary purpose the treatment of a serious physical condition requiring emergency medical treatment necessary to save the life of a mother."); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-41-40, -50 (2002) ("No private or non-governmental hospital or clinic shall be required . . . to permit their facilities to be utilized for the performance of abortions; provided, that no hospital or clinic shall refuse an emergency admittance."); Tex. Occ. Code Ann. § 103.004 (Vernon 2004) ("A private hospital or private health care facility is not required to make its facilities available for the performance of abortion unless a physician determines that the life of the mother is immediately endangered.").

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> See note Error! Bookmark not defined. above and Appendix A.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> See M.D. Code, State Government, § 20-604 (stating that it will not be a discriminatory employment practice for "a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion or sexual orientation to perform work connected with the activities of the religious entity").

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> See, e.g., 32 C.F.R. § 1630.11 (accommodating conscientious objectors to military service); 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (accommodating health care professionals who conscientiously object to participating in medical procedures such as abortion or sterilization); 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb *et seq.* (Religious Freedom Restoration Act lifts federal-created burdens on religious exercise).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS, Douglas Laycock, Anthony R. Picarello, Jr. & Robin Fretwell Wilson, eds. (Rowman & Littlefield 2008) (including contributions from both supporters and opponents of same-sex marriage). *See also* Thomas Berg, What Same-Sex-Marriage and Religious-Liberty Claims Have in Common, 5 Nw. J.L. & Soc. Pol'y 206 (2010); Marc D. Stern, *Liberty v. Equality y.* 

Senator Brian E. Frosh, Chairman January 31, 2012 Page 7 of 228

marriage *without* providing robust religious accommodations will create widespread and unnecessary legal conflicts—conflicts that will work a "sea change in American law" and will "reverberate across the legal and religious landscape." The conflicts between religious conscience and same-sex marriage generally take one of two forms. First, if same-sex marriage is legalized without appropriate statutory accommodations, religious organizations and individuals that object to same-sex marriage will face new lawsuits under the state nondiscrimination act and other similar laws. So will many small businesses, which are owned by individual conscientious objectors. Likely lawsuits include claims where:

- o Individuals of conscience, who run a small business, such as wedding photographers, florists, banquet halls, or making wedding cakes in one's home, can be sued under public accommodations laws for refusing to offer their services in connection with a same-sex marriage ceremony.<sup>18</sup>
- Religious summer camps, day care centers, retreat centers, counseling centers, meeting halls, or adoption agencies can be sued under public accommodations laws for refusing to offer their facilities or services to members of a same-sex marriage.
- A church or other religious nonprofit that dismisses an employee, such as an organist or secretary, for entering into a same-sex marriage can be sued under employment discrimination laws that prohibit discrimination on the basis of marital status.<sup>20</sup>

LIBERTY, 5 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL'Y 307 (2010); Robin Fretwell Wilson, Insubstantial Burdens: The Case for Government Employee Exemptions to Same-Sex Marriage Laws, 5 Nw. J. L. & Soc. Pol'y 318 (2010)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> *Id.* Marc Stern, *Same-Sex Marriage and the Churches* at 1 [hereinafter "Stern"]. *See also id.*, Douglas Laycock, University of Virginia Law School, *Afterword* at 191-97 [hereinafter "Laycock"] (detailing the scope of "avoidable" and "unavoidable" conflicts).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> See MD. Code, State Government § 20-304 (making it unlawful for any person to refuse to do business with any other person on the basis of, among other things, "marital status, [or] sexual orientation . . ."); Elane Photography v. Willock, No. D-202-CV-200806632 (N.M. 2d Jud. Dist. Ct.) (filed July 1, 2008) (New Mexico photographer fined for refusing on religious grounds to photograph a same-sex commitment ceremony); Stern at 37-39; see also Issues Brief: Same-Sex Marriage and State Anti-Discrimination Laws at 3-5, available at http://www.becketfund.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/Same-Sex-Marriage-and-State-Anti-Discrimination-Laws-with-Appendices.pdf [hereinafter "Issues Brief"].

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Bernstein v. Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass'n, No. PN34XB-03008 (N.J. Dep't of Law and Public Safety, Notice of Probable Cause issued Dec. 29, 2008) (finding that a Methodist organization likely violated public accommodations law by denying same-sex couples use of its wedding pavilion); Butler v. Adoption Media, 486 F. Supp.2d 1022 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (administrators of Arizona adoption facilitation website found subject to California's public accommodations statute because they refused to post profiles of same-sex couples as potential adoptive parents); see also Stern at 37-39; Robin Fretwell Wilson, A Matter of Conviction: Moral Clashes Over Same-Sex Adoption, 22 BYU J. Pub. L. 475 (2008) (describing clashes over adoptions by same-sex couples).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Stern at 48-52; Issues Brief at 3-5. Maryland's religious exemption from employment discrimination laws does not cover every possible situation. *See* Md. Code. Ann. art. 49B, § 18(2) (2010) (exempting any "religious corporation, association, educational institution or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion or sexual orientation to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution or society of its activities" from the prohibition on discrimination in employment.)

The second form of conflict involving religious organizations and individuals (or the small businesses that they own) that conscientiously object to same-sex marriage is that they will be labeled unlawful "discriminators" under state or municipal laws and thus face a range of penalties at the hand of state agencies and local governments, such as the withdrawal of government contracts or exclusion from government facilities. For example:

- O A religious college, hospital, or social service organization that refuses to provide its employees with same-sex spousal benefits can be denied access to government contracts or grants on the ground that it is engaging in discrimination that contravenes public policy.<sup>21</sup>
- o A religious charity or fraternal organization that opposes same-sex marriage can be denied access to government facilities, such as a lease on government property or participation in a government-sponsored employee charitable campaign.<sup>22</sup>
- O Doctors, psychologists, social workers, counselors, and other professionals who conscientiously object to same-sex marriage can have their licenses revoked.<sup>23</sup>
- Religious fraternal organizations or other nonprofits that object to same-sex marriage can be denied food service licenses, adoption agency licenses, child care licenses, or liquor licenses on the ground that they are engaged in unlawful discrimination.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>21</sup> See, e.g., Code Md. Regs. 21.05.08.07 (2010) (prohibiting public works contractors from discriminating on the basis of, among other things, "marital status, [or] sexual orientation"); see also Catholic Charities of Maine v. City of Portland, 304 F. Supp.2d 77 (D. Me. 2004) (upholding ordinance forcing religious charity either to extend employee spousal benefit programs to registered same-sex couples, or to lose access to all city housing and community development funds); Don Lattin, Charities Balk at Domestic Partner, Open Meeting Laws, S.F. CHRON., July 10, 1998, at A-1 (describing how the Salvation Army lost \$3.5 million in social service contracts with the City of San Francisco because it refused, on religious grounds, to provide benefits to the same-sex partners of its employees).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> See Evans v. City of Berkeley, 38 Cal.4th 1 (Cal. 2006) (affirming revocation of a boat berth subsidy at public marina due to Boy Scouts' exclusion of atheist and openly gay members); Boy Scouts of America v. Wyman, 335 F.3d 80 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that the Boy Scouts may be excluded from the state's employee charitable contributions campaign for denying membership to openly gay individuals).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> See, e.g., MD Code, Health Occupations, § 19-311.16 (giving the Maryland Board of Social Work Examiners the power to "deny a license to any applicant, fine a licensee, reprimand any licensee, place any licensee on probation, or suspend or revoke a license if the applicant or licensee" discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation); Stern at 22-24 (noting that a refusal to provide counseling services to same-sex couples could be "considered a breach of professional standards and therefore grounds for the loss of a professional license"); see also Patricia Wen, "They Cared for the Children": Amid Shifting Social Winds, Catholic Charities Prepares to End Its 103 Years of Finding Homes for Foster Children and Evolving Families, BOSTON GLOBE, June 25, 2006, at A1 (explaining how Massachusetts threatened to revoke the adoption license of Catholic Charities for refusing on religious grounds to place foster children with same-sex couples); Robin Fretwell Wilson, A Matter of Conviction: Moral Clashes Over Same-Sex Adoption, 22 BYU J. Pub. L. 475 (2008) (describing dismissals and resignations of social services workers where conscience protections were not available).

Senator Brian E. Frosh, Chairman January 31, 2012 Page 9 of 228

- Religious colleges or professional schools can have their accreditation revoked for refusing to recognize the validity of same-sex marriages.<sup>25</sup>
- o Church-affiliated organizations can have their tax exempt status stripped because of their conscientious objection to same-sex marriage. <sup>26</sup>

All of these conflicts either did not exist before, or will significantly intensify after, the legalization of same-sex marriage. Thus, legalizing same-sex marriage without adequate protections for religious liberty will have at least two unintended consequences: It will harm religious organizations and individuals of conscience, and it will spawn costly, unnecessary conflicts, many of which will lead to litigation.<sup>27</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> See, e.g., N.J. REV. STAT. § 9:3-40 (forbidding adoption agencies from discriminating in the selection of adoptive parents on the basis of sex or marital status); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 10:122B-1.5 (forbidding foster care, or "resource care," agencies from discriminating against a resource parent applicant on the basis of gender or sexual orientation); see also Stern at 19-22 (noting that many state regulators condition licenses on compliance with nondiscrimination requirements).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> Stern at 23 (describing how religiously affiliated law schools have unsuccessfully challenged diversity standards imposed by the American Bar Association as a condition of accreditation); D. Smith, *Accreditation Committee Decides to Keep Religious Exemption*, 33 MONITOR ON PSYCHOLOGY 1 (Jan. 2002) (describing a proposal of the American Psychology Association to revoke the accreditation of religious colleges and universities that have codes of conduct forbidding homosexual behavior), *available at* <a href="http://www.apa.org/monitor/jan02/exemption.html">http://www.apa.org/monitor/jan02/exemption.html</a>; Ward v. Polite, Nos. 10-2100/2145, \_\_\_ F.3d \_\_\_ (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2012) (January 27, 2012) (student expelled from graduate-level counseling-degree program for expressing religiously grounded objection to counseling a gay client permitted to proceed with lawsuit claiming that she was expelled because of hostility to her speech and religious faith), *available at* <a href="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/12a0024p-06.pdf">http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/12a0024p-06.pdf</a>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> Jill P. Capuzzo, *Group Loses Tax Break Over Gay Union Issue*, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2007 (describing the case of *Bernstein v. Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass'n*, in which New Jersey revoked the property tax exemption of a beach-side pavilion controlled by an historic Methodist organization, because it refused on religious grounds to host a same-sex civil union ceremony); Douglas W. Kmiec, Pepperdine Law School, *Same-Sex Marriage and the Coming Antidiscrimination Campaigns Against Religion* in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS 107-21 (describing attacks on tax exemptions for religious organizations with objections to same-sex marriage); Jonathan Turley, George Washington University Law School, *An Unholy Union* in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS 59-76 (arguing for same-sex marriage but against withdrawal of tax exemptions for religious organizations with conscientious objections).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> Filed lawsuits are often just the tip of the iceberg with respect to conflicts over a given law and a claimed right. Most conflicts get resolved before a suit is filed and comes to the attention of the public. Some employers will back down when suit is threatened. Others will pay a settlement and walk away. Some employers will be quietly "chilled" even though they would prefer another course of action. What matters is the number of conflicts rather than the number of lawsuits. This data is not available, however, and so cannot be empirically studied. Nonetheless, there need only be a few conflicts for there to be a crisis of conscience. Each conflict is a profound violation of religious liberty. Moreover, even assuming that there are a small number of actual conflicts (as some critics claim), then there will be a correspondingly few number of same-sex couples affected by the religious exemptions we recommend. Finally, discrimination lawsuits often increase dramatically over time, so an important question is how many lawsuits against conscientious objectors will be filed 20 years from now. See, e.g., Vivian Berger et al., Summary Judgment Benchmarks for Settling Employment Discrimination Lawsuits, 23 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 45, 45 (2005) ("The number of employment discrimination lawsuits rose continuously throughout the last three decades of the twentieth century. In the federal courts, such filings grew 2000% . . . . ").

### D. The Need for Robust Religious Liberty Protection

Senate Bill 241 adds important protections missing in last year's failed 2011 Senate Bill 116, which contained protections only for the clergy when introduced. Like last year's bill, Senate Bill 241, the Civil Marriage Protection Act, contains ersatz protections for the clergy, who are already protected by the U.S. Constitution. Senate Bill 241 provides in Section 2 that:

That an official of a religious order or body authorized by the rules and customs of that order or body to perform a marriage ceremony may not be required to solemnize or officiate any particular marriage or religious rite of any marriage in violation of the right to free exercise of religion guaranteed by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and by the Maryland Constitution and Maryland Declaration of Rights. Each religious organization, association, or society has exclusive control over its own theological doctrine, policy teachings, and beliefs regarding who may marry within that faith. An official of a religious order or body authorized to join individuals in marriage under § 2–406(a)(2)(i) of the Family Law Article and who fails or refuses to join individuals in marriage is not subject to any fine or other penalty for the failure or refusal.<sup>28</sup>

By its own terms, Section 2 confers on religious organizations protections already guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution and Maryland Constitution. With or without this language, "[n]o one seriously believes that clergy will be forced, or even asked, to perform marriages that are anathema to them." Focusing on the issue of "forced officiating" is entirely unnecessary and a distraction from real situations where religious conscience is at risk.

Unlike the failed 2011 Senate Bill 116 upon introduction, the current bills adds important protections from civil suit or the loss of government benefits for religious organizations that refuse to solemnize or celebrate a same-sex marriage or to promote such marriages in certain narrowly-confined ways.

## Specifically, Section 3 provides that:

- (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a religious organization, association, or society, or any nonprofit institution or organization operated, supervised, or controlled by a religious organization, association, or society, may not be required to provide services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges to an individual if the request for the services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges is related to:
  - (1) the <u>solemnization</u> of a marriage or <u>celebration</u> of a marriage that is in violation of the entity's religious beliefs; or

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> Senate Bill 241 § 2, available at http://mlis.state.md.us/2012rs/bills/sb/sb0241f.pdf.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> Stern at 1.

- (2) the <u>promotion</u> of marriage through any social or religious programs or services, in violation of the entity's religious beliefs, unless State or federal funds are received for that specific program or service.
- (b) A refusal by an entity described in subsection (a) of this section, or of any individual who is employed by an entity described in subsection (a) of this section, to provide services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges in accordance with subsection (a) of this section may not create a civil claim or cause of action or result in any State action to penalize, withhold benefits from, or discriminate against the entity or individual.
- (c) Nothing in this Act shall be deemed or construed to prohibit any religious organization, association, or society, or any nonprofit institution or organization operated, supervised, or controlled by a religious organization, association, or society from limiting admission to or giving preferences to individuals of the same religion or denomination when otherwise permitted by law.

Section 4 provides companion protections to "fraternal benefit societ[ies] described in § 8–402 of the Insurance Article that [are] operated, supervised, or controlled by a religious organization." Such societies "may not be required to admit an individual as a member or to provide insurance benefits to an individual if to do so would violate the society's religious beliefs," and any such refusal "may not create a civil claim or cause of action or constitute the basis for the 3 withholding of governmental benefits or services from the fraternal benefit society."

As the following Parts explains in more detail, although these sections provide important protections, what they leave out is considerable:

- o Senate Bill 241 provides no protection to religious organizations from the loss of government benefits for refusing to **recognize** a same-sex marriage, confining its protections narrowly to solemnization, celebration, and promotion of marriage through social services and religious programs that do not receive government funds.
- o Senate Bill 241 provides **no protection whatsoever** for individual objectors in the stream of commerce or government positions.

## E. Senate Bill 241 Offers Limited Protection from Government Penalty

A good deal of misunderstanding surrounds religious liberty exemptions. Exemptions serve the important function of protecting conscientious objectors from private lawsuits. But exemptions also serve the purpose of insulating conscientious objectors from penalties at the hands of the government.<sup>30</sup> How might this occur?

An objector may be penalized by losing access to government grant programs or other state or local benefits. Thus, in *Catholic Charities of Maine v. City of Portland*, the district court upheld a

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> Robin Fretwell Wilson, *Matters of Conscience: Lessons for Same-Sex Marriage from the Healthcare Context in* SAME SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS at 81.

Senator Brian E. Frosh, Chairman January 31, 2012 Page 12 of 228

Portland ordinance that forced a religious charity either to extend employee spousal benefits to registered same-sex couples, or to lose eligibility to all city housing and community development funds. Similarly, the Salvation Army lost \$3.5 million in social service contracts with the City of San Francisco because it refused, on religious grounds, to provide benefits to the same-sex partners of its employees. The Boy Scouts of America have litigated, *and lost*, numerous suits over a state's authority to deny them access to benefits that others receive, when the law was otherwise silent. 33

Church-affiliated organizations have lost their exemption from taxes as well. In New Jersey, the Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Association, a group owned and operated by an historic Methodist organization, refused on religious grounds to host the same-sex civil union ceremonies of two lesbian couples in its beach-side pavilion. Local authorities stripped the group of their exemption from local property taxes, and billed them for \$20,000. The same stripped the group of their exemption from local property taxes.

These results are possible because of the United States Supreme Court's decision in *Employment Division v. Smith*, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (concluding that neutral and generally applicable laws do not violate the First Amendment no matter how much they burden an individual's or organization's exercise of religion). These outcomes demonstrate our point: legislative relief is needed to protect religious conscience.

Some exemption opponents argue that *Ocean Grove* is irrelevant to the same-sex marriage debate because the tax exemption at issue was conditioned upon the Camp Meeting Association's willingness to open the property for the entire public. This argument, however, overlooks two points. First, while the tax exemption in *Ocean Grove* was based on an open-space requirement, nothing stops governments from conditioning tax exemptions on other things, such as compliance with state and local anti-discrimination laws or, more generally, being organized for the "public interest." *Bob Jones Univ. v. United States*, 461 U.S. 574, 592 (1983). Thus, just as governments can strip a tax exemption because an organization cannot in good conscience open its property to the entire public, so also governments can strip a tax exemption because it concludes that an organization's conscientious objection to same-sex marriage violates anti-discrimination laws or "public policy" more generally. Second, when the Camp Meeting Association agreed to open its property to the entire public, it likely never contemplated the legalization of civil unions or same-sex marriage, much less that it would be asked to facilitate such a marriage in violation of its religious beliefs. *Ocean Grove* thus illustrates the fact that legalizing same-sex marriage will create significant conflicts of conscience that were never contemplated before.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> 304 F. Supp. 2d 77 (D. Me. 2004); *see also* footnote 21 above.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> See Don Lattin, Charities Balk at Domestic Partner, Open Meeting Laws, S.F. CHRON., July 10, 1998, at A-1.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> See Evans v. City of Berkeley, 38 Cal.4th 1 (Cal. 2006) (affirming revocation of a boat berth subsidy at public marina due to Boy Scouts' exclusion of atheist and openly gay members); Cradle of Liberty Council v. City of Philadelphia, 2008 WL 4399025 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 25, 2008) (city terminated a lease with the Boy Scouts based on the Boy Scouts' policies regarding homosexual conduct); Boy Scouts of America v. Wyman, 335 F.3d 80 (2nd Cir. 2003) (holding that the Boy Scouts may be excluded from the state's workplace charitable contributions campaign for denying membership to openly gay individuals).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> Jill P. Capuzzo, Group Loses Tax Break Over Gay Union Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2007 (describing the case of *Bernstein v. Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass'n*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> See Bill Bowman, \$20G Due in Tax on Boardwalk Pavilion: Exemption Lifted in Rights Dispute, ASBURY PARK PRESS, Feb. 23, 2008.

Senator Brian E. Frosh, Chairman January 31, 2012 Page 13 of 228

The Camp Meeting Association did not just lose its tax exemption. It was also investigated by the New Jersey Department of Civil Rights for an alleged violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination. In fact, an administrative law judge ultimately found that Camp Meeting Association had violated New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination "when it refused to conduct a civil-union ceremony for" same-sex couples. Thus, the case is not only about losing tax exempt status, but also about being penalized for allegedly violating state anti-discrimination laws. The case is not only about losing tax exempt status, but also about being penalized for allegedly violating state anti-discrimination laws.

These impacts on church-affiliated organizations, predicted by scholars, <sup>38</sup> did not result from statutory revocations of tax-exempt status in civil union legislation. Instead, these actions occurred because state law offered no explicit exemption providing otherwise. These experiences drive home the need for explicit protection from penalties by the government.<sup>39</sup>

Maryland law prohibits discrimination based on, among other things, marital status, sex, and sexual orientation. Such discrimination is prohibited in a variety of areas—including employment, housing, 40 and public accommodations 43—with only very narrow, if any, exemptions for religious organizations. 41

The Administrative Law Judge who ultimately heard the case determined that the association "was renting space at the Pavilion for weddings, an activity largely detached from associational expression or speech," had rented "wedding space to heterosexual couples irrespective of their tradition," and had never "inquire[d] into religious beliefs or practice because it did not sponsor, or otherwise control, these weddings," and thus the association had violated New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination "when it refused to conduct a civil-union ceremony for" a same-sex couple. *Bernstein v. Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass'n*, O.A.L. Dkt. No. CRT 6145-09, at 6 (Jan. 12, 2012).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> As the Third Circuit explained, "The federal complaint arose out of the DCR's investigation into whether the Association's refusal to permit couples to use the Boardwalk Pavilion for civil unions violates the LAD. Clearly, therefore, New Jersey's interest in eliminating unlawful discrimination is at the center of this dispute." *Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass'n of United Methodist Church v. Vespa-Papaleo*, 339 Fed.Appx. 232, 238 (3rd Cir. 2009).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup> Douglas W. Kmiec, Pepperdine Law School, *Same-Sex Marriage and the Coming Antidiscrimination Campaigns Against Religion* in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS 107-21 (describing attacks on tax exemptions for religious organizations with objections to same-sex marriage); Jonathan Turley, George Washington University Law School, *An Unholy Union* in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS 59-76 (arguing for same-sex marriage but against withdrawal of tax exemptions for religious organizations with conscientious objections).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup> To make matters worse, Maryland is one of only a handful of states that have both interpreted their state constitutional religious freedom protections narrowly and have declined to pass a state Religious Freedom Restoration Act. *See* State Religious Freedom Map, *available at* <a href="http://law.ucla.edu/volokh/religionmap.jpg">http://law.ucla.edu/volokh/religionmap.jpg</a> (listing New Jersey, Oregon, and Tennessee as the other similar states). Thus, religious objectors receive no generally available protection from state law and must instead rely on the narrow protections of the federal constitution under *Employment Division v. Smith*, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). *See* footnote 33 above.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> Md. Code, State Government, § 20-606 (2010).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup> Md. Code, State Government, § 20-707 (2010).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup> Md. Code, State Government, § 20-302 (2010).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> See footnote 8 above.

To its credit, Senate Bill 241 allows refusals to provide certain "services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges" if related to the "**solemnization**" or "**celebration**" of a marriage or "the **promotion** of marriage through any social or religious programs or services, in violation of the entity's religious beliefs" so long as the latter receives no government funding.

However, the terms "solemnization" and "celebration" have temporal connotations closely tied in time to the marriage ceremony itself—and presumably do not reach activities that would require a religious organization to "**recognize**" a couple's marriage long after the marriage's solemnization. Yet, experiences teaches us that the real protection that religious organizations need from government penalty is for the decision not to recognize a marriage that violates the organization's own religious beliefs—not the decision not to solemnize or celebrate it.<sup>42</sup>

Senate Bill 241 does exempt "the **promotion** of marriage through any social or religious programs or services" that receives no government funding. This presumably would cover marriage counseling services and marriage retreats, as other States explicitly do,<sup>43</sup> but presumably would not encompass married student housing or the decision to limit spousal benefits only to employees in marriages recognized by the organization's faith tradition.

Neither would Senate Bill 241 allow most faith-based foster care services to continue to provide services in accord with their religious convictions, since those services are disproportionately funded with government dollars. He refusal to provide an exemption for such services has resulted elsewhere in tangible losses for religious organizations and perhaps also the public. In February 2010, the Archdiocese of Washington, D.C., ended its eighty-year-old foster care placement program because it could not, consistent with its religious tenets, approve same-sex couples for placement after D.C.'s enacted same-sex marriage. The provide are services are disproportionately funded with government dollars. The refusal to provide an exemption for such services has resulted elsewhere in tangible losses for religious organizations and perhaps also the public. In February 2010, the Archdiocese of Washington, D.C., ended its eighty-year-old foster care placement program because it could not, consistent with its religious tenets, approve same-sex couples for placement after D.C.'s enacted same-sex marriage.

<sup>44</sup> See Roseana Bess, et. al, The Cost of Protecting Vulnerable Children III What Factors Affect States' Fiscal Decisions?, The Urban Institute (2002) available at <a href="http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/310596\_OP61.pdf">http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/310596\_OP61.pdf</a> (last visited Jan. 30, 2012) ("Of the \$20 billion in government funds spent on child welfare services for fiscal year 2000, federal funds totaled \$9.9 billion, states \$7.9 billion, and local funds \$2.2 billion.").

Catholic Charities provides an instructive example. In fiscal year 2007, Catholic Charities USA reported \$24,287,146 in revenue. *See* CharityNavigator.org, Catholic Charities USA,http://www.charitynavigator.org/index.cfm?bay=search.summary&orgid=10656 (last visited Aug. 15, 2010). "Approximately 65 percent of [this] revenue [came] from government contracts." Jacqueline L. Salmon, *Government Cutbacks Leave Faith-Based Services Hurting*, Wash. Post, Feb. 20, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/19/AR2009021903512.html.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup> See Catholic Charities of Maine v. City of Portland, supra note 31.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup> See Appendix A.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>45</sup> See Michelle Boorstein, Citing Same-Sex Marriage Bill, Washington Archdiocese Ends Foster-Care Program, Wash. Post, Feb. 17, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dvn/content/article/2010/02/16/AR2010021604899.html.

Senator Brian E. Frosh, Chairman January 31, 2012 Page 15 of 228

Importantly, Senate Bill 241's "savings" clause, Section 3(c), does not appear to save or accommodate such actions, <sup>46</sup> although other states recognizing same-sex marriage have provided explicit protections for some of these activities, like housing. <sup>47</sup>

While we believe the model conscience protection contained Part A exhaustively addresses each of these areas of concern, the majority of the collisions described in this Part can be prevented by adding five words to the protections in Section 3 (1): "or recognition of a marriage."

## F. Senate Bill 241 Omits Needed Protection for Individual Objectors

Legal recognition of same-sex marriage can also place a real burden on *individuals* whose objection arises not from anti-gay animus, but from a sincere religious belief in traditional marriage. Senate Bill 241 provides no protections whatsoever for ordinary individuals (other than employees of religious organizations), who may be subject to suit under Maryland's anti-discrimination laws.

Without exemptions for individuals who, for religious reasons, prefer to step aside from same-sex marriage ceremonies, a religious individual who runs a small business making wedding cakes in her home, a wedding photographer, a caterer, a florist, a reception hall owner, a seamstress, or a tailor, receives no protection at all. The failure to protect such individuals puts the individual to a cruel choice: your conscience or your livelihood.

Some assume that any religious objection to same-sex marriage must be an objection to providing goods or services to gays as such: in other words, that a refusal represents animus towards gay couples. Yet many people of good will view marriage as a religious institution and the wedding ceremony as a

<sup>46</sup> See Senate Bill 241 § 3(c), in Part D supra. For example, Maryland's law on Housing Discrimination makes it unlawful for "[a] person whose business includes engaging in residential real estate-related transactions [to] discriminate against any person in making available a transaction, or in the terms or conditions of a transaction, because of race, color, religion, sex, disability, marital status, familial status, sexual orientation, or national origin," but it exempts for "discrimination on the basis of sex, sexual orientation, or marital status," "(i) the rental of rooms in any dwelling, if the owner maintains the dwelling as the owner's principal residence; or (ii) the rental of any apartment in a dwelling that contains not more than five rental units, if the owner maintains the dwelling as the

owner's principal residence." Md. Code, State Government, §20-704(a)(2).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>47</sup> See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann § 457:37(3) (expressly protecting religious organizations from "the promotion of marriage through ... housing designated for married individuals"); N.Y. Dom. Rel. § 10-b (2) ("... [N]othing in this article shall limit or diminish the right, ... of any religious or denominational institution or organization, or any organization operated for charitable or educational purposes, which is operated, supervised or controlled by or in connection with a religious organization to limit employment or sales or rental of housing accommodations or admission to or give preference to persons of the same religion or denomination...") in Appendix A.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>48</sup> See Elane Photography v. Willock, No. D-202-CV-200806632 (N.M. 2d Jud. Dist. Ct) (filed Jul. 1, 2008) (New Mexico photographer fined for refusing on religious grounds to photograph a same-sex commitment ceremony).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>49</sup> Robin Fretwell Wilson, *A Matter of Conviction: Moral Clashes Over Same-Sex Adoption*, 22 BYU J. Pub. L. 475 (2008) (describing dismissals and resignations of social service workers where conscience protections were not provided).

Senator Brian E. Frosh, Chairman January 31, 2012 Page 16 of 228

religious sacrament. For them, assisting with a marriage ceremony has religious significance that commercial services, like serving burgers and driving taxis, simply do not. They have no objection generally to providing services, but they object to directly facilitating a marriage.

In short, statutes enacted years ago now take on a whole new level of significance, with a much greater need for religious exemptions. Any Marriage Bill that provides no protection to individual objectors (other than authorized celebrants, who are already protected by the Constitution) would effectively leave any individual who refuses to assist with same-sex wedding ceremonies open to suit, whether framed as sexual-orientation discrimination, sex discrimination, or, where applicable, marital-status discrimination. <sup>50</sup>

Of course, accommodating individual objectors might not be without cost for same-sex couples. Thus, we argue only for "hardship exemptions"—exemptions that are available only when there is no substantial hardship on same-sex couples.<sup>51</sup>

## Conclusion

Without adequate safeguards for religious liberty of the sort proposed in this letter, the recognition of same-sex marriage will lead to socially divisive and entirely unnecessary conflicts between same-sex marriage and religious liberty. That is a needless and destructive path where both sides lose. There is a balanced "middle way." The Maryland General Assembly should avoid either extreme and be the peacemaker.

There is no doubt that the denial of Levenson's request that Sears be made a beneficiary of his federal benefits violated the EDR Plan's prohibition on discrimination based on sex or sexual orientation. Levenson was unable to make his spouse a beneficiary of his federal benefits due solely to his spouse's sex. If Sears were female, or if Levenson himself were female, Levenson would be able to add Sears as a beneficiary. Thus, the denial of benefits at issue here was sexbased and can be understood as a violation of the EDR Plan's prohibition of sex discrimination.

See also In re Golinski, 2009 WL 2222884 at \*3 (9th Cir. Jan. 13, 2009) (Order of Kozinski, C.J.) (construing Ninth Circuit benefits policy to include same-sex spouses because denial of benefits to same-sex spouses raised difficult constitutional questions regarding sex discrimination and sexual-orientation discrimination); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (plurality op.) (discrimination by state against same-sex marriage was form of sex-based discrimination); In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 436-40 (Cal. 2008) (same-sex marriage proponents pursued gender discrimination claims ultimately rejected by court); cf. WIS. STAT. § 111.36(1)(d) (defining sexual-orientation discrimination as a form of gender discrimination).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>50</sup> Refusals to provide benefits to same-sex partners have been invalidated in other jurisdictions as a form of gender or sex discrimination. For instance, in *In re Levenson*, 560 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 2009) (Order of Reinhardt, J.), the court found an employer's denial of coverage for an employee's same-sex partner under the company's employment benefits plan to be sex discrimination. As Judge Reinhardt explained:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>51</sup> See Part A above.

Senator Brian E. Frosh, Chairman January 31, 2012 Page 17 of 228

On that note, we would welcome any opportunity to provide further information, analysis, or testimony to the General Assembly.

## Respectfully yours,<sup>52</sup>

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 $<sup>^{52}</sup>$  Academic and organizational affiliation is indicated for identification purposes only. The universities and organizations that employ the signers take no position on this or any other bill.

# **Appendix**

Core Religious Liberty Protections Enacted Elsewhere	Senate Bill 241
All jurisdictions (New York, New Hampshire, Vermont, Connecticut, and the District of Columbia) expressly allow a religiously-affiliated group to refuse to "provide services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges for the solemnization or celebration of a marriage." N.Y. Dom. Rel. § 10-b (1). See also VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 8 § 4502(1); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:37(III); D.C. Code § 46-406(e) (covering "services, accommodations, facilities, or goods"); 2009 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 09-13, § 17.	Protected in Section 3(a)(1)
All jurisdictions (New York, Connecticut, District of Columbia, New York and Vermont) <b>expressly</b> insulate covered religious objectors from <b>private suit.</b> (Vt. Stat. Ann. Tit. 8 § 4502(1); 2009 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 09-13, § 19; D.C. Code § 46-406(e); N.Y. Dom. Rel. § 10-b (1).	Protected in Section 3(b)
Four <b>expressly</b> protect religious objectors, including religiously affiliated <b>nonprofit organization</b> , from being <b>"penalize[d]"</b> by the government for such refusals, say, for example, through the loss of governments grants. D.C. Code § 46-406(e)(2). <i>See also</i> 2009 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 09-13, § 17; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 457:37(III)); N.Y. Dom. Rel. § 10-b (1).	Protected in Section 3(b) for refusals to solemnize, celebrate or promote marriage through government-funded programs
Two jurisdictions (District of Columbia and New Hampshire) <b>expressly</b> protect religious organizations from "the promotion of same-sex marriage through religious programs, counseling, courses, or retreats, that is in violation of the religious society's beliefs." D.C. Code § 46-406(e) (2011)). <i>See also</i> N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann § 457:37(3) (exempting "the promotion of marriage through <b>religious counseling</b> , programs, courses, retreats, or housing designated for married individuals"). <b>New York</b> may protect this. <i>See</i> N.Y. Dom. Rel. § 10-b (2) (" nothing in this article shall limit or diminish the right, of any religious or denominational institution or organization, or any organization operated for charitable or educational purposes, which is operated, supervised or controlled by or in connection with a religious organization from taking such action as is calculated by such organization to promote the religious principles for which it is established or maintained").	Protected in Section 3(a)(2) so long as the program receives no government funding
Two jurisdictions (New Hampshire and New York) <b>expressly</b> protect religious organizations from "the promotion of marriage through <b>housing</b> designated for married	Silent

individuals." N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann § 457:37(3). See also N.Y. Dom. Rel. § 10-b (2) (" [N]othing in this article shall limit or diminish the right, of any religious or denominational institution or organization, or any organization operated for charitable or educational purposes, which is operated, supervised or controlled by or in connection with a religious organization to limit employment or sales or <b>rental of housing accommodations</b> or admission to or give preference to persons of the same religion or denomination").	
Two states (Vermont and New Hampshire) expressly allow religiously-affiliated fraternal organizations, like the Knights of Columbus, expressly to <b>limit insurance coverage</b> to spouses in traditional marriages. <i>See</i> VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 8 § 4501(b); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:37(IV) (2009).	Protected in Section 4
One state (Connecticut) <b>expressly</b> allows a religiously-affiliated <b>adoption or foster care agency</b> to place children only with heterosexual married couples so long as they don't get any government funding. (Conn. Pub. Acts No. 09-13 § 19).	Protected in Section 3(a)(2) so long as the program receives no government funding
Two states (New Hampshire and New York) <b>expressly</b> exempt <b>individual employees</b> "being managed, directed, or supervised by or in conjunction with" a covered from celebrating same-sex marriages if doing so would violate "religious beliefs and faith." N.Y. Dom. Rel. § 10-b (1). <i>See also</i> N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 457:37(III).	Protected in Section 3(b)